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FORWARD
This thesis was written during the Conservative administration of 1992-1997, and reference to the 
Government unless otherwise stated, refers to that Government's administration.
The importance of declaring this, is to discern the difference in attitude from the current administration on 
issues such as worker representation on corporate boards, the issue of corporate regulation in the City and 
the involvement of shareholders in management.
All of these areas may yet prove not to have any discernible difference in attitude or policy, as pressures 
from the different groups within the corporate nexus, exert themselves, in persuading any government to 
protect their interests as a priority.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The advent of popular capitalism has initiated many debates surrounding the role of the 
corporations and their officers both in the UK and the international community. In particular, 
the relationship of the director with his shareholders, creditors, employees and the broader 
community have been subject to greater scrutiny. This has developed the concept of the 
"director corporation" and redefined their role and objective in relating to all the nexus groups 
within and without the corporation. The objective of each nexus group will invariably differ 
and even involve conflict with others in the same corporate entity. The role of the law in 
formulating new standards of directors' duties and creating general objectives for the 
corporation is to seek to balance all interests within the corporate nexus.
Insolvency law in England and Wales has been harnessed to achieve some progress in raising 
standards of director behaviour. With its unique evolution English insolvency law is seen not 
just as an efficient means of liquidating company assets. It is also a basis for providing the 
commercial world with legal devices which 'punish' those in that community who fall short of 
the standard of care demanded by the ever broadening shareholder base. The position is 
clarified by Peter Totty, a partner in Alien & Overy who, commenting on the Insolvency 
Service stated:
"Insolvency law... underpins all commercial law."'
In the far reaching legislative reform programmes illustrated in the Companies Acts 1985, 
1989 the Insolvency Acts 1986, 1994, The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and
"Promised Land for Debtors" The Times. December 2nd 1993
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the Royal Commission Report which led to the Acts2 the importance of policing directors and 
of developing their duties becomes increasingly apparent.
The objective of this thesis is to analyse and explain the reasons for the particular development 
of section 214 IA 1986 and the broadening of its remit in the area of governance. In this 
respect I shall attempt to place in perspective its ability to act as a policing measure against the 
misconduct of directors in a society which is increasingly characterised by mass incorporation 
of business and the establishment of an entrepreneurial ethos.
In analysing the role of the Insolvency Act and related legislation in affecting the development 
of directors duties, there is a need to consider the reaction of society to insolvency, and 
whether this is reflected consistently in the provisions of insolvency law. In particular the 
effects which the legislation has relation to personal liability in this area of insolvency and its 
inception as the vanguard of commercial morality will be viewed and the problems that have 
been encountered on its application in the courts.
The importance of corporate law as an expression of the values which society deems 
acceptable in the process of making profit underpins the idea that the area cannot be viewed in 
the abstract but rather as an expression of the close relationship between the company and 
society. Corporate law not only affects the individual, in that the individual is a shareholder or 
creditor of the company but also indicates the aspirations of society towards profit and the 
accepted methods of achieving that profit3 . This factor has magnified in importance as the 
number of people in society who are affected directly or indirectly by management decisions 
in large listed corporations continues to grow.
2 Insolvency Law and Practice - Report of the Review Committee (The Cork Report) (Cmnd 
8558) 1982 chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork.
3 Parkinson : Corporate Power and Responsibility, Chapter One.Oxford Clarendon Press. 1993.
Introduction
In this context, the growth in the expectations of the director will also be considered. The 
common law standard of care illustrated in the case of Re Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. 4 , 
has been superceded by statutory development5 . However, the capability of this statutory 
response can be measured only by its grasp of the growth in power of the director in the 
context of him receiving greater autonomy from the articles of association, and from the 
incapability of the shareholder to act as an effective check on the directors powers.
The recent development of English company law has a tradition of being conscious of the new 
parameters and controls of its foreign competitors. The effectiveness of commerce to remain 
competitive is an integral part of the regulations which affect our corporations. It is therefore 
appropriate that the approach of European competitors and other advanced trading nations are 
analysed to see if their proposals and laws relating to directors' duties are more effective as a 
policing measure generally, and more sensitive to the changes in the economic and power 
structures of the company. Important here is judging whether their developments are sensitive 
to the needs of the corporate form which in fact, if not in law is a very eclectic institution 
covering many differing economic areas, different sizes and resources.
Remedial action in Britain to weaknesses within the corporate structure can only be attained 
once those weaknesses are identified. Such weaknesses were illustrated in the developments of 
the Queen Moat Hotels Co.6 The case indicated the weaknesses of the law to ensure that, as 
the company grows, and thus has the capacity to incur increasing amounts of debt, there are 
sufficient restrictions on the company to ensure that any such debts are protected and that this 
can be effectively achieved by independent observation of the company, and in particular 
Board activity.
4 [1925] Ch 407 (Chancery Division). See post Chapter 7.
5 In particular Section 214 Insolvency Act 1986. See Chapter 2 & 3.
6 See post Chapter 7. The weaknesses illustrated in the structure of the company were 
reviewed inter alia, Patrick Weever "QMH: anatomy of the crash" The Telegraph 27 th 
February 1994.
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Connected with the perceived weakness of the current corporate structure is the objective of 
ensuring that the directors employ effective measures of communicating with others in the 
corporate nexus who will make an important contribution to company policy. In achieving this 
the directors ensure that the company distribute the correct information about its performance 
to the shareholders, auditors, creditors and even employees.
A new ethos of professionalism amongst the personnel of companies has to be established as 
an indication that directors and others understand the gravity of their position as trustees of 
often large amounts of money belonging to the small investors, and of the importance attached 
by society to the privilege afforded to the company in the form of limited liability. In 
particular, the role of the institutional investors who act on behalf of the general public in the 
form of pension funds and savings plans will be analysed to assess what factors determine the 
effectiveness of their monitoring, and indeed if the law goes far enough in requiring them to 
participate actively in the policing of directors.
The Insolvency Service plays an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of the law's 
application in the area of director policing and in ensuring objective standards of corporate 
management. Its structure, and ability, is central to the success of commercial policing, so this 
thesis will look at the current performance of the service and suggest reforms which will meet 
the needs of the commercial community. The ambit of this service is considerable both as an 
administrator of insolvency winding-up procedure, and as a protector of commercial morals.
Despite the rapid problems caused by the growth of small business ventures and the on-set of 
the last recession, the service has been required to keep the same standards of vigilance over 
the commercial community. This undoubtedly affects the service's ability to keep control of 
the delinquent actions of many corporate directors as financial constraints preclude effective 
action based on an already controversial area of law7 .
7 See post Chapter 6.
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As an integral appreciation of the effectiveness of the service in achieving its aims, it will be 
essential to view the commercial community's attitude to the service, and the Government 
response to the increased pressures with which the service is now confronted.
The growth in public subscription has led to greater interest in the activities of the directors 
and officers of the large public companies. The effect this has had on the general expectation 
of the director indicates that there is an ever increasing danger of an expectation gap between 
the public's perception of what is acceptable behaviour for the director and his liabilities and 
responsibilities in law and in practice. Indeed the interpretation of the court of those measures 
designed to prevent malpractice, can be seen as compromising standards of behaviour which 
the public would wish to see maintained by the director.
To illustrate the difficulty in the relationship between the law and the insolvency service, it is 
appropriate to analyse the concept and ramifications of wrongful trading, and how it has been 
interpreted and applied by the judiciary. This analysis is placed in a political context, which 
illustrates a more general attitude to governance, from Government and society.
The debate concerning the effectiveness of the insolvency provisions as an integral part of the 
broader question of governance, can be further understood, by appreciating those 
characteristics within the UK which sets the question of governance apart from other European 
countries whose history and economic structures have led to a metamorphosis in the 
expectations of the corporation from profit maker to good citizen, broadening the corporation's 
objectives. For this reason, the German and French systems of corporate structure will be 
assessed, as will the general objectives of the European and international community on the 
part played by the different nations in ensuring effective governance without intimidating the 
enterprise spirit.
Finally, it is important to measure the expectation of directors towards their future role in the 
corporation. Here, the advent of creating greater legal standards for the directors will involve
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training and an appreciation that the skills of the director will be assessed in part by the size of 
the corporation he governs and the expectation of those for whom he is acting.
In this respect the role of the director mirroring the role of the corporation will be subjective, 
yet this will be within the remit of an objective standard. To clarify the position for the 
director it will be advocated that an increase in the different types of corporation in law will 
reflect the various types of corporations which in fact, if not in law, exist. The result will be 
an incremental development of the corporation defined by statute which will refine both the 
judiciary's interpretation of what constitutes a director's duties and those non-statutory 
regulations which have increased in importance in post war company law.
CHAPTER 2
THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
MODERN INSOLVENCY LAW
The pragmatic development of English insolvency law, has created a multiplicity of objectives 
which are now encapsulated in two major legislative provisions, the Insolvency Act 1986 
together with the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and the Financial Services Act 
1986. These Acts have initiated new concepts to try and eliminate the flagrant abuse of limited 
liability, and to recognise that the role of the director is now far beyond that of trustee for the 
company, and that the practical application of the modern director's powers and 
responsibilities have lead to the creation of a 'managerial autonomy'. These Acts illustrate the 
pervading underlying philosophy of English insolvency law, which was summed up in The 
Cork Report (Cmnd 8558), 1982 :
"Insolvency law, is treated by the trading community as an important instrument 
in the process of debt recovery, the threat or imminence of insolvency 
proceedings as a weapon for persuading a defaulting debtor to pay or make 
proposals for the settlement of a debt cannot be underestimated as it institutes in 
the majority of cases, the sanction of last resort for the enforcement of 
obligation." '
Insolvency laws, through their investigative processes, are the means by which the demands of 
commercial morality are met; any disciplinary measures against the debtor which may appear 
necessary in the light of this investigation process can be imposed either inside the insolvency 
proceedings themselves, or outside for example, by the machinery of the criminal law or by 
professional disciplinary bodies2 .
1 Insolvency Law and Practice - Report of the Review Committee. Cmnd 8558, Chapter 4, 
para 235 (a) and (b).
2 Ibid.
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The emphasis on insolvency law and procedure as a means of establishing a code of practice 
for company directors, gives English insolvency law the peculiar idiosyncrasy of creating 
standards for corporate governance, at a time when the company is facing possible extinction, 
through the use of the Administration Order, or more likely through liquidation.
The need for the reforms, set out in the two Acts, stems from the fact that before their 
initiation, insolvency in England and Wales was dealt with by a,
"Plurality of statutes and statutory instruments of widely varying vintages, with 
the relevant case law in a similarly fragmented and chaotic state. "3
One of the major problems with the law as it existed, was its lack of any firm principles to 
which the courts could be faithful. The law progressed in a piecemeal fashion, which by the 
mid twentieth century no longer provided a satisfactory solution to many of the problems 
inherent in insolvency proceedings4.
In particular, the problem arose concerning voluntary liquidation. Often, the liquidator would 
be a "director's friend" who would not be vigilant in his search for evidence relating to 
corporate mismanagement. The net result of this apathy would be to create a climate in which 
the insolvency procedure was used to sequestrate assets from company funds, leaving the 
company "dry", and the directors, with sufficient assets to create another company, of almost 
identical staff and assets but without the debts of the previous company; the notorious and well 
documented "phoenix syndrome"5 .
3 Fletcher : 'The Genesis of Modern Insolvency Law - An Odyssey of Law Reform' [1987], 
Journal of Business .Law 365.
4 Ibid.
5 This was made unlawful by S 216 and 217 Insolvency Act 1986. The sections prohibit the 
re-use of the company name and make directors personally liable for the debts of the 
company in contravention of S 216. Directors are also prohibited from using their spouses 
as a facade to continue trading de facto when they have been disqualified, or their 
corporation wound-up. See post.
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The Road to Reform
The onset of the 1960's brought with it an increased number of these unacceptable 
arrangements relating to company insolvency, and with it came an increase in the political 
weight behind the whole concept of insolvency law. The maxim that insolvency had "no votes 
in it" 6 was overreached by a desire to take insolvency out of the "secret garden" 7 of the 
privileged few and reform it in such a way as to create a whole new ethos of insolvency 
legislation for both individual and corporate insolvencies8. It seemed that the pragmatic 
approach of English law to change the status quo was about to be usurped by an expeditious 
attempt to combat these "unacceptable facets of capitalism"9 .
However, The Law Commission was denied the same sort of access to the legislative reforms, 
which were so prevalent in the corresponding Scottish law review which was published in 
1982. The Department of Trade and Industry maintained their almost custodial claim to the 
area of insolvency which fettered the workings of the Commission. It was the accession to the 
European Community in January 1973 which acted as a catalyst to the overdue reforms. The 
Community required greater weaponry in its battle against cross border insolvency which was 
an increasing problem.
The Advisory Committee which was initiated to deal with tackling the British position was The 
Cork Committee, headed by Sir Kenneth Cork. Two Reports were to follow from the 
committee, between 1977 and 1982. While the committee had serious doubts about adopting 
the EEC Convention on the subject, its Report in 1977 did conclude with the recommendation 
that if the Convention were adopted, it would prompt an entire review of the existing 
insolvency law. Thus in order to be an effective force in moulding the Convention it would be
6 Supra 3.
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
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necessary to properly review our own law. This would provide the negotiators, with a 
conviction that would earn respect in the Community.
The net result of the Cork's findings, was the Insolvency Act of 1976, which was initiated by 
the then Labour Government, after the committee had made a preliminary report to the 
Secretary of State for Trade, Peter Shore. The Act initiated some minor reforms of corporate 
insolvency, but there was still much room for further regulation, and another more detailed 
report was to follow in 1982.
Cork and the 1986 Legislation
The objective of the Insolvency Act 1976, was to provide an interim measure to alleviate some 
of the more blatant shortcomings of the existing law. The bill was carried uncontroversially 
through Parliament, but it was left to Peter Shore's successor, Edmund Dell, to announce that a 
fundamental and exhaustive reappraisal of all aspects of the insolvency laws of England and 
Wales, would be carried out10 .
After deliberation and debate which took much longer than originally intended, the report was 
finally completed in 1982". Crticism of the committee came from those who felt that a 
broader input from individuals outside the narrow world of insolvency, would provide more 
radical and far reaching legislation, sensitive to the growing public concerns of insolvency as 
an effective deterrent against director abuse of the corporation. Also there was a lack of 
empirical research upon which the recommendations could have been made, and the 
presentation was considered "sprawling and formless" 12 .
10 Hansard H.C, Vol. 918, October 1976, written answer no. 20.
11 Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558, June 1982.
12 Supra 3.
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Inspite of these criticisms, the report illustrated and codified some of the major aspirations of 
insolvency, which for many years had to be gleaned from observing limited and piecemeal 
reforms. It proposed the rationalisation, harmonisation, and modernising of the existing laws, 
and attempted to meet the demands of the public by initiating concepts which would it hoped 
fulfil its role as a policing body for director activity.
The Cork Report was published in June 1982 to a rather more phlegmatic response than that of 
its predecessor. The Government was indifferent and no debate was arranged in Parliament on 
its findings. It looked as though the former political apathy in the area of insolvency was once 
again to amerge.
However, the Conservative Government became increasingly aware of the public's lack of 
confidence which increased during the years of recession (1981 to 1983). An increase in 
liquidations coupled with major scandals both in The City and at Lloyds, prompted the laissez- 
faire attitude of the Government to modify and intervene. The growth of privatisation and 
consumer shareholders also contributed to the change in attitude.
The Cork Report was consulted and a White Paper13 issued in February 1984. The paper 
revealed that the Government would be adopting some but not all of the Reports 
recommendations. In particular, the White Paper emphasised the importance of applying more 
stringent standards to the conduct of company directors, through extending the perameters for 
directors to incur personal liability for company debts, coupled with disqualification.
The Cork Report suggested that there should be mandatory disqualification for serious 
misconduct with the court's discretion limited to prescribing the number of years which that 
disqualification would last14 . The Government's response was initially even more stringent. 15 
It stated in the paper that if a director's conduct was ipso facto unfit to control the company,
13 A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law, Cmnd 9175.
14 Supra 11, para 1816-1837.
15 Supra 11, para 13 - 14, 46 - 51 and 53 - 56.
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then he would be subject to an automatic three year order for disqualification, where the 
company was being wound up, because it was insolvent. For the director to exonerate himself 
from the disqualification time limit, would necessitate him going to court and pleading that he 
could now be responsible to act in management.
This provision was particularly onerous for those directors who held more than one 
directorship as it would involve them in the process of going to court to plead their case 
immediately. Even if the disqualification order was lifted, it would still effect the other 
companies in which he was involved.
The provision became increasingly objectionable for several reasons. The delinquent director 
would certainly be caught in its ambit, but so also would the 'honest but unfortunate' type of 
director whose inability to manage the company appropriately was due to inexperience rather 
than fraudulent intent. It would clearly make those directors who were facing financial 
difficulty more nervous about their companies, and thus would prompt them to be more prone 
to winding-up the company prematurely.
However, on December 10 1984 the Insolvency Bill was first presented to the House of Lords, 
the proposal for automatic disqualification was duly incorporated16 . This manifested itself as 
an error of judgement on behalf of Parliament and the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI), 
who had initiated the legislation. The lack of preliminary debate which might well have 
mitigated the draconian measure before it entered the House of Lords, resulted in a flurry of 
lobbying amongst those sectors of society which would be adversely affected by the provision. 
The Confederation of British Industry and the Institute of Directors, successfully enlisted 
Parliamentary support not just from the Conservative majority in the House of Commons as 
well as their 'natural' majority in the House of Lords, but also members of the Opposition. 
The result was that a highly contentious debate followed and 1200 amendments were made to
16 See clauses 7 - 14 inclusive of the Insolvency Bill 1984 (No. 29).
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the Bill. The Bill remained intact however, on many procedural points and points of 
principle 17 .
When the provision relating to directors disqualification was eventually enacted it was 
considerably less robust than the provision in the White Paper18 . For example, individual 
directors may be disqualified from management when the company is insolvent, for a period of 
between two and fifteen years, but subject first of all to a court order. The burden of proof is 
thus switched to the person seeking the order, the only persons eligible to do this being the 
Secretary of State or the Official Receiver, acting on his behalf.
This results in the director facing a far less immediate or powerful call for disqualification, as 
any application by the appropriate authority, must come as a result of the (DTI) making an 
investigation. The law thus detracts from its objective of being a deterrent against the 
delinquent director. The administration of the proceedings in themselves may not carry on 
beyond the two year time limit for bringing such an action, leaving the director with the 
feeling that there is a sporting chance of survival, in view of the elaborate reporting from the 
liquidator to the Secretary of State in order to obtain the disqualification order19.
This was perhaps an opportunity missed as far as those who wished to see tougher sanctions 
against those directors who disregarded their privileges in the limited company. The Cork 
Report had advocated that it should be made possible for the creditor and the liquidator to be 
able to make a claim for disqualification against the director. This arguably would have 
provided a more potent threat where the time limit for such a claim would become closer in 
propinquity to the actual misfeasance.
17 Supra 3.
18 Insolvency Act 1985, s 12, now enacted as ss 6 & 7 of the Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986. See Appendix 1. 
" See S.I. 1986 Nos. 2067 and 2134, S.I. 1987 No. 2023.
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One provision that complied in part with the recommendations of the Cork Report, was that 
relating to wrongful trading20. Here, the liquidator can apply to the court for an order for 
disqualification in addition to making the director liable for company debts. The effectiveness 
of this provision has however been the subject of debate which has resulted in appraising 
whether the very basic philosophy of modern insolvency law is an appropriate measure for 
dealing with corporate governance21 .
The objective of the Cork Report was to create a standard for directors in their duties to others 
within the corporate nexus which would be perceived as constituting a barrier which if 
transgressed, would make the director liable for the company's debts. In creating a scenario 
which it was hoped would engender fear of personal liability amongst directors, the Cork 
Committee expected that it would raise the level of consciousness of the director to the 
responsibilities of his position, through seeking affirmation from creditors before any further 
money is advanced22 .
In structuring such a standard, the Committee saw the need to balance two sometimes opposing 
objectives. Firstly, to administer penalties where in the course of the company's failure:
"the conduct of officers or agents, merits criticism or punishment, while also 
providing means for the preservation of viable commercial enterprises capable 
of making a useful contribution to the economic life of the country. " (para 198 
Cork Report)_
The Committee concluded that such objectives would be best facilitated in a:
"framework of law ...", which would "command universal respect and 
observance, and yet is sufficiently flexible to adapt to and deal with the rapidly 
changing conditions of our modern world; in particular, to achieve a system 
that:
20 Insolvency Act 1985, ss 15 - 16. These provisions are now enacted as ss 214 & 215 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. See Appendix 1.
21 See inter alia Williams and McGee, Wrongful trading, Chartered Association of Certified 
Accountants, London 1992.
22 Cmnd 8558, para 1799.
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i) is seen to produce practical solutions to financial and commercial
problems,
ii) is simple and easily understood, 
Hi) is free from anomalies and inconsistencies, 
iv) is capable of being administered efficiently and economically." 23
The concept known as wrongful trading, initiated in S. 214 of the 1986 Insolvency Act is 
probably the most ambitious provision implemented in the Act, not only to fulfil the objectives 
of creating a higher standard for directorial activity, but also to make the Insolvency Service a 
more respected institution for policing management. S. 214 of the Act provides that where:
"in the course of a winding up of the company it appears that ...a person is or 
has been a director of the company, the court on the application of the 
liquidator, may declare that that person is to be liable to make such contribution 
(if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper. "
Such a contribution is to be made where:
i) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation,
ii) at some time before the commencement of the winding up of the company, that 
person knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect 
that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation,
and 
Hi) that person was a director of the company at the time.''
The legislation clearly tried to establish an objective standard by which the activities of 
directors could be assessed. By imposing the threat of personal liability, it was felt that 
directors would comply with a legally imposed standard of behaviour which would satisfy 
their peers, as to the commitment to commercial propriety. It was to seek the satisfaction of 
the reasonable man and thus objectifies what had previously been a matter of speculation and 
uncertainty25 .
The concept heralded a departure from the previous redress available for those against whom 
the director had committed an act of financial mismanagement. Previously, the only redress 
which the creditor had against any financial mismanagement in an insolvent company, was to
23 Supra 11, para 198.
24 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214(2). See Appendix 1.
25 Supra 21.
15
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be found in fraudulent trading, civil liability for which is now found at S 213 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986. Under this section, the creditor seeking some form of financial return from a 
director personally, had to show that:
i) "If in the course of the winding - up of a company it appears that any business of 
the company has been carried on^ with the intent to defraud creditors of the 
company*' or creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent purpose..."
then
ii) "The court on the application of the liquidator may declare that any persons who 
were knowingly parties to carrying on the business in [that] manner are to be 
liable to make such contributions ( if any ) to the company's assets as the court 
thinks proper."
The director had to be dishonest; carrying on the business with the "intent to defraud creditors 
of the company or creditors of any other person.", s 213(1).
The concept has replaced the provision found at S 332 of the Companies Act 194828 . The 
stipulation created a widely defined criminal offence of carrying on the business of a company 
with intent to defraud. It further provided that, if a company was in the course of winding-up, 
the courts could declare that the culprits were to be personally responsible without limitation of 
liability for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company to the extent that the court 
might direct.
The concept had both a criminal and a civil aspect to it, representing the two objectives of 
punishing the director as well as compensating, and thus protecting, the creditor. The criminal 
aspect of fraudulent trading can now be found in Section 458 Companies Act 1985.
26 It may be regarded as carrying on business not withstanding that it has ceased active trading: 
Re Sarflax Ltd. [1979], Ch 592.
27 It suffices if only one creditor in the course of one transaction is defrauded: Re Coopers 
Chemicals Ltd. [1978] Ch 262. Or of those defrauded are customers who are not actual, 
but only potential creditors: Re Kemp [1988]Q.B 645 c.a ( pet. dis [1988] 1 W.L.R 846 
H.L.)
16
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For many debtors it was all too easy to circumvent the necessary mens rea required for 
fraudulent trading to be proven. In the case of William C. Leitch Brothers Limited [1932] Ch 
71, Lustgarten J pointed out that the inability to pay debts was not enough to make a 
transaction fraudulent. This afforded the director the opportunity of pleading that incurring 
credit while knowing the company was insolvent, was merely an illustration of a cash flow 
problem. For those who could show a previous course of dealing which prompted them into 
such a situation, the evidential burden to prove their innocence was made that much easier29.
The director who could show that he genuinely believed that "the clouds would roll away and 
the sunshine of prosperity would shine upon him", was thus exonerated from any personal 
liability," per Buckley J in re White and Osmond (Parkstone) Ltd. 30th June 1960 
(unreported). This was so, regardless of the inadequacy of the decision that was taken, in 
terms of knowledge of the industry or the market in general.
The Jenkins Committee 1962, and subsequently the Cork Committee 1982, responded to the 
inadequacies of the former system, by initiating a concept which required a lower standard of 
mens rea. The Jenkins Committee had advocated the concept of "reckless trading", while the 
Cork Report chose the concept of wrongful trading30 .
The initial wording of the concept of wrongful trading, advocated by the Cork Report, linked it 
very closely to its predecessor, seeing it very much as an evolutionary extension of fraudulent 
trading. The draft proposed by the Cork Report, included both the intent to defraud creditors 
while establishing a more objective standard of behaviour by making a director liable in 
situations where he carried on trading but "ought in all the circumstances to have known" that 
the company's trading was wrongful31 .
28 As amended by s 96 of the Companies Act 1981, which reversed the effect of the decision 
in DPP v Schildkamp [1971] A.C.I (H.L) holding that winding-up of the company was an 
essential precondition to a criminal prosecution.
29 Supra 21.
30 Cmnd 8558.
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Establishing an Objective Standard
The diversity in the objective of wrongful trading from its predecessor, was illustrated when on 
commenting on the effects of fraudulent trading, Judge Bromley QC held that the civil action 
of fraudulent trading:
"was in the nature of a punitive provision "-^.
It thus followed that the compensation payments made by the director as a result of fraudulent 
trading contained a punitive element. This was reflected in the requirement of a high standard 
of mens rea in order to bring a successful claim. The court, through the necessity of actually 
requiring an element of dishonesty, was in a position to justify a punitive award although the 
frequency of the application was impaired by the all to easy circumvention of the provision.
Parliament's desire to word the new provision of wrongful trading so differently suggested that 
it was to change the philosophy of the policing provisions from one of penalising the director 
to compensating and thus protecting the creditor.
Knox J in Re: Produce Marketing Consortium stated that:
"In (my) judgement the jurisdiction under section 214, is primarily 
compensatory rather than penal. "33
However, the position is less clear when he goes on to state that:
"The fact that there was no fraudulent intent is not of itself a reason for fixing 
the amount at a nominal or low figure, for that would amount to frustrating what 
I discern to be Parliament's intention in adding section 214 to section 213 in the 
1986 Act, but I am not persuaded that it is right to ignore that fact completely. "
31 Supra 1, para 1806.
32 Re a Company (No. 001418 of 1988).
33 [1989] BCLC 520 (Chancery Division)
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The statement highlights the reluctance of the judiciary to see the perimeter of the insolvency 
laws which give them policing powers as being devoid of some element of blameworthiness 
worthy of a quasi-sentencing criteria34 .
The quote by Knox J indicates the ambiguity surrounding a provision which demands a clearly 
defined objective if the courts are going to be able to interpret the provision with some degree 
of consistency35 .
The perception of S 214 losing its purely civil nature and becoming a quasi criminal sanction is 
to some extent influenced by the personnel involved in its execution and the perception society 
has in that execution being made. As Feinberg writes:
"The principle that the need to prevent harm to persons other than the actor is 
always a morally relevant reason in support of proposed state coercion. I call 
the harm to others principle (the harm principle for short). At least in that vague 
formulation it is accepted as valid by nearly all writers. Controversy arises 
when we consider whether it is the only valid liberty limiting principle, as John 
Stuart Mill declared. " 36 37
In looking at the procedural aspect of wrongful trading, it is relevant to look at those who are 
capable of initiating an action, in deciding whether there are any criminal overtones to the 
concept which are the remains of its pedigree.
The action can only be brought by an official qualified according to the requirements of 
legislation. It is not open to those who are aggrieved by the wrongdoing of the defendant. In
34 Dine, "Wrongful Trading-Quasi Criminal Law. Insolvency Theory and Practice, Rajak. 
1993 Sweet & Maxwell LONDON.
35 Defining the concept of insolvency demands certain pre-requisites. As the corporation may 
be "balance-sheet" insolvent but will be able to continue to trade, or "cash flow insolvent" 
which will pre-empt the corporations creditors into seeking an early realisation of assets as 
the corporation becomes paralysed.
36 The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (OOP, 1990), Vol. 4, p ix.
37 See also Feinberg, op cit. Vol. 4, Chap 32 for a discussion of the morality using criminal 
sanctions in relation to "wrongful gain" which has no immediate obvious victim.
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this respect it closely resembles the criminal process38 . Wrongful trading also carries with it 
the sanction of disqualification, which is at the discretion of the court39 .
In discerning the objective of the concept, it is important to incorporate those elements of the 
section which operate to effect the lives of those against whom the claim is brought.
The value of any measure, is determined:-
i) by the degree of condemnation to which the defendant will be subject as a result of
the outcome of the case and,
ii) by the degree to which the result will affect the future life of the defendant, 
including his capacity to make a living.
If the degree of these factors is sufficient to go beyond compensating the victim, then it will 
roam into the realm of punishment for the defendant. If the objective of the civil procedure is 
compensation there is a good and sufficient method of distinguishing between that and a 
punitive fine. If the amount paid by the defendant or the penalty to be suffered by him relates 
to his behaviour rather than to the loss suffered by the victim, that is a clear indication that 
punishment of the defendant rather than compensation to the victim is the issue under 
consideration by the court40 .
An example of this objective is found in Re: A Company (No. 001418 of 1988)^1. Here, the 
parameter of the concept incorporated those elements of penal consequence which makes the 
perception and thus the outcome of the concept criminal in its nature.
Naming the concept, as wrongful, suggests a degree of condemnation from society. It 
emphasises the anti-social behaviour of those who practise it, and initiates the idea of blame 
being attached to one person because of loss to an innocent party.
38 Ante 25.
39 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 10. See Appendix 1.
40 Supra 27.
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The effect on the perception of wrongful trading, is to employ it only as a means of obtaining a 
just solution to a particular set of circumstance, rather than to compensate the creditor for loss. 
When Knox J therefore quotes that he will not disregard fraudulent intent in assessing the 
damages to creditors, he consciously moulds the concept of wrongful trading into a solution, 
the path to which is paved with criminal considerations.
The problem lies in the many factors which the civil court balances in reaching its decisions, 
for with all the legislative provisions at its disposal, it is conscious of the fact that it has the 
power to severely restrict the freedoms of those upon whom it makes judgement.
The intention of Parliament, as illustrated by the Cork Report, does not help the dilemma. On 
the one hand, it emphasises the compensatory element when it states :
"// is right that it should be an offence to carry on a business dishonestly; and 
right that in the absence of dishonesty no offence should be committed. Where 
however, what is in question, is not the punishment of the offender, but a 
provision of a civil remedy for those who have suffered financial loss, a 
requirement that dishonesty be proved is inappropriate..." 42
However when the report goes on to justify the new concept, the idea of it acting as a deterrent, 
with retributive overtones in mind is illustrated when it is argued:
"...a climate should exist in which downright irresponsibility is discouraged and 
in which those who abuse the privilege of limited liability can be made 
personally responsible for the consequences of their conduct." 43
The dual nature of the objective, indicates the confusion which was to be found at the time of 
initiating the 1986 Act. As Fletcher indicated :
" It was suddenly felt to be important for the government to be seen to be facing 
up to the issues of incompetence - even downright delinquency - on the part of 
directors and managers of companies. "44
41 [1991]BCLC197.
42 Supra 1, para 1777.
43 Supra l.para 1805.
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The White Paper which followed shows that while the more draconian action of automatic 
disqualification was lost,45 there was a clear indication by the Government that the measure 
would act as a deterrent and thus wrongful trading was given its punitive dimension.
The Court's Response to Wrongful and Fraudulent Trading
The evolution of 'fraudulent trading' with its criminal background is, as already illustrated, 
divided into a criminal and a civil remedy46 . In order for a claim to be successful, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant acted with 'intent to defraud', and that the directors were not just 
acting unreasonably, but also dishonestly. This is determined by factual deduction of each 
individual case, with its obvious subjective analysis47. The section therefore brings the sword 
of the criminal law firmly into the area of insolvency.
Wrongful trading however, is ostensibly the weapon of the civil courts and unlike fraudulent 
trading, an application can only be made once a company has gone into insolvent liquidation, 
i.e. gone into liquidation at a time when its assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts. 
Also an application may only be brought against a director or a shadow director48.
One of the most revolutionary departures which wrongful trading made from its predecessor 
was that it sought to make objective the standard of care owed by directors and shadow 
directors to creditors. Clearly there is a demand from the provision that the director or shadow 
director ought to have concluded that the company would not avoid insolvent liquidation and 
not that they did know that fact and were dishonest in concealing it.
44 Supra 2.
45 Cll 7-14 of the Insolvency Bill 1984.
46 Section 458, Companies Act 1985 and S 213 Insolvency Act 1986 respectively.
47 Re Todd (Swanscombe) Ltd. [1990] BCC 125.
48 Section 214 (1) and (7) Insolvency Act 1986.
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The thinking of the courts regarding the standard of care was well explained by Knox J in Re: 
Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. (No. 2) 49. He said :
"It is evident that Parliament intended to widen the scope of legislation under 
which directors who trade on when the company is insolvent may, in appropriate 
circumstances be required to make a contribution to fa company's creditors]... 
the test to be applied by the Court has become one under which the director in 
question has to be judged by the standards of what can reasonably be expected 
of a person fulfilling his functions and showing reasonable diligence in doing 
so... [t]he general knowledge skill and experience postulated will be much less 
extensive in a small company in a modest way of business with simple 
accounting procedures and equipment than it will be in a large company with 
sophisticated procedures. Nevertheless certain minimum standards are assumed 
to be attained.... [Wrongful trading is] an enhanced version of the right which 
any company would have to sue its directors for breach of duty- enhanced in the 
sense that the standard of knowledge skill and experience required is made 
objective."
However, in establishing such a standard, the aims of the legislation are an important part of 
the judiciary's considerations. So far as Knox J was concerned in Re: Produce Marketing 
Consortium 50 the situation indicates only confusion. In context he stated :
"In my judgement the jurisdiction under section 214 is primarily compensatory 
rather than penal. Prima facie the appropriate amount that a director is 
declared to be liable to contribute is the amount by which the company's assets 
can be discerned to have depleted by the director's conduct which caused the 
discretion under subsection (I) to arise. But Parliament has indeed chosen very 
wide words of discretion, more especially since this is, so far as counsel were 
aware, the first case to come to judgement under this section. The fact that there 
was not fraudulent intent is not of itself a reason for fixing the sum at a nominal 
or low figure, for that would amount to frustrating what I discern as 
Parliament's intention in adding section 214 to section 213 in the 1986 Act, but I 
am not persuaded that it is right to ignore that fact totally."
Clearly, while expressing the compensatory objective of the legislation, Knox J illustrates that 
the quasi-criminal overtone of the section is not to be ignored and thus the ambit of the section 
suddenly becomes subject to considerations of penalty which are entrenched with matters 
which are subjective and are to be viewed very much on the facts of the each case. This in turn 
serves to undermine the certainty which is usually to be expected from objectivising the mental 
element of a particular legal principle.
49 [1989] BCLC 520, pp 549-550 and 553.
50 ibid, p 553.
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With the inclusion of these subjective matters, wrongful trading is held to judicial 
interpretation by standards which are not defined completely. The result is that while the 
concept is viewed with gravity by the courts, the scope of the penalty will still be determined 
by the mens rea of the directors51 .
51 Supra 27.
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CHAPTER 3
WRONGFUL TRADING: A CASE LAW STUDY
In this chapter, I will examine the practical application of the wrongful trading provision and 
its interpretation by the courts. Perhaps the greatest indictment of the Cork Report's 
expectations for the provision of wrongful trading has been the pitifully few cases which have 
been decided by the courts. This has been so, despite a rise in corporate insolvencies during 
the last eight years; forty thousand alone for the period 1992-3'.
The first and arguably the most significant examination of an insolvent liquidation for the 
purposes of Section 214, came in the case of Re Produce Marketing Consortium (No 2) 2. 
Here, the company was ran by two people, both directors, and its business was the importation 
and distribution of citrus fruit. It retained a commission of 3.5% on all fruit imported and 
distributed and as it required £35,000 to cover its annual costs (including the remuneration of 
the two directors) it had to have a turnover of at least £lm to break even. In fact, for virtually 
the entire six year period prior to liquidation, the turnover was less and not surprisingly, the 
bank overdraft rose from nil in 1980 to over £91,000 in 1984. The overdraft limit was agreed 
at £75,000 but this was frequently exceeded. Close to liquidation however, it was substantially 
reduced. This did not occur through any additional income received by the company, but at 
the expense of the company's major supplier, the citrus produce and exporting company in 
Cyprus which at liquidation was owed £175,000 (unsecured); in fact one month before 
liquidation, the overdraft had been reduced to about £57,000, a debt which was almost entirely 
covered by the personal guarantee of one of the directors. Had it not been for the continued 
support of the bank, the company would have been forced into liquidation much earlier.
1 Figures supplied by the Department of Trade and Industry, "The Insolvency Report" 1993.
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In the course of a long judgement with detailed examination of the company's history, it was 
revealed that the company's accounts were often presented later than the time limit prescribed 
by the Companies Act3 . The draft accounts for the periods 1984/85 and 1985/6 were produced 
in January 1987. Those for the period 1984/5 should have been produced not later than July 
1986. When they were produced, they revealed a trading loss of over £50,000, and an excess 
of liabilities over assets of £175,000.
On the basis of these figures the court held that, as at July 1986, the directors ought to have 
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid insolvent 
liquidation. The court selected this date because it represented the date that the company ought 
to have realised the disastrous state of its financial position which could have been discerned 
by viewing the accounts which should by then have been finalised and presented. Here the 
court relied on the assessment of the reasonably diligent person as one who has a certain 
amount of knowledge, including the details of the accounts by the last date by which they 
should have been presented4 .
In this conclusion, the court furnished the legislation with a definition of insolvency. This has, 
however, led to further ambiguities in defining the section. Under S 214(7), the company goes 
into insolvent liquidation when its assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts and other 
liabilities and the expenses of the winding-up. The test for insolvency was on the balance 
sheet and not on the liquidity basis (the Cork Report had suggested that either would be 
appropriate (para 1806)). However, the Act gives no indication as to whether the assets should 
be valued on a 'going concern' basis which includes the invisible asset of goodwill or that the 
break-up basis should be applied5 . The reference to 'going concern' in the making of business
2 [1989] BCLC 520.
3 Section 224, Companies Act 1985.
4 Ante 2, page 550, paras g and h.
5 The choice of test is important as the "break-up" test of corporate assets, which values the 
corporation in terms of the fixed assets which it has to sell, It will provoke the keenest 
interest from creditors who see that the corporation is to be wound-up. The surge that 
follows from creditors will further undermine the already deflated value of the corporation, 
and thus places a detrimental effect on the value of the company. For further reading see
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judgements in S 214 (2)(b), supports the idea that it would be wrong to judge the matter with 
hindsight, simply on the basis that some of the assets had to be sold on a piecemeal basis, and 
that a 'going concern' basis is felt to be more appropriate6 . The section displays a further 
degree of uncertainty as to the overall effectiveness of the clause by not making it clear in what 
circumstances the section will 'bite'.
The next question was whether, between July 1986 and October 1987, when the company was 
in liquidation, the respondents (the two former directors) took every step that reasonable 
diligent people in their position would have taken to minimise loss to creditors7 . On the facts, 
which clearly indicated that the company had been in a financially deficient state from the 
beginning, the answer was no. The respondents argued that a date later than July 1986 was 
more appropriate for the conclusion that insolvent liquidation would take place, and that from 
that later date, they had taken all such steps in that they had only continued trading in order to 
sell a cargo of stored fruit at the best possible price. The court rejected the later date and found 
that even after the later date other trading continued in addition to the attempts to sell the 
stored fruit8 .
Under the section, the court has a wide discretion as to the order to be made where wrongful 
trading is found to have existed. Given that the section is solely, as the court put it 
compensatory an assessment has to be made as to the cost to the creditors of the failure to act 
diligently in accordance with the section. Here the order was that both respondents contribute 
£75,000 to the assets of the company. In fact, this was much less draconian than it sounds, as 
one of the directors who had personally guaranteed the overdraft was responsible for a 
contribution of £50,000 anyway (the amount of the guarantee). Although the order was
R.M.Goode "Wrongful Trading and the Balance Sheet Test for Insolvency", JBL (1989), 
p436.
6 L.S.Sealy : Disqualification and Personal Liability of Directors (Fourth Edition), Chapter 6, 
1993.
7 Section 241(3). This provides the director or officer of the company with a defence of "good 
faith" if he can show that he did everything possible to control the damage done to the 
creditor. For further practical steps which the officer can employ to show this, see Draper 
"Companies in Trading Difficulties: The Pitfalls for Directors and How to Avoid Them", 
International Company and Commercial Law Review, Vol. 11, 1993 p 400.
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against both directors jointly and severally, i.e. that either was responsible for the entire 
amount, the court ordered the director responsible under the personal guarantee to indemnify 
the other to the extent of £50,000.
The case is important not just because it was the first to be decided, but also because it 
illustrated the court's ability and willingness to embark on a detailed examination of the 
company's history leading up to the liquidation, and while being sympathetic to the company's 
position, was nevertheless firm in its judgement9.
This decision based on the application of S 214 Insolvency Act 1986, displays both a 
subjective and objective standard for the duty of skill and care owed by the directors to the 
corporation and to its creditors. This Knox J. believed represented the different objectives of 
the new concept. Knox J. accepted that "regard must be had to the particular company and its 
business; hence it followed that the general skill, and knowledge and experience postulated 
will be much less extensive in a small company in a modest way of business, with simple 
accounting procedures and equipment, than it will be in a large company with sophisticated 
procedures" 10 .
However, compliance with the accounting obligations imposed by statute must be presumed," 
moreover, since S 214(4) refers inter alia to :
"facts which a director...ought to know or ascertain "
the fact that the accounts were actually prepared late would not prevent inputed knowledge of 
factual information, but at any rate, knowledge of the situation could be presumed considering
8 Supra 2, page 552, paras a and b.
9 Rajak (1989) 139, New Law Journal, 1374 & 1458.
10 Supra 2, page 550, para c. This has led to much debate on the employment of the section in 
providing a new general objective standard for company directors. See Hicks "Advising on 
Wrongful Trading :part 1", 1993, Company Lawyer, Vol. 14, no.l, page 16, together with 
part 2, Company Lawyer 1993, Vol. 14, no.3, p 55.
11 Supra 3.
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the extent of the deficiency of assets over liabilities, ascertainable with reasonable diligence 
and an appropriate level of general knowledge, skill and experience. The directors should, 
therefore, have concluded midway through 1986, that the company had no reasonable prospect 
of avoiding insolvent liquidation.
Factors listed by the judge as affecting his exercise of discretion in the case included that:
i) The directors had failed to appreciate what should have been clear, rather than 
indulged in deliberate wrong-doing; nevertheless at the time, positive untruths had 
been stated, exceeding unwarranted optimism.
ii) The auditor's solemn warning had in effect been ignored.
iii) Debtor balances of sizeable amounts shown in the company's ledgers did not figure 
at all in its liquidation statement of affairs; the question of disappearing debtors was 
of significance and could not be ignored.
iv) One of the directors had personally guaranteed the company's overdraft up to 
£50,000, and the bank had a charge over the company's assets which would 
embrace anything the directors were ordered to contribute and would pro tanto 
relieve the director who had given the guarantee from his liability under it.
v) During its final months of trading, the company's affairs were conducted in a way 
which reduced its indebtedness to the bank, for which a director stood guarantor at 
the expense of the trade creditors 12.
However, the judge concluded that the facts were not ambiguous. Clearly the company had 
fallen foul of the insolvency provision by continuing to trade. The directors had been
12 Supra 2, pages 553-554, paras c-f.
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negligent in their handling of those communicative elements of corporate governance, which 
should have told them that something was wrong; i.e. the failure to keep up to date accounts 
for their inspection. As a result, the section provided for compensation from the directors 
leading to an expectation that the section would become a preventative weapon in the armoury 
battling against cavalier directors 13 .
The communication of the state of the corporation to the directors which would then be 
translated into action to minimise the loss to creditors was an important element in the 
reasoning of Re DKG Contractors Ltd.U. Here a husband and wife traded as a groundworks 
subcontractor from 1979 to 1988, and incorporated the business in 1986. The company did not 
take over the outstanding contracts owned by the proprietor, Mr. Gibson, but rather paid them 
as if the company had sub-contracted to the former business. The result was that the company 
was-invoiced for work done by the firm owned by Mr. Gibson.
After some time, Mr Gibson became the company's major creditor. However, during 1988 the 
company faced financial difficulty and no fewer than sixteen creditors obtained judgement for 
debts between May and November of that year. Subsequently the company went into 
creditors' voluntary liquidation in December 1988 with an estimated deficiency of over 
£260,000.
There were basically three areas for the courts to deal with in the case. First, the question of 
Mr. Gibson receiving a salary of £417,763 from the company in the ten months before the 
company went into liquidation. The company paid Mr Gibson for the works which his firm 
had carried out on the company's behalf. However, the company and Mr. Gibson were 
connected persons and therefore the transactions were in effect placing Mr. Gibson in a 
preferential position in contravention of S 239 Insolvency Act 1986. This constituted an act of 
wrongful preference and as a result, the money from the transaction ought to be repaid inspite
13 See inter alia, "Wrongful Trading - The Start of Something Big", Nicholas Bourne, Business 
Law Review, April 1995 p 79.
14 (1990)BCC903.
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of the defence's arguments that the money was justified on the ground that the defendants were 
simply being reimbursed for the works which the firm owned by Mr Gibson had done, and that 
the defendants had acted honestly and reasonably, and ought reasonably to be excused under S 
727 Companies Act15 .
Second, the question of the directors' duty to handle the creditor's money in accordance with 
the common law standard of care, which finds redress, in S 212 Insolvency Act 1986 16 . Here 
the court concluded that the directors had misapplied and retained money belonging to the 
company, for the benefit of Mr.Gibson, who as a result of the transactions between the 
company and himself, became accountable for the money.
Third, came the question of wrongful trading. In his judgement, Sir John Weeks QC, spoke of 
wrongful trading as "an alternative remedy to fraudulent trading" 17 , thus immediately 
emphasising the evolutionary connection with the former, penal provision now incorporated by 
S 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The fact that Mr. & Mrs. Gibson were inadequate for the 
task of running a company was also emphasised, 18 but as a factor which would not protect 
them from the provision. The only factor relevant for the judge was determining a date when 
the couple ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of the company 
avoiding liquidation19 .
The judge differed from the view of the defendant as to the time when they should have 
concluded that the company ought to be wound-up. This was when the first creditors began to 
press for their money at the end of April. At that point, the defendant was also aware that a 
supplier refused to make further deliveries to the company which caused the defendant to have 
a row with his wife.
15 Ibid, p 903, para g.
16 This focuses on the director's action during or immediately before the liquidation has taken 
place, and makes a director personally liable for monies which have been misapplied or 
retained, or has committed any misfeasance or breach of fiduciary duty, S 212 (l)(c).
17 Supra 14, p 912, para b.
18 Ibid, p 912, para b.
19 Ibid, p903, para h.
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The couple had employed someone to prepare quotations for work; Mr. Broomfield. He had 
assured the couple that monies would come in to cover those laid out to the defendant. The 
judge's response to this was to look at the adequacy of the return, and found that this fell well 
short of the amounts given to the defendant. In any event, Mr. Broomfield's job had not been 
to analyse whether this would be sufficient monies to cover the expenses, only to supervise the 
income. Any such analysis would have to come from someone who had access to the accounts 
book, and that was the defendants20.
The judge concluded that from the middle of April when the warning signs were showing, 
some form of financial control should have been placed on the company. If this had been 
done, the directors would have seen that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding 
liquidation. The directors became liable for repayment of monies as from the 31st April.
The cases attempt to define some of the sections in this part of the Insolvency Act, by attaching 
to them a certain philosophical basis. The fraudulent trading reference shows that while the 
provision of S 214 has been classed primarily as compensatory21 , the pedigree of dishonest 
intent was still a factor fashioning the judges view that the objective of the section contains an 
element to penalise the director22 .
This fact seemed to be illustrated in the judgement of John Weeks QC, when he stated, that he 
has little sympathy for the defendant or his wife, and that his major sympathy lay with those 
unpaid creditors who extended credit to the company in all innocence23 .
20 Ibid, p 912, para d.
21 Supra 2.
22 Ibid, p 544, para a. The judge considered it relevant to mention that the pay awards to the 
directors while reasonable per se, did look less than reasonable in the context of the 
company's performance. The judge's remarks inferred that it was important to him to look 
at the "honesty" factor in the case even though his final conclusion (ante) was that 
dishonesty was not an important factor.
23 Supra 14, p 908, para e.
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This comment is contradicted later in the judgement, when John Weeks makes it quite clear 
that the defendants had not acted dishonestly24 , believing that the scheme used to run both the 
company and the firm was not done with the intention of avoiding personal liability. 
Nevertheless, the defendants had acted unreasonably in trading in the manner they had. This 
was enough to incur liability under the section25 .
The case displays that there is an undefined conceptual area of legal thought between the 
realms of dishonesty and unreasonableness, which includes concepts such as recklessness and 
gross negligence. While the judge in the case was prepared to admit that the defendants were 
not dishonest, there is from his judgement, a lack of sympathy for the defendants which 
suggests a moral culpability which extends beyond that of concluding that someone has been 
unreasonable.
However, the argument that wrongful trading is primarily a compensatory measure, is 
illustrated by the judges decision to allow the money which the directors had to return under 
the wrongful trading provisions, to be partly satisfied by the provisions relating to S 212 
Insolvency Act, that of misapplication of funds and S 239, relating to wrongful preference. 
Both these sections are compensatory in their application and thus were seen by the judge as 
fulfilling the compensatory element of S 21426 .
The case of Re Purpoint Ltd. 27, also illustrates the court's predilection for using the company's 
method of keeping accounts as determining the date upon which the directors ought to have 
concluded that the company could not avoid going into insolvent liquidation28 .
In that case the director, Mr. Meredith, ran a company engaged in retailing photographic 
equipment, which never actually produced accounts, and was erratic in paying its debts. No
24 Ibid, p 912, para h.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid, p 912, paras e and f.
27 [1991] BCLC 491.
28 Ibid, p 491, paras e - g.
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significant procedure was established for paying the Inland Revenue's PA YE, with the result 
that £19,723.43 became outstanding by the end of 1986. Also, there were a number of 
occasions in 1986, when creditors had to take action through the county court in order to 
secure payment. The court was not disposed to believing the defendants' claim that they 
actually reviewed the company's position at the end of each month29.
A meeting did take place between the defendants and a Mr. Adamson, in May 1987, in which 
Mr. Meredith was advised to stop trading, as to continue in the insolvent state which the 
company now found itself would result in the defendant incurring personal liability for 
company debts30.
The overall total of liability at the date of liquidation was £63,685. In his summing up Vinelott 
J. stated:
"/ have felt some doubt whether the reasonably prudent director would have 
allowed the company to commence trading at all. "31
Yet he was not convinced that the commencement date was the most appropriate date on 
which to start calculating liability under S 214. Also, the date at which Mr. Meredith took 
advice from Mr. Adamson was considered too late to determine the date for liability.
The judge clearly saw that the responsibilities for management would be allowed some degree 
of risk at the beginning of trading, but that the defendant could not protect that risk through 
seeking professional advice from an accountant32 . The court showed that it had expectations of 
the director to take certain responsibilities for himself and these were clearly manifested by the 
production of company accounts, and a reasonable response to them.
29 Supra 27, p 493, para i.
30 Ibid, p 494, paras h and i.
31 Ibid, p 498, para c.
32 Ibid, p 495, paras c and d.
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The case also raises other aspects of the provision, which have been the source of debate in 
interpreting the section. In Re Purpoint ", Vinelott J. was acutely aware of the need to show 
that the provision was to be used as an extension of the sacred concept of part passu when he
states:
"The purpose of an order under S 214, of the 1986 Act, is to recoup the loss to 
the company so as to benefit all of the company's creditors and the court has no 
jurisdiction to direct payment to a particular class of creditor. "34
However Knox J. in Re Produce Marketing Consortium, was prepared to give one group of 
creditors a more privileged position, by making their approval of the directors' actions, a 
reason for greater conviction in the idea'that the directors had a defence that they were trying 
to improve the position of the creditors by continuing to trade. In reply to this defence, Knox 
J. states:
"These are fine sentiments but they would carry more conviction ifRomana had 
been given the opportunity to decide for itself if it wanted to avail itself of 
PMC's marketing expertise. "3$
The statement suggests that if the directors had given its major creditors the opportunity of 
scrutinising the directors' actions, and approving them, then this would have somehow 
exonerated the directors' liability under the provision. This is contrary to the philosophy that 
all ordinary creditors rank equally regardless of the amount of their financial assistance to the 
company. It also detracts from the section's ability to act as a device designed to extend the 
general duty of the director by curbing deals which are contrary to S 239 of the Act36 .
The Defence to Wrongful Trading
33 See ante
34 Supra ll,p 491, para g.
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The question of the provision's defence, was raised in the case of Re Pinpoint " and in Re 
Produce Marketing Consortium 38 and others. The only defence which was afforded to the 
director is found in S 214 (3), which states that a declaration as to wrongful trading will not be 
made where the director could show that he had taken :
"every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company's creditors as 
(assuming him to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would 
avoid going into insolvent liquidation) he ought to have taken. "39
However, debate over the question of a dishonest intention forming a relevant factor for 
establishing a case of wrongful trading40, have prompted many defendants to advocate a 
defence under S 727 of the Companies Act 1985. Under this section, the court has the 
discretion to grant relief from liability where it can be shown that despite the proceedings 
against a director "for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust", the officer of the 
company can show that he acted "honestly and reasonably and that having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case (including those connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to 
be excused."41
The section has been considered an inappropriate defence to the concept of wrongful trading 
for several reasons. First, wrongful trading is the provision initiated by the Cork Committee42 
to combat those inadequacies in the fraudulent trading provision, which resulted in many 
directors who had acted unreasonably but not dishonestly in the continuing to trade. The 
wrongful trading provision was designed to fill a gap in the law.
35 Supra 2, p 540, para c.
36 See ante.
37 See ante
38 Supra 8.
39 Steve Hill "The End Of Limited Liability as We Know It?", Mind Your Own Business, 
February 1990, p39. Here the question of S 214(3) is viewed as a defence to commercial 
misfortune, which may have involved the directors taking a risk which would breach S 214.
40 See ante.
41 Section 727(1) Companies Act 1985.
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The very demand that the section makes to the director acting reasonably, with the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that he actually has, suggests that the whole basis of the 
provision is to establish an objective standard, that may be one standard which reflects an 
appropriate level at which a company director may perform'13 .
This point led Knox J. in Re Produce Marketing Consortium to consider S 727 as being 
"difficult to marry ", with the essentially objective nature of the provision44 . Section 214(4), 
imputes for the purposes of subsection (2) and (3) to a director not only the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that might reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the 
same functions as are carried out by that director in relation to that company, but is in fact 
extended to cover not only to the functions that he did carry out but also the functions that had 
been entrusted to him45 . Thus the provision covers not just the things which the director did 
but not dishonestly, but also the abdication of those things which he ought to have done.
The Cork Committee had intended for the courts to have the power to grant relief from 
wrongful trading in hard cases. At paragraph 1793 it stated:
"We propose that, in cases where there is actual or constructive knowledge of 
the wrongful trading, a person who can establish that he has acted honestly 
and that the circumstances were such that he ought to be excused may apply to 
the court for relief from personal liability. The Court's power to give relief, 
deriving from S 448 of the Act [Companies] of 1948 and the analogous 
provisions of S 61 of the Trustee Act 1925, will be available to give relief in 
what otherwise would be regarded as hard cases. "
However, the analogy with the Acts of 1925 and 1948, proves somewhat inappropriate, when 
at the following paragraph, The Cork Committee states:
"Under our proposals no one can be made liable for wrongful trading unless he 
has acted dishonestly, or in some respects later, unreasonably. It would 
therefore, be inappropriate if relief could be extended only to those who had 
acted reasonably. There may however , be circumstances in which the honest
42 Cmnd. 8558, 1982, Ch 44.
43 Section 214(4) Insolvency Act 1986.
44 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. [1989] BCLC 513 at p 518, para b.
45 Supra 8, p 518.
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director ought to be relieved in whole or in part, and we do not wish those 
circumstances to be circumscribed in any way. "4"
The Government did not initiate the provision of wrongful trading based on the draft set out by 
the Cork Committee. Instead, the basis of liability was as a result of incurring further debt 
while insolvent, and continuing to trade47 . The emphasis was moved to one of failing to take 
every step to minimise the potential loss to creditors. This defence, intrinsic to the provision 
itself,48 affords the courts complete discretion over the extent of the director's liability and no 
additional form of relief is therefore necessary49 .
It was this relationship between the two sections which Knox J. had to consider in the case of 
Re Produce Marketing Consortium, as no formal indication of any relationship between the 
two had been made. He concluded that S 214 expressly excluded S 727.
First, S 214 judges the director by way of an objective test which is irreconcilable with the 
subjective test of S 727. While it is clear that S 214 is not completely devoid of any subjective 
matters50, Knox J. pointed out that:
"...certain minimum standards are to be assumed to be attained."5 '
However, S 727 is itself not truly subjective. Reference is given to the director being given 
relief if he acted "honestly and reasonably and having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case (including those connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to be excused". The fact 
that the word reasonably is used, suggests an objective element to S 727.
Conversely, in Re Produce Marketing Consortium, Knox J. observed that he would not 
disregard any fraudulent intent in assessing the amount of contribution which the director
46 Cmnd 8558, para 1794, 1982.
47 Ibid, para 1806, contrast the White Paper, "A Revised Framework for Insolvency", para 52.
48 Section 214 (3) Insolvency Act 1986.
49 Bradgate & Howells (1990), Journal of Business Law 249.
50 Supra 10.
51 Supra 2, p 550, para c.
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would have to make as a result of wrongful trading. This imputes a subjective element, albeit 
at the stage of determining the extent of liability rather than if liability has taken place at all52 .
As both sections contain the objective standard of acting reasonably as a criterion for their 
implementation, is it really that incompatible to use S 727 as a further defence to the provision 
of wrongful trading? In cases of negligence, the standard is objective, and S 727 can be used. 
In such cases the word 'reasonably' in S 727 might be taken to refer to a director who had 
nevertheless behaved reasonably in the light of his own abilities: there is no compelling reason 
why the court should not have the power to excuse the objectively incompetent but 
subjectively honest and reasonable director53 .
The decision taken by Knox J. not to use S 727, is perhaps an insight into the policy of the 
court not to compromise what Parliament had intended to be a most forceful weapon against 
those abuses of the insolvency law which led to the initiation of S 214. Section 214(3) does 
not provide a defence for the provision, but rather establishes a second condition which has to 
fulfilled before the court can make an order54 . If it is shown that the director took all 
reasonable steps to protect the interests of the creditor then no order can be made. The courts 
clearly have taken the view that to compromise the provision by making it subject to the 
question of whether the director was honest, is to undermine the dramatic effect which the 
Government clearly had intended the provision to make55 .
In Re Produce Marketing Consortium, the two directors failed in viewing their accounts until 
several months after the accounts ought to have been prepared. This meant that they had failed 
to take every reasonable step to protect the interests of the creditors because a reasonable 
director would have prepared the accounts on time, and would have reacted accordingly. The 
directors could not have been accused of being dishonest in their intention so arguably then- 
actions ought to have been subject to some sort of mitigating provision, like S 727.
52 Supra 22.
53 Bradget and Howells "No Excuse for Wrongful Trading", JBL (1990), 249.
54 As observed by the editors of Gore Brown on companies.
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The final argument against the use of S 727 as a defence, comes from the application of the 
section itself in other areas of law. The Court of Appeal in Customs & Excise Commissioners 
v Hedon Alpha Ltd. $*> pointed out that S 727 could only be used in a situation where a claim 
against the director or officer was by the company itself, a fact raised by the editors of 
Gore-Browne, commenting on the Hedon Alpha case. They stated that S 727 "is applicable 
only in respect of a director's or officer's liability to his company under the Companies Act. It 
cannot be used to seek relief for default imposed on a company director by other 
legislation."57.
However, it is clear that the section can apply to S 212 of the Insolvency Act, relating to the 
retention or misapplication of money, thus illustrating that the section is in fact used outside 
the Companies Act58 . The section can be utilised by the company itself against its directors. 
This is a significant distinction from S 214 of the Insolvency Act, because there only the 
liquidator, an outsider, can bring a claim. It is clear that claims brought by 'outsiders', cannot 
rely on S 727 as a defence.
In Re Produce Marketing Consortium, Knox J. took the view that the liquidator was in fact an 
outsider, and was therefore outside the ambit of S 72759 . This approach can be subject to the 
criticism that while the liquidator is technically outside the company, his work is done on 
behalf of the company and his duty is owed to the company, making him just as much a part of 
that company as the director or shareholder60.
The use of S 727 may prove redundant, as S 214 gives the court a wide discretion to order 
"such contribution (if any) ...as the court thinks proper," to the creditors. This means that
55 See Chapter 2.
56 [1981] Q.B. 818.
57 Ibid, para 27.21
58 For a general application of the use of S 727 for misfeasance proceedings, see Re Kirbys 
Coaches Ltd [1991] BCLC 414. Also Halsbury's Statutes, 4th Edition, Vol. 4.
59 Supra 2,p 4, para h.
60 Supra 22.
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while technically a claim for wrongful trading is successful, the outcome will result in the 
director being exonerated from any compensation payment to the creditor. Also, S 215 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, empowers the court to "give such further directions as it thinks proper 
for giving effect to the declaration. "These are ...very wide words of discretion and it would be 
undesirable to seek to spell out limits on that discretion..."61 .
The final order in Re Produce Marketing Consortium (No, 2) illustrates the flexibility of the 
court's power. The two directors, one of whom had guaranteed the company's overdraft up to 
a figure of £50,000, were ordered to pay jointly and severally £75,000 to the company assets, 
but the director's guarantee satisfied only the first £50,000 of the order. Section 214 is thus to 
be seen as a self contained section, which was never meant to be fettered by a mitigating 
section, like S 727 of the Companies Act 1985.
The courts in not using S 727 as a means of a defence, have illustrated their wish not to 
compromise the expectations of the Cork Committee and the Government of providing the 
commercial community with a more stringent measure with which to combat the more cavalier 
amongst those in corporate power. Nevertheless, certain compromises have been made.
One of the more recent annunciation of the effect of the wrongful trading provision on the 
legal standards expected from directors came in the case of Re D 'Jan of London 62 . The case 
involved a summons under S 212 Insolvency Act 1986, where a company had a shortfall to its 
creditors upon liquidation of £500,000. The defendant, D, held 99 of the 100 shares, and the 
liquidator was bringing a claim for negligence against the director, for failing to insure 
premises in which stock valued at £174,000 was stored. The failure arose as a result of the 
director answering a question stating that at no time had he been involved in a company which 
had gone into liquidation. In fact, the director had been involved with an insolvent company, 
five years previously.
61 Supra 23, p 553, para f.
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He admitted that the application form was filled in incorrectly, but also stated that he had not 
filled in the form, or seen the form before it was sent to the insurers. This he had entrusted to 
his insurance broker, Mr. Shenyuz, whose rates of pay and longevity of service culminated to 
make a presumption that the form would be filled in accurately. This form of events was 
disputed by Mr. Shenyuz, who claimed that he had merely delivered the form to Mr. D'Jan.
It was during the judgement that Hoffman J. stated that Mr. D'Jan had been negligent in not 
reading the form before signing it, commenting that the duties of the director were illustrated 
in S 214(4) Insolvency Act 1986. These were :
i) the conduct of someone with " the general knowledge, skill and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried 
out by that director in relation to that company
and 
ii) the general knowledge, skill and experience that that director has.
It was thus on the basis of this objective/subjective test that the director was found liable for 
negligence.
D'Jan was held liable to compensate the company for the loss incurred as a result of his breach 
of duty, and the amount was to be up to that amount he could have claimed in dividends, as an 
ordinary creditor. In their judgement the court held that the director had been negligent in the 
performance of his duties. It was no defence that he had not read the document, as this was 
something that need not be expected from a director63 . It was also no defence that his actions 
may well have been ratified by the other shareholders, that is D' Jan and his wife.
62 [1993] BCC 646.
63 Ibid p 648, para c.
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The two important parts of the decision for the purposes of the legal objectives of wrongful 
trading, were that the duty of care owed by a director at common law, was accurately stated in 
S 214(4) Insolvency Act 1986, and that under both the subjective and objective test set out in 
that section, D had failed.
However, the court went on to say that as this was a case under S 212 Insolvency Act 1986, the 
subjective effects of the director's action could also be viewed in considering whether, under S 
727 Companies Act 1985, he could be afforded a defence to his actions. As only he and his 
wife would suffer from his actions, it was clear that there had been no dishonesty involved but 
that there had been gross negligence. As a result, the director was excused from some but not 
all of the liability64 .
The section is analogous to the American provision of the "Business Judgement Rule"65 . This 
principle has been a part of the American principles of corporate governance for over one 
hundred and fifty years. It acts as a shield against personal liability for the director where his 
decision has caused commercial mismanagement. The essential elements are:
(i) that there was an absence of personal interest or self-dealing by the director, 
(ii) that it was an informed decision, which reflects a reasonable effort (subject to permitted 
reliance on the advice and efforts of others),
(iii) there was a reasonable belief that the advice would serve the interests of the corporation, 
and 
(iv) that there was good faith66.
This equitable concept, provides the court with a broad discretion to determine whether the 
director should indeed incur personal liability, but the rule is not a matter of right. For
64 Ibid, para h.
65 See post Chapter 8.
66 Joseph Hinsey IV: "Business Judgement and the American Law Institutes Corporate 
Governance Project" George Washington Law Review, 1984, 52.
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instance, in Norlin Corporation v Rooney, Pace Inc.61, the rule was not used to protect 
directors who had issued shares to employees, ostensibly as an ESOP or employee benefit 
programme, but which was in fact done to fight off a take-over bid. The court concluded that 
despite the large independent element on the Board, the scheme was managerially self- 
perpetuating. The scheme would however have been viable had the self-interest not been 
established68 .
The court's intervention is not to be an everyday occurrence where, in the absence of 
stockholder approval, the courts become surrogate shareholders. Rather the court's 
intervention comes where the directors' actions have constituted a breach of trust69 . The 
principle has with it the hallmark of American free-market enterprise, as it captures the essence 
of liberal attitude to entrepreneurialism, which includes allowing for commercial mistake.
It has prompted analysis of its relationship with the duty of care for directors. During the 
eighties this standard was also objectivised by the Principles proposed in the Model Business 
Corporation Act. Here, the Standard for the director was that of the 'ordinarily prudent 
person'. This proposed draft seemed to engender the idea that the business judgement rule was 
at last being codified. However, the basis of the rule is subjective, looking at the personal 
characteristics of the director. The result would be a two tier system of care. Under the code, 
an objective duty, which if breached would not necessarily mean personal liability for the 
director if he could then go on to show that the business judgement rule applied .
In the case ofAronson v Lewis ", the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that liability under 
the business judgement rule is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence. The effect of 
such a rule would allow the British courts to recognise the relevance of S 727 Companies Act 
1985 in this scenario. However, in rejecting its application to the area of wrongful trading we
67 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 91, 564 (2nd Cir June 27, 1984).
68 Southern Public Services Co. v Graniteville. C.A. No. 83-1028-8 (D.S.C May 19, 1983).
69 Justice Louis Brandeis in Cooper Securities Co. v Amalgamated Cooper Co., 244 US 261, 
263 (1917).
70 Supra 65.
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see a gap arising between the flexibility of the American system, and the rigidity of judicial 
intervention in the British system.
Clearly, wrongful trading is designed to inhibit the idea that the director has at all times a 
'carte blanche' to indulge in commercial activity, regardless of the consequences to the 
shareholder, even if he can show that he gained no personal profit from his trade, and that he 
acted in good faith. The business judgement rule allows the director to be more cavalier with 
the company without incurring personal liability. His British counter-part is however, limited 
when it comes to the question of taking such action to get the company out of financial 
difficulty, if it necessitates him trading while insolvent.
This is perhaps a broader refection of the philosophical state of the nations to the question of 
director management. There is however a strand of opinion within the commercial community 
in Britain which would no doubt be quite at ease with accepting the more commercially daring 
principle of the American courts72 .
For its part, wrongful trading is at present a hallmark of British conservatism in the free 
market, but this has its problems in trying to stem the ever increasing tide of market openness 
and free trade spirit.
Judicial Reservation of Wrongful Trading
In the case of Re Bath Glass ", two directors were faced with a disqualification order of up to 
fifteen years, under S 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The section
71 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
72 See post Chapter 9.
73 [1988] BCLC 329.
44
Wrongful Trading : A Case Law Study
provides that where a company is insolvent, the court is under a duty to make an order for a 
period of not less than two years where :
"... on the application of the section, it is satisfied (i) that he is or has been a 
director of a company which has at any time become insolvent (whether while he 
was a director or subsequently), and (ii) that his conduct as a director of that 
company (either taken alone or taken together with his conduct as a director of 
any other company or companies) makes him unfit to be concerned in the 
management of a company. "?4
The case involved a company dealing in crafts, in which the directors were also the major 
shareholders. From June 1981, the company's balance sheet showed that the company was 
making a loss; that year it was £20,000. By 1982, the liabilities of the company exceeded the 
assets of the company by £36,000, and by 1983, this resulted in a loss of £60,000 and liabilities 
exceeding assets by £75,000. This increased to a £120,000 deficit by May 1984 and £158,000 
by June of that year.
Throughout this period Midland Bank continued to support the company although, throughout 
1985 it did press the company to reduce its borrowing, which it did by some £87,000, albeit at 
the expense of the Crown in relation to monies owed for VAT, PA YE contributions and 
national insurance75 . When the company was compulsorily wound up on 14th July 1986, it 
had an estimated deficiency regarding creditors of £128,000, including VAT sums of £38,000 
for the period of May to December 1985, and PA YE tax and national insurance contributions 
to the sum of £68,000.
In the judgement, counsel for the Official Receiver, argued that while the directors were not 
dishonest in terms of committing fraud, there had been some dishonesty in continuing to trade 
while not telling the creditors of the true position of the company and of not paying the 
creditors76 .
Section 6 (l)(a)(b), Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
Ibid, p 335, paras d and e.
FKiH n "J3R riara a76 Ibid, p 338, par  a.
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During the final years of trading sums of £5,750, £39,000, and £55,200 were paid to the new 
company called Collective Ltd., by the managers. The sums were justified by the directors as 
being remuneration, which enabled them to keep a certain standard of living, and also to 
improve their homes, which were collateral for the monies borrowed from the bank. The 
judge, Peter Gibson J., stated that this was a criticism, as the directors had not kept the 
transactions between the companies at arms length77 .
Nevertheless, when it came to granting the order, Peter Gibson J. refused the Official 
Receiver's application for the following reasons. Firstly, he stated that the directors had in no 
way been dishonest, in that they had not benefited themselves at the expense of the company. 
Secondly, they had shown readiness to make a financial commitment to the company which 
was to their credit. Thirdly, accounts were always kept, and even if they were inaccurate, they 
were kept up to date with care and even caution. Fourthly, that the directors' belief that the 
company would trade out of difficulty was not without any rational foundation. Fifthly they 
took professional advice, and lastly, that the misfortunes of the company were not within the 
directors' control. For example, the breakdown of one of the director's marriage, a contraction 
in the craft market and a problem with one of the ranges of crockery which the company had 
made78 .
These defences can be criticised for several reasons. Firstly, on the question of dishonesty, the 
directors knew that the Inland Revenue had not been paid and yet continued to trade. The 
excuse the directors gave for non-payment, was that the Crown did not press for payment79 . 
Can this really be a good reason for concluding that the directors were not dishonest.?
The court also praised the directors for their account keeping, but there had been occasions 
where the accounts were submitted late, and, with the judge's admission, were not always 
accurate. The observation that the company could trade out of its predicament is hard to marry
77 Ibid, p 338, paras f and g.
78 Ibid, p 339, paras g - i. Also p340, para a.
79 Ibid, p 337, para h.
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with the fact that throughout the period 1981 to 1986, the company's deficit worsened 
considerably, as did its profit, and that the report of the Midland Bank in May 1984, opened 
with the statement that the company was insolvent.
Nevertheless, the directors continued to trade and the decision by the bank to continue its 
financial help, was taken on the understanding that the company would move into profit by the 
end of that year. This however was a view misguided by the fact that the bank believed the 
trading to belong to one company, when in fact the forecast was one for Bath Glass and 
Collective jointly.
Finally, the judge stated that there were factors which lay outside the control of the directors. 
This was a challenge to the orthodox position that judge never evaluates the decisions taken by 
the management80. In doing so, the judge opens a debate about the use of the judiciary as a 
means for establishing a more objective standard of behaviour for directors.
The case is the focus of much debate on this issue,81 * because while the judge was prepared to 
intervene and make the decision that the directors were not unfit, he was not able to invoke the 
wrongful trading provision at all, despite the fact that there was ample evidence, that even after 
the advice and opinion of the bank, the two directors continued to trade, while the company 
was clearly insolvent. This resulted in greater loss to the creditor, in particular the Inland 
Revenue and Customs and Excise.
The directors believed that their new Christmas collection and 'Dinner at Eight' collection, 
would genuinely take them out of their otherwise dire position82 . However, on the facts of the 
case there was a continued rise in the deficit, warnings from the bank and a decision to ignore 
payment of considerable sums of money to the public purse. Would this not constitute the sort 
of behaviour which the Cork Report envisaged the section covering?
80 See Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibility, Chapter 4, pi05-109 ante.
81 See post Chapter 4.
82 Supra 8, p 336, paras b and c.
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There are several explanations as to why the provision was not used in this case. Section 214 
has itself a disqualification provision which is to be found in S 10 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, Under that section, the court, upon making a declaration under 
S. 213 or 214 of the Insolvency Act, may consider "whether an application for such an order is 
made by any person,...also make a disqualification order against the person to whom the 
declaration relates."83
The major difference between the court's discretion under this section and S 6 of the Act, is 
that at no time can the court take into consideration the directors' performance in a company, 
other than that of the company in which he has wrongfully traded. If Peter Gibson J., had on 
the facts of this case, used the wrongful trading provision, he would have been faced with the 
almost inevitable decision of disqualifying the directors. They were considerably in debt and 
much of this had been due to their dishonest decision not to pay the Inland Revenue.
In making an analogy with those cases in which a successful claim of wrongful trading was 
brought, it is difficult to avoid perceiving a policy reason for an absence of the provision in the 
present case. The directors of Re Bath Glass, had established another company, Collective, 
which was trading successfully and a source of employment. To utilise a disqualification 
provision, which was not sensitive to this fact, would be to undermine the successful company 
by disqualifying its directors.
Section 6, however, has the dimension to look at the director's performance in other companies 
and decide on that broader base whether to disqualify. Thus, judicial interpretation of the 
provision was in this case deferential to the economic expediency of the commercial world. 
The judicial sensitivity to this matter which contains that element of socio-moral expectation to 
which corporate managers are subject as the commercial world relies increasingly on the 
public for financial input, can be justified in that too draconian a measure, illustrated in the
83 Section 10(1), Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
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effects of S 214, and the disqualification provision of S 10, fetters that growth in enterprise 
which is the desire of the vast majority84 .
The cost of the action would for the same reason, make the provision less attractive as a means 
for gaming redress against the directors. Based on 1991 figures it is suggested that between 
£30,000 and £50,000 are needed to bring a successful claim, where the evidence is clear, and 
the case is therefore straightforward85 . As costs are usually awarded against the defeated 
defendant, the two directors in Re Bath Glass, would have been faced with a considerable bill, 
which would not only damage their own capital, but also the capital of the new company 
which was trading successfully.
Whether costs would be universally so high is unclear. What the case does illustrate is that it is 
a real inhibition to the use of the provision. Peter Sergent writing about a case in which he was 
representing a group of creditors86 made the folio whig comments:
"Wrongful trading actions do not have to be taken in only larger cases; it can be 
successfully applied to smaller matters. What it does require is the courage, 
determination and willingness of the liquidator and his solicitor alike to carry 
the matter through to a successful conclusion despite the paucity of the available 
assets."
In this particular case, a husband and wife team had incorporated their business, running a tour 
operating company. The directors had been using customer's money to fund the company's 
working capital from the very beginning and had never operated a separate customer deposit 
account. The company never made a profit and was eventually wound up just over three years 
after its incorporation. The directors were ordered to pay £7,000 to the liquidator pursuant to 
proceedings under S 214, despite the fact one of them was unemployed87 .
84 Supra 40, and Chapter 1.
85 Figures from Report by Christina Williams and Professor Andrew Mcgee for the Chartered 
Association of Certified Accountants. LONDON 1992.
86 ibid at p 15. Fairmont Tours (Yorkshire) Ltd. (unreported), Insolvency Law and Intelligence 
(1990).
87 Supra 43, Chapter 4.
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One of the factors which led to the provision being so forcefully used in this case was the fact 
that a number of those who were affected by the directors' action, were old age pensioners 
who had paid money to the company and had lost out. It was the determination of the 
liquidator and the solicitor in this case to pursue the directors for compensation, which was the 
source of the success. This seems to be a rare move for a liquidator in circumstances where 
there is no large fighting fund nor assets to cover his costs in getting a case off the ground.
The motive behind the creditor is an important factor as to whether a case is brought at all. In 
this particular case, there was a feeling amongst those who had lost out as a result of the 
directors' actions, to make them pay for what they had done. This gives further strength to the 
argument that the provision is punitive in nature88 .
The paucity of case law, while indicating a dissatisfaction of the use of the provision, does 
illustrate some of the problems which the judiciary has faced generally in making decisions 
involving commercial judgements. In the next chapter, there will be an exploration of the 
problems faced by the judiciary and the Department of Trade and Industry, in the 
implementation of wrongful trading, and in particular the use of disqualification as an effective 
policing measure in the company.
The Position of the Shadow Director
Commentary on the interpretation of the shadow director's liability for wrongful trading, 
which is found in S 214(7) Insolvency Act 1986 only serves to buttress the general view of the 
judiciary's reservations in interpreting the concept of wrongful trading.
The importance of whom the courts have perceived as a shadow director is central to the 
section's effectiveness to act as an assessable measure which will produce a result. This is
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because often, the institution which will be under scrutiny as a potential shadow director in law 
is a bank with a considerable pocket and great influence over the destiny of many corporations.
Two cases which illustrate judicial reservation in this particular aspect of the section are Re 
Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd. 89 and Re PFTZM9**.
The first case involved the liquidation proceedings of Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd., a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Eagle Trust pic. The defendants were directors of Eagle Trust and sought 
to strike out the liquidators application for liability for wrongful trading on the basis that 
neither of the men were in fact directors or shadow directors of the subsidiary.
Millet J. defined three different types of corporate directors. First, in law, directors (validly 
appointed); second, de facto directors (those who assume to act as directors without valid 
appointment) and shadow directors (within the meaning of S 251 of the Insolvency Act 1986). 
While the judge was prepared to include all of the categories in the ambit of liability, pointing 
to the fact that the responsibility of directorship and not the validity of the appointment was the 
issue, he did stress the need to distinguish between the different types of directors when 
bringing a claim. Here, the liquidator had not distinguished between the concept of shadow 
and de facto a director91 .
In order to prove that someone was a de facto director all that was necessary to show was the 
person had acted as a director. However to prove that someone was a shadow director, it was 
necessary to show: firstly, who the corporate directors were (either de jure or de facto); 
secondly, that the defendant directors directed those directors how to act or that he was one of 
the persons that did so; and, thirdly, that those directors acted in accordance with such
88 See Chapter 1.
89 (1994) BCC 161.
90 [1995] BCC 280.
91 Supra 89, p 163, para c.
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instructions and were accustomed so to act on those instructions. The emphasis of the judge 
was clearly that shadow directors "...lurk in the shadows" and are not directors at all92 .
Millet's J. interpretation of the term "directors who are accustomed to act" was displayed as 
meaning the whole board and not individual directors of the corporation93 . Thus, on the facts 
of the present case, it was correct to assume that the parent company Eagle Trust was a shadow 
director, but the individual directors who made up the company, were not shadow directors. 
This was due to the fact that they did no more than was expected of a director in the holding 
company; to attend meetings, and to vote. For Millet J., the directors' duties were to Eagle 
Trust and not to the subsidiary. As a result, the liquidator's claim for wrongful trading was 
struck out94 .
In Re PFTZM, a company which ran a hotel and country club refinanced loans to H, a group of 
bankers for the sum of £6.75 million. It was agreed that apart from the security of the lease on 
the buildings, the bankers would be entitled to weekly meetings concerning the company's 
performance. These meetings were held for two years until the company went into liquidation. 
The liquidator brought exparte claims against the plaintiffs (H) after they refused to answer a 
second questionnaire which they thought was oppressive. The liquidator sought an action for 
wrongful trading.
In his judgement, Judge Sir Paul Baker QC, made a number of observations concluding that 
the bank was not a shadow director95 . The judge considered the powers of the bank as a 
secured creditor. The bank could take steps to recover its investment; it could give the 
borrower time to breathe; and it could choose to honour one cheque and not another. All this
92 Ibid, p 163, para e and f.
93 "Shadow Directorship - a Real or Imagined Threat to Banks", Insolvency Practitioner 
(1991), p 14-15.
94 The distinction here is important, as the de jure directors of the parent corporation were not 
de facto directors of the subsidiary (and thus exonerated). The parent corporation was not a 
shadow director thus not falling within the category of those liable for wrongful trading.
95 Supra 86 , p 290.
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however, could be seen as a display of the bank's objective of protecting its interest as a 
secured creditor and did not change the bank into a shadow director96 .
Importantly, the bank's actions were merely terms on which their finance would continue, it 
was up to the company whether or not to accept those terms and thus it was within the ambit of 
the company to direct without any direct help from the bank. The liquidator's claim failed 
therefore and the plaintiffs costs were paid.
The cases signal a lack of threat to the banks, but the cases also open a debate as to how 
independent the directors of the company have to remain from the bank's influence, before the 
banks are also included as a de facto or a shadow director. Provided that the company is 
allowed to make up its own mind whether to continue trading or go into liquidation, then the 
bank will not be a shadow director. This draws a fine distinction between a company who has 
no option but to go into liquidation on the advice of the bank, and one that chooses itself to go 
into liquidation. The important issue is that the company must take the decision itself 
regardless of how influential the advice is from others97 .
The cases also show the need for further legal clarity on what constitutes the definition of the 
term director. The position under S 741(2) Companies Act 1985, is that a parent company will 
not be a shadow director of its subsidiary just because the subsidiary's directors are 
accustomed to act in accordance with its directions or instructions. Section 251 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 does not include this caveat, nevertheless, the judiciary seems to have 
implemented one. The net result is that while statute law may have tried to broaden the ambit 
of the directorial net for determining liability, the courts have tightened the rope.
96 Ibid, p 291.
97 Gautam Bhattacharyya, Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd 'Shadow Directors and wrongful 
trading', The Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, no. 5, 1994.
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Clearly, the scenarios indicate that the liquidator should be very careful when alleging 
wrongful trading against a director98. This is particularly so in relation to the fact that the cost 
to the liquidator may result in even fewer assets being available to turn into money for the 
creditors. This was the case in Re Hydrodan.
The courts have prioritised the importance of the different contractual groups which make up 
the corporate nexus and to which company law constantly tries to strike a fair balance. The 
cases show that the banks as creditors will not be inhibited from lending money, on the basis 
that monitoring that loan may result in a claim for wrongful trading. It also allows for the bank 
to make offers to the company to suggest that the company remains as a going concern, again 
with the objective of freeing the banks from the threat of wrongful trading.
For the concept of wrongful trading itself, the cases illustrate a reluctance to use wrongful 
trading, perhaps because there are other policy reasons for narrowing its scope. The draconian 
consequences, applied to the concept have prompted the courts to understate the provision.
While this judicial reluctance to use the concept may be expedient to the commercial 
community, it does undermine further the intention of the 1986 legislation. This is to get 
tough on those directors who play with company assets, and who fall short of the objectively 
perceived standard of directorial behaviour, for which S 214 Insolvency Act has been held to 
be a statutory definition". This compromises the hope that the new concept of wrongful 
trading would lead to broadening the duty of the director in a 'professional' capacity. This has 
created an idiosyncratic history for the position of the director, as the role of insolvency law 
has become an important aspect of the general development of directors' duties.
98 See inter alia Gautam Bhattacharyya, Shadow Directors and wrongful trading revisited 
1995. The Company Lawyer, Vol. 16, no. 10, p 313.
99 Supra 61.
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CHAPTER 4
DISQUALIFICATION OF DIRECTORS AND THE 
INSOLVENCY SERVICE
An important aspect of director policing is the threat of disqualification, which will deprive the 
director not only of his current ability to act in a commercial enterprise, but will have the 
added burden of restricting his activities for sometime into the future. The objective of this 
chapter is to illustrate how effective this aspect of director policing is and also how effective 
the idea of disqualification is in attempting to raise the standards of the director's performance 
by acting as a threat to the director's livelihood.
Powers to disqualify were vested in the courts as a result of the recommendations of the 
Departmental Committee on the Companies Acts in 1925, which led to the implementation of 
ss 217 and 275 Companies Act 1928 re-enacted in the Companies Act 1948, ss 187 and 188'. 
The sections dealt largely with undischarged bankrupts acting as directors and with persons 
who had been convicted of fraud being involved in the management of a company.
These provisions were extended and toughened by the Companies Act 1976, extending the 
maximum disqualification period to 15 years for cases of fraud, and providing for the first time 
a register of disqualification orders. These provisions were further strengthened in the 
Insolvency Act 1985. Under this Act, it was possible to disqualify a director for an unlimited 
period, if he were to be found unfit to be a director, after one company failure2 .
1 L H Leigh (1986), 7 Company Lawyer, 179.
2 Insolvency Act 1985, S 12 (1) as amended by section 8 Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986. For a complete overview of the provisions, see post.
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Under s28 (1) of the Companies Act 1976, an extra power was given for "persistent default" of 
the Act. As Nourse J. reflected in Re Civicia Investments Ltd. 3 the first application of this 
provision was not made until 19804, and by the time this case had been brought to court, only 
four previous cases had been heard5 .
As a result of this section, the court was able to make a disqualification order for up to five 
years where a person had persistently been in default in relation to:
"Any provision of the Companies Acts which require any return, account, or 
other document to be filed with , delivered or sent, or notice of any matter to be 
given, to the registrar of companies."1"
From 15 June 1982, s28 was replaced by an amendment to si88 of the 1948 Companies Act 
made by s3 of the Companies Act 1981. This extended the power to make disqualification 
orders to cover liquidators, receivers and managers of the property of the company. At first, 
these powers were used cautiously7 with reference to their use being in the context of the 
defendants having a previous conviction in the magistrate's court for default and continuing 
defaults thereafter. Such caution was not obligatory however under the terms of the section8 .
The provisions were strengthened in the Companies Act 1985 s 300, where a director could be 
disqualified if his unfitness was illustrated through him being connected with two successive 
insolvent companies. This was tightened in subsequent legislation, to one failure9 . Thus The 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA), represents an attempt by the 
legislature to not only toughen the provisions relating to disqualification, but also to make 
them easier to discern by the lawyer10.
3 [1983] BCLC 456.
4 ibid, Nourse J., p 457.
5 ibid.
6 ibid, p 458.
7 ibid, p 459-460. Indeed in his summing up of the case Nourse was prepared to be on the 
lenient side with the director, giving him a one year ban from being a director because he 
had sought to put right the wrongs which had been done as a result of his incompetence.
8 "The Disqualification of Directors" Dine (1988), 9 Company Lawyer, 213.
9 Supra 2.
10 Thus a conviction of an indictable offence in connection with a company under S 296 
Companies Act 1985, became s2 CDDA 1986, and remedies for persistent default of 
companies legislation formerly in S 297 Companies Act 1985, were to become S 3 CDDA.
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Inspite of these far reaching measures, disqualification of directors was not frequently 
employed by the Department of Trade and Industry. The most compelling reason for this was 
the restricted number of individuals who could actually bring an order against a director, as 
only the Secretary of State or an Official Receiver nominated by him, could make an 
application. Also liquidators of companies were often disinclined to disclose knowledge of 
directors wrongdoing to the authorities even though they were under a statutory duty to do 
so". This inaction was the major consequence of the laissez-faire approach to industry which 
was the hallmark of the corporate policing institutions in the early eighties 12 .
However, with the passing of the Insolvency Act 1986, and the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, it was hoped that some of the more phlegmatic elements of 
corporate policing would be eroded and the threat of disqualification be a more effective 
measure in regaining director deference to the statutory provisions relating to amongst other 
matters, returns of accounts and fitness to direct13 .
The provisions, including section 6 of the CDDA, reduced the need to show mismanagement 
in two successive company insolvencies, and that the directors conduct would be judged on the 
facts of the current insolvency, although his activities, positive or negative, in other companies 
would be taken into consideration when making a disqualification order14 .
Only S 300 relating to unfitness discernible by two involvements with successive company 
failures within 5 years was dropped for a tougher regime (see supra 2).
11 Supra 2, S 12(a) and S 632(3) Companies Act 1985.
12 This inaction led to the reforms of 1986, with their reactionary approach to the problem of 
insolvency abuse by directors. See ante Chapters 2 & 3.
13 See The Cork Report 1982, para 1818.
14 See S 6 (l)(b). At S 6(2), the breadth of the section was illustrated by the broad definition 
of the term insolvent company, which is a prerequisite to the order being made. Apart from 
the balance sheet definition at section 6(2)(a), the company is also deemed to be insolvent 
when an administration order has been granted (S 6(2)(b)) and when an administrative 
receiver is appointed (S 6(c)). In contrast, S 8 CDDA, requires an investigation to have 
taken place for a disqualification order to be granted for unfitness. But here, the broader 
notion of disqualifying in the interest of the public is at the court's discretion.
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Throughout the latter part of the eighties there was a rise in the use of the disqualification 
orders which suggested that the traditional approach taken by liquidators was under threat. 
The following table shows the number of disqualification orders made before and after the 
advent of the 1986 insolvency legislation.
Disqualification Figures for 1978-1996' 5 :
15 See Annual Reports of the Insolvency Service 1978-1996, published by the DTI. During the 
latter part of 1996, the Insolvency Service issued proceedings against 352 directors 20% 
more than the previous year. DTI Press Notice No. P/97/162, 24.2.97. Business Law Review 
(April 1997).
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This increase shows that the Department of Trade and Industry realised that direct intervention 
to disqualify directors is a more effective policing measure than penalising the company with 
a fine in the hope that the shareholders will then bring an action against the directors to dismiss 
him 16 . The profit motive, traditionally central to the shareholder, will make them reticent to 
get rid of the corporate managers' 7.
16 S 303 Companies Act 1986. This section has been eroded in its effectiveness by the wide 
based share ownership and the gap of that ownership with corporate control.
17 See post Chapter 5, particularly focusing on the reasons for shareholder reticence in utilising 
their common law and statutory powers within corporate management.
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The Insolvency Service
The Insolvency Service is an Executive Agency of the DTI, and is designed to create 
confidence in the market by providing the means of dealing with individual and corporate 
financial failure and tackling fraud and wrong-doing in insolvencies' 8 . It principally operates 
under the Insolvency Act 1986, The CDDA 1986 and the Companies Act 1985. Its principal 
functions are numerous:
i) the preliminary administration and investigation of compulsory insolvencies 
(bankruptcies and companies, including partnerships, wound-up by the courts) and 
acting as interim receiver and provisional liquidator in appropriate cases
ii) to report criminal offences in compulsory insolvencies and taking disqualification 
proceedings against unfit directors of failed companies (including Scotland)
iii) to act as trustee or liquidator in compulsory insolvencies where no private sector 
insolvency practitioner is appointed
iv) to authorise and regulate, directly or through recognised professional bodies, of 
private sector insolvency practitioners (including Scotland)
v) to provide banking and investment services for bankruptcies and liquidations
vi) to provide advice to Ministers on insolvency issues (including corporate insolvency 
in Scotland)
vii) to operate the IS accounts.
With such a broad spectra of responsibilities, the Insolvency Service stands at the centre of 
issues relating to more than just the winding-up or rescuing of the company, and has the
18 The Insolvency Service Annual Report 1992-1993: Introduction and Summary.
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responsibility for determining factual situations which will result in a successful 
disqualification of directors and other office holders who have breached their duties and who 
have mismanaged company affairs.
It is this element of the Service's responsibility which is affected most by the way the courts 
have chosen to interpret that legislation which currently provides the Service with ammunition 
to curtail managerial fraud and negligence. An inconsistent approach by the courts would 
inevitably lead to uncertainty in the Service about the success of a potential order being sought.
The Insolvency Service along with the DTI's Investigation Division, provide the epicentre of 
evidence building for successful claims against directors. Other bodies which aid in this are 
the Serious Fraud Office, the Securities and Investment Board, the Crown Prosecution Service 
and the Police Force, as well as the regulatory bodies on the Stock Exchange.
The relationship between the courts and these bodies has been an important factor in the 
effectiveness of the service as a policing measure 19. The legislation of 1986, intended to 
provide more stringent standards for corporate managers, increasing the penalties for 
mismanagement, particularly where the company is in financial difficulty.
However, the courts have taken a flexible approach to the use of disqualification orders in 
fulfilling this objective. Under section 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986, it is possible for a director who is disqualified to apply to the courts for leave to be 
reinstated. The courts have seized upon this waiving provision as a method for exonerating 
company directors from disqualification, not just at a stage later on in their disqualification, but 
earlier, when the initial decision to disqualify is being made20.
19 See "Investigations - How They Work", DTI, 1993. In particular, the responsibilities given 
to the different bodies so that there is no overlap in their investigation processes.
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The Effect of Case Law
The judicial journey in making the CDDA an integral aspect of commerce's attitude to and 
expectation of director activity, has produced certain criteria which balances both the need to 
set standards of commercial integrity while at the same time allowing for directors not to feel 
too inhibited by any draconian legal consequences to the inherent characteristic of risk in their 
responsibilities.
The legacy of Re Bath Glass21 was illustrated in Re Matthews22 . Here Peter Gibson J. again 
exercised wide discretion in deciding the fate of the director. The case was brought under the 
old rules in the Companies Act 1985 (section 295 and Pt 1 of schedule 12). Here, a director 
who conceded that his conduct in two failed limited liability companies was unsatisfactory, 
argued that he had learned his lesson and that the public had no need to fear from his 
management in a third company which was successful.
Peter Gibson J., while not accepting this argument as justifying the exemption from a 
disqualification order, did remark that an application for reinstatement as a company manager 
would be viewed with sympathy if the defendant continued to trade in an unlimited liability 
company23 .
A more liberal approach was taken by Mervyn Davies J in Re Majestic Recording Studios 
Ltd.24. Here, a director was able to continue trading as long as he remained subject to the 
auspices of an independent accountant and to submit audited accounts by a specified date. A 
significant factor in the judge's decision was the need to protect the 50 or so employees of the 
second company. The imposition of a third party to oversee the actions of the director, was
20 See cases below and inter alia, "Partial Disqualification Orders", David Milman, 1991, The 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 11.
21 [1987] Ch 329, Supra Chapter 3.
22 (1988) BCC 513.
23 ibid, p 518.
24 [1989]BCLC1.
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allowed in Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd. 25 . Here a named person, a qualified accountant, 
also remained a director of the company, and the controlling voting share was to remain with 
the family.
The above cases were decided under the former rules relating to disqualification which were to 
be found in s 300 of the Companies Act 1985. The predilection of the judiciary to be flexible 
in the decision to disqualify directors carried forward into the subsequent legislation relating to 
disqualification. In Re Chandos Ltd. 26 , a director of a company that was undercapitalised and 
that had failed to produce proper accounts was allowed to continue as a director of a successful 
company as long as he held monthly board meetings in which the company's auditors would be 
present. This arrangement was for a trial period of one year, but the judge allowed for a fresh 
application to be made by the defendant at the end of that period.
These cases illustrate the judiciary's objective of trying to weigh what is often the conflicting 
interests of commercial functionalism with the need to protect the public from the corporate 
managers who utilise their position for their own personal gain. The balance between 
encouraging enterprise and protecting the consumer and creditor is a fine one and the judges 
have displayed caution in developing the concept of a partial disqualification order27 .
This objective is complicated by the equivocal ambit of the provisions of the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act (CDDA) 1986. The standard of behaviour which warrants a 
disqualification order, gives the court the same degree of difficulty in defining the underlying 
objective of the provisions as it faced when implementing the then new provision of wrongful 
trading, after the 1986 legislation28 .
The most frequently employed section of the CDDA 1986 is section 6 relating to the 
disqualification of directors for unfitness. The Act contains criteria for the courts to use in
25 [1988]3WLR26.
26 [1990] BCLC 673.
27 David Milman, 1991, The Company Lawyer, 224 - supra 18.
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deciding that a director is unfit. Under section 9 and Schedule 1 part I of the Act, a director 
will be disqualified if he has committed a misfeasance in his fiduciary position, in relation to 
the company29, has retained monies30, has entered into preference agreements31 , has failed to 
comply with the administrative provisions of the Companies Act relating to company 
administration, and finally has failure to make annual returns or make annual accounts32 .
Under Part II of the Schedule, there are further matters which relate to insolvency only. These 
include the responsibility of the director in the company becoming insolvent33 , the 
responsibility of the director in failing to supply goods which have already been paid for34 , the 
director's responsibility for entering into a preference35 , a failure on behalf of the directors to 
call a creditor's meeting in compliance with section 98 of the Insolvency Act, as well as a 
failure on behalf of the director to comply with those aspects of the Insolvency Act which 
relate to the winding-up of the company, including providing a statement of affairs, and 
cooperating with the liquidator36 .
In order to establish whether the courts have been able to employ an objective standard to the 
cases involving disqualification, it is first necessary to analyse the evolution of the 
disqualification order.
The philosophy underlying the disqualification provisions, reflects the changing attitude of the 
courts to the objective of disqualification. The position was unequivocally stated by Bramwell 
L J. in Mellor v Denham 37, commenting on whether a disqualification order was a criminal or 
civil consequence. He said :
28 Supra, Chapter 2.
29 Schedulel.pt 1(1).
30 ibid (2).
31 ibid (3).
32 ibid (4).
33 Schedulel.pt2(6).
34 ibid (7).
35 ibid (8).
36 ibid (9) & (10).
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"...it is clear to my mind that the matter complained of is in truth a criminal 
offence...."
This statement reflects the criminal/quasi-criminal nature of the disqualification order which 
has resulted in the courts finding mitigating factors within the civil legislation relating to 
director disqualification, which clearly have a penal or had criminal characteristic to them. 
This in turn detracts from the underlying philosophy of civil law which is protect the 
consumer, without reference to the consequences for the director.
In the case of Green v Green 38, the appellants pleaded guilty to carrying on a business with 
the intent to defraud creditors, contrary to the Companies Act 1948 section 332(3) which had 
resulted in a suspended prison sentence, a fine and disqualification. On appeal, the sentence 
and the fine were quashed as was the disqualification order. No distinction was made between 
the fine and imprisonment (which clearly involve punishment) and the disqualification order. 
The same factors were regarded as mitigating or aggravating in respect of each possible 
outcome39 .
The argument for the nature of disqualification to be placed in a criminal context was given 
further credibility in Re Gilgate Properties Ltd. 40 . Here, the judge, Sir Robert Megarry VC 
heard three originating summonses on the basis that the directors of the company had been 
"persistently in default in relation to relevant requirements of the Companies Act" (s28 of the 
Companies Act 1976). Counsel for the defence argued that the introduction of evidence about 
the former misconduct which showed a failure to comply with the Companies Act, was 
analogous to the effect of adducing previous convictions in criminal law.
The judge while arguing that this analogy was far from perfect, did conclude that there were 
grounds for accepting that former misconduct whether charged separately or not, could be 
relevant in illustrating the sophistication of the director's activities in avoiding the provisions
37 (1880)5QBD467.
38 (1981)3CrAppRep.
39 Supra 11.
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which led to a s28 charge being successfully brought against him. In doing so he gives the 
provision an unequivocal message, that disqualification is indeed punishment41 .
The quasi criminal nature of the disqualification provision will effect the judge's conclusion 
that the case has been sufficiently well evidenced against the director. The more serious the 
consequence of the actions, the more burdensome it is for the petitioner to prove his case. The 
extension of the civil burden of proof was recently illustrated in the case of Re Living Images 
42 when, on making a disqualification order of six years, the judge was not prepared to allow 
grounds for disqualification where a transfer of unprofitable business was made to the 
company and was held by the petitioner not to be in the best interests of the company. The 
case shows that something beyond commercial misjudgement is to be shown before the 
disqualification order is made; trading while insolvent and depriving the company of profitable 
business were two such criteria.
The theme of punishment is reflected further in R v Kazmi n . Here disqualification was 
mentioned as a criminal penalty with the objective of a deterrent. In Re Stanford Services 44 
Vinelott J. stated that the consequences faced by the director reflected the:
"Serious breaches of obligation as a director, which for the public interest 
resulted in an order of disqualification."
The case law does not reveal any consistency, but instead reflects the ambiguity of judicial 
reasoning which pervades the area of corporate governance. In R v Russen 45\ Lord Lane CJ 
stated that the "primary object of disqualification is to protect the public". What was important 
in this case which involves revenue debts was that the judge saw no direct harm to the public. 
This reasoning is somewhat compromised if the broader view of not contributing to the public 
purse is reflected in public services being cut.
40 Ch 13:3:1981. (unreported).
41 Supra 11.
42 [1996] 1 BCLC 348.
43 (1984)7CrAppll5.
44 [1987] BCLC 607.
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The diversity of reasons for the disqualification order to be implemented is further highlighted 
in the actual grounds for disqualification itself. Discerning a sufficient mental element for 
disqualification has left the courts with several options. Under s6 of the CDDA, the question 
of unfitness has initiated three standards, the compromise of which will lead to a 
disqualification order being granted.
First, a disqualification order will be granted if there has been a "disregard for commercial 
morality". In Re Dawson Print Group Ltd. "6, Hoffmann J. refused to grant a disqualification 
order because the case had failed to show the requisite need that:
"some conduct in breach of standards of commercial morality or some gross 
incompetence which persuaded the court it would be a danger to the public if he 
was allowed to be involved in the affairs of the company."
In this case a disqualification order was refused under section 300 of the Companies Act 1985, 
where a director had been involved in two companies which had been compulsorily wound up 
owing money to the Crown in the form of PAYE, NIC and VAT. In Re Bath Glass "7 , the 
incompetence and imprudence of the directors was not enough to justify a disqualification 
order as Peter Gibson J. stated that:
"To reach a finding of unfitness the court had to be satisfied that the director 
had been guilty of a serious failure or series of failures, whether deliberately or 
through incompetence, to perform those duties of directors which were attendant 
on the privilege of trading through limited liability companies."
This conclusion was reached despite the fact that the company was insolvent owing the public 
purse £128,000, while there was clear evidence that the directors had ignored constant advice 
from banks that the company was insolvent48 . The issue of a greater culpability attaching to 
debts owed to the crown have taken a more positive course in subsequent cases, such as Re
45 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 6 July 1984, transcript from Lexis.
46 (1987) BCLC 601.
47 Supra Chapter 3 at 32,
48 See case in Chapter 3
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Pamstock Ltd. 49. Here, Vinelott J. made an issue of the fact that crown debts had gone 
unpaid, but the case is unusual in that the activities of the director concerned were being 
focused on over a period of fifteen years and thus the protracted nature of his bad conduct was 
important.
In Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd. 50, again brought under section 300 of the Companies Act 
1985, Browne-Wilkinson VC said that commercially culpable conduct would be a ground for 
finding unfitness, which contrasted with mere mismanagement which he said would not 
constitute unfitness51 .
In Re Ipcon Fashions Ltd. 52, Hoffman J. spoke of the directors' activities as displaying:
"a certain cunning in dealing with his suppliers and disposing of assets."
In that case the director started to trade in another company while winding-up the first. The 
judge had no hesitation in disqualifying the director for five years. In the case, the moral 
overtone of the condemnation of the director by the judge, displays the penal nature of the 
legislation which the judge felt was appropriate to comment upon53 . The hallmarks of 
"Phoenix Syndrome" were undoubtedly an important factor in the decision as this was one of 
the major reasons why the legislation was initiated hi 1986. It was the cynical use of limited 
liability rather than any personal dishonesty in that case which prompted the disqualification 
order54 . The court does leave in doubt whether the reasoning was entirely protective in nature. 
Ipcon was clearly another case involving impropriety and this is illustrated hi the use of the 
term "commercial morality".
49 [1994] 1BCLC791.
50 (1988) BCLC 698.
51 McNullty's Interchange Ltd. [1989] BCLC 709.
52 (1989)5BCC733.
53 Vanessa Finch, 1990, 53 Modem Law Review, 385.
54 Re Douglas Construction Services Ltd., [1988] 4 BCC 553, 557.
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The second reason for implementing a decision that the director is unfit, is on the basis of 
"reckless mismanagement", which occurs regardless to whether the company has the ability to 
pay its debts. In Re Stanford Services 5i, the Official Receiver placed emphasis on the fact that 
the directors continued to trade while effectively insolvent. This showed that the director was 
in sufficient breach of duty in not keeping himself informed of the company's financial 
position, and as a result was liable to be deemed unfit even though the actual practice of not 
keeping sufficient monies by to pay public taxes was not in itself a breach of commercial 
morality56 .
The case of Re C U Fittings Ltd 51 , distinguished the most morally culpable reason for 
disqualification, that of breach of commercial morality, with the director who simply made a 
bad commercial decision. The concept of reckless mismanagement, was in this case 
considered as being the product of the directors being "immersed in the day to day task of 
trying to keep their business afloat" so that they could not be expected to possess "wholly 
dispassionate minds" regarding the likely demise of their companies. They tended to:
'cling to hope '^8
This quote from Hoffmann J. seems to permit a rather cavalier ethos to the actions of the 
director justifying it in the name of commercial enterprise. This remains so even to the point 
where it begins reflecting a sentimental part of the director's activity; the very thing which the 
legislation of 1986 was meant to combat. If therefore the error of judgement was for the right 
reason, the director can feel safe from any disqualification ramifications, but that does not 
mean that he will always be free to do what he pleases. The judgement does not indicate that
55 Post 67.
56 The inability to keep informed as to the current state of company accounts was a reason for 
a two year disqualification against a director in the case of Re Hitco 2000 Ltd. [1995] 2 
BCLC 63.
57 (1989)5BCC210.
58 ibid at p 214
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the court will take a protectionist view of stakeholder interests when creating a legal remit for 
directors' duties, and thus does not comply with the general aspirations of the Cork Report59 .
The third reason for being deemed unfit is that of "gross incompetence". In Re Rolus 
Properties Ltd. 60, Harman J. stated that the lack of knowledge displayed by the director in 
relation to those administrative aspects of company law relating to the keeping of books were 
relevant for the purpose of determining unfimess6 '.
This case perhaps indicates that placing the requisite level of intention too low in determining 
disqualification, would discourage entrepreneurs. As Harman J. recognised,
"The purpose and great value of the invention of 1862 and of the limited liability 
company was to enable the entrepreneurs to take risks without bankrupting themselves"^.
Against this argument is the fact that in these circumstances only truly incompetent 
entrepreneurs would be discouraged and that that is a small price to pay for exacting a greater 
degree of commercial integrity in the market.
These cases do not provide an exhaustive list for determining unfimess. The Company 
Directors Disqulification Act 1986 itself gives a comprehensive list of matters to be taken into 
consideration when determining unfimess. In Schedule 1 part 1, a list of matters concerning 
all companies is given. These include any misfeasance or breach of fiduciary duty, the 
misapplication or retention of money, by the director, and the failure of the director to comply 
with those administrative provisions of the Companies Act, for example, section 221 (failing to 
keep accounting records).63
59 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee, Cmnd 8558, Chapter 44, 
para 17777
60 (1988)BCC446.
61 Francis Fitzpatrick, 1992, 142 New Law Journal 596.
62 Supra 46, p 557.
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Part 2 of Schedule 1 deals with those matters which are relevant to companies which have 
gone into liquidation64 . This section reflects on the director's responsibility for the company 
becoming insolvent, and a failure by the director to comply with those administrative aspects 
of the Insolvency Act which deal with the director assisting the administration of the 
company's winding-up, for example, section 235 (the duty to co-operate with the liquidator).
While comprehensive, this schedule does not provide an exhaustive list of factors for 
determining disqualification65 . The attitude of the directors to 'Crown' debts has proved to be 
a significant factor in determining whether a director is to be deemed unfit. The lack of 
payment of Crown debts, has led to the courts taking a tougher line with directors. In Re 
Churchill Hotel (Plymouth) Ltd.66, the courts seemed to follow the rule laid down in Re 
Stanford Services 67, that monies used as working capital which should have been used to pay 
crown debts was a significant factor in determining the unfitness of the director. However, this 
was not followed in the case of Re Dawson Print Group 6S .
The amount of the outstanding debt, and in particular Crown debt was the important issue in 
Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd. 69, while issues as diverse as the age and experience of the 
director may mitigate the disqualification70 . These differing degrees of behavioural 
justification for initiating the disqualification order have led to judicial uncertainty in a number 
of recent cases, as the courts have continued to be busy in implementing such orders. 
Perhaps the most enlightening admission of the judiciary's eclectic approach to the issue of 
disqualification comes from Dillon LJ in Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd. 71 where on 
commenting on unfitness he states:
63 Supra 29-36.
64 See ante.
65 Janet Dine, 1991, 12 Company Lawyer 6.
66 [1988]BCLC341.
67 [1987] BCLC 607.
68 [1987] BCLC 596.
69 Supra 50.
70 Supra 24.
71 [1991] BCLC 325.
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"Unfitness. is a question of fact, what used to be described in the Chancery 
Division as a 'jury question'. "72
In Re Chadwick Warren Control Systems Ltd. 73 , failure by a director to disclose an interest in a 
company's transactions, led to a six year and a two year disqualification order. The 
indebtedness of the company upon insolvent liquidation was £3 million. The Secretary of 
State sought an order for disqualification on the basis that the directors had bought a new 
company without disclosing that they had a financial interest in the company being acquired.
Chadwick J. distinguished between the director who did not disclose because he wished to 
deliberately deceive the members, in which case a six year disqualification order was 
appropriate, and the director who did not wish to deceive. There a two year order was 
sufficient74 . This shows that while moral culpability is important in terms of 'sentencing', the 
order itself will be granted without having to show rashness or imprudence75 .
In Re Gsar Realisations Ltd. 76, continued trading by an insolvent company involving a failure 
by the director to co-operate with an office-holder and produce a statement of affairs - three 
years disqualification order. Three years was also given in Re New Generation Engineers 
Ltd11, where accounts were not properly kept, making it impossible for the directors to keep 
abreast of the company's financial position, and thus not paying those creditors who did not 
press for payment, the Crown being the most deprived creditor. The facts are similar to Re 
Bath Glass, but in this case there was no alternative commercial activity in which the directors 
were participating which would have been undermined by a disqualification order.
72 ibid, p 330.
73 [1993] BCLC 80.
74 Louis Doyle: Solicitors Journal, 18th February 1994.
75 Supra 46.
76 [1993] BCLC 409.
77 [1993] BCLC 435.
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In Re Swift Ltd. (sub nom SoS for Trade and Industry v Ettinger) ?&, directorial activity in 
sixteen other companies did not prevent the court on appeal increasing the disqualification 
order from three to five years, on the basis of failing to keep the appropriate accounts.
The cases illustrate that to find an objective standard which produces a uniform decision in 
determining the culpability for disqualification and the length of any order is beset with the 
same problems of discerning the attitude of the commercial world which is found in the 
legislation relating to wrongful and fraudulent trading. To make decisions too tight, would 
render the insolvency legislation too draconian, and too difficult to evidence. To make it too 
liberal would undermine its position as an effective policing measure.
The disqualification provision for wrongful trading is found in section 10 CDDA, and is less 
severe than the unfitness provision at section 6, as it does not compel the court to disqualify 
and there is no rninimum disqualification provision. In Re Bath Glass, 79 it was argued that the 
definition of unfitness should be no lesser a test than that for wrongful trading. But the court 
said that the wrongful trading provision created a specific offence80 .
Nevertheless, wrongful trading can be used to furnish evidence of unfitness and thus the two 
sections are not completely separate. With the decision in Re Bath Glass, it seems clear that 
when the wrongful trading provision is too inflexible to use, because the facts of the case 
would render a disqualification order inevitable, section 6, an ostensibly tougher measure, is 
employed because its wide discretionary element gives the court the power not to disqualify. 
The wrongful trading provision becomes increasingly obsolete.
In Re Continental Assurance Company of London ", Mr. Justice Chadwick stated that:
78 [1993JBCC312CA.
79 (1988) 4 BCC 130.
80 Geraint G Howells : Directors Disqualification and Unfitness, 1988,132 Solicitors Journal
1470.
81 The Times, Monday 8th July 1996.
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"gross incompetence which did not amount to dishonesty in a director of a 
company could be regarded as unfitness for the purposes of making an order 
under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. "
It was concluded in that case that the director who was a corporate financier, should be able to 
read and understand the accounts of the company in which he was a director82 .
The case involved a Mr. Michael Gordon Burt who was a director of Continental Assurance 
Company of London pic from June 1988 to November 1991. The sole allegation related to 
unsecured interest free loans made by Continental Assurance to Yorkdale Holdings Ltd. to 
enable Yorkdale to service bank loans made specifically for buying shares in Continental 
Assurance.
The Secretary of State's case was based on the fact that these loans contravened section 151 
Companies Act 1985 as financial assistance. It was also contended by the Secretary of State 
that there was no ground for believing that the loans would be repaid or that there was a 
commercial advantage to Continental Assurance in making the loans.
The defence for Mr. Burt was that he did not know what was going on, and that had he known 
he would have prevented the transactions from occurring. Mr. Justice Chadwick was prepared 
to believe this defence even though he was of the opinion that what had been going on was 
plain for everyone to see83 .
However, Mr. Justice Chadwick's opinion was that the director did not know because he did 
not choose to read the relevant accounts. Had he done so, there would have ample evidence to 
conclude what had been happening. In not looking at the accounts, Mr. Justice Chadwick 
concluded that Mr. Burt had failed in his responsibilities as a director. Thus it was not his 
knowledge, but his failure to give himself the knowledge, which rendered the director 
incompetent.
82 ibid.
83 ibid.
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Mr. Justice Chadwick went on to conclude that this sort of incompetence fell short of what 
people expected when dealing with directors, particularly as in this case, Mr. Burt was in fact 
the finance director. The incompetence was gross, by 'allowing' the loans to take place.
The defence forwarded the argument that the director was only in charge of allowing the loan 
to take place and he had not directly been involved in its initiation. However, Mr. Justice 
Chadwick was adamant that the law should not be strictly interpreted, so that the more general 
question of incompetence could not be circumvented on the basis of a technicality. As a result, 
Mr. Burt was disqualified for three years.
Inconsistency has come from the nature of disqualification itself being interpreted in more than 
one legal context, and the legacy of the 19th century has remained inspite of the commercial 
expectations of creating a new morality after the inception of the 1986 legislation. The courts 
clearly see the gravity of disqualification as a concept in need of refinement at the point at 
which the case is viewed on its facts, and not something which can be the product of 
commercial prescription. This fact however has clearly produced a cautious attitude within the 
Insolvency Service and other agencies which was not the intention of the 1986 legislation on 
director's civil responsibilities and liabilities. 84
84 See post.
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The Effectiveness of the Insolvency Service
The net result of the judiciary's incapacity to set standards of certainty in the process of 
disqualification is that the Insolvency Service will only bring action against directors where it 
almost certain of achieving a positive result.
In the Auditor General's Report on The Insolvency Service Executive Agency85 , figures 
showed that while the number of cases for disqualification brought was comparatively small in 
relation to the number of insolvencies, on average the ratio was 1:36, the actual success rate for 
the cases brought was in fact very high, 93% of cases having a positive result for the DTI.
The demands of economic expediency have mitigated the more stringent elements of the 
CDDA, notably illustrated in Re Bath Glass, but this has not been the only or indeed the most 
demonstrable factor in inhibiting the execution of disqualification orders. The financial strains 
upon the Disqualification Unit of the Insolvency Service have clearly had a marked effect on 
its effectiveness.
In the year 1992-1993, for instance, Official Receivers successfully submitted reports to the 
unit within fifteen months of the beginning of the investigation, on 35% of occasions. This 
compares with 49% for the previous year. The escalation in the case load was not responded 
to with an increase in resources, which would enable the service to function more proficiently.
The impact that this has on the effectiveness of the legislation is that time limits for 
disqualification orders are being exceeded with the result that application for disqualification 
orders are dismissed. For instance, the time limit for section 6 CDDA, is two years. Under the 
current financial conditions, forecasts suggest that up to 50% of applications for 
disqualification will not be brought because of the service's inefficiency.
85 Report by the National Audit Office, 20th October 1993, HMSO.
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The court's initial jurisdiction for allowing an application to be brought out of time is found in 
section 7(1) of the CDDA, which provides that:
"If it appears to the Secretary of State that it is expedient in the public interest 
that a disqualification order under section 6 should be made against any person, 
an application for the making of such an order against that person may be 
made:
(a) by the Secretary of State
(b) if the Secretary of State so directs in the case of a person who is or 
has been a director of a company which is being wound-up by the 
court in England and Wales by the Official Receiver."
The court does have a discretion to allow an order to be brought under section 6, out of the 
time limit of two years (section 7(2)). In Re Probe Data Systems Ltd. (no.3), Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry v Desai 86 Scott LJ said that the court should take into account the 
following matters when determining whether an application for an order should be made out of 
time: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the strength of the case 
against the director and (4) the degree of prejudice caused to the director by the delay. In that 
case, it was argued that there had been undue delay in commencing proceedings within the two 
year period, and that this was a factor which should be taken into account. The court held that 
while such delay could be relevant, it was not material on the facts of the particular case. In Re 
Tasbian Ltd. (No. 3) 87 Balcombe LJ said :
"There can be no point in extending the time if the application is going to fail. 
If, however, the court is satisfied that the evidence shows a fairly arguable case 
on the applicant's part, then on this ground alone, that is leaving aside the 
reasons for the delay and any questions of prejudice to the other party, the court 
will not refuse leave. "&&
In Re Crestjoy Products Ltd. 89, leave for an order to be brought out of time was refused on the 
grounds that understaffing and pressure of work on the Insolvency Service itself was not 
enough to justify a delay in the proceedings, and that the court would look more favourably on 
an application which was brought within the two year period than after it.
86 [1992] BCC 110, pi 18.
87 [1992] BCC 358, p 362.
88 Disqualification and Personal Liability of Directors, Fourth Edition : L.S Sealy. 1993.
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The procedure to extend the time limit is made ex parte which is designed to filter out the 
unmeritorious claims which would be thrown out at an early stage. Millet J. preferred this type 
of application as it would enable the courts to get an overview of the case as the initial 
application would contain a detailed affidavit including the reasons why the extension of time 
is meritorious. If there was, the Respondent would be allowed to challenge the application, 
again providing the judge with evidence to support the claim. An integral understanding of 
both cases could then be realised before any decision was made90 .
Another restriction relates to the amendment of mistakes in the application. 91Here the judge 
ruled that the test was twofold. First, the mistake had to be genuine, and secondly, it had to be 
capable of amendment, such as one of the names of the parties. If the mistake is so 
fundamental that it constitutes a mistake at law, then the application will be thrown out. For 
instance, making the identity of the plaintiff ambiguous, in the hope that an amendment at a 
future date would extend the time limit for the eventual application. The result is that the 
application for the change in the originating summons was successfully thrown out.
However, the courts will not always give in to a technicality which the defence relies on to get 
an application thrown out. In the case of Re Seagull Manufacturing Company Ltd. 92 , 
Blackburne J. allowed an order for disqualification even though the Official Receiver had 
structured the summons too narrowly by including references to S.l(l) of the CDDA 1986. 
The judge ruled that such narrowness was irrelevant in the case, as the order sought under S.6 
could be granted without reference to S. 1 of the Act.
With such restrictions, both in substantive law and in procedure on the reasons for bringing an 
application out of time, the DTI has frequently failed to make a successful disqualification 
order. More recently, the DTI had its application for a disqualification order thrown out
89 [1990] BCC 555.
90 Abbas Mithani and Sally Wheeler : "Disqualification Orders Out of Time", 1989, 86 Law 
Society Gazette, 32,28.
91 See inter alia Millet J in Evans Ltd. v Charrington and Co. Ltd [1983] I QB 810.
92 [1996] 1BCLC51.
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against Mr. Asil Nadir.93 In the case, which was unreported, Lindsay J. stated that there was 
"no good reason" for an extension to the time limit and that there had already been 
"unreasonable" delays in the case to date.
Most of the evidence in that case was based on reports submitted by accountants Touche Ross, 
and the court felt that while one report was highly critical of Mr. Nadir, there was insufficient 
evidence in the reports generally to justify a disqualification order against Mr. Nadir. In view 
of the large sums involved in the case with Mr. Nadir facing charges of £34 million for theft 
and false accounting, the case was highly embarrassing for the DTI.
The importance of keeping within the time limit is twofold. First it encourages the liquidator 
to be efficient in his preliminary investigations concerning the director of the company, and 
second to allow the director to restructure his business career without the fear of the 
disqualification order from being resurrected94 . The strictness of the provision was illustrated 
when, in Re Tasbian 95 Peter Gibson J., stated :
"the power of the court to extend time would no doubt be used in a case where 
information was available after the two years were up."
This has been rejected by Millet J amongst others who restricts the extension to circumstances 
where the director furnished misleading information to the office holder which resulted in 
relevant information being received out of time. 96
The combination of judicial inconsistency and financial constraint has led the Insolvency 
Service to be cautious in bringing an application for disqualification. The Service's
93 Report by Andrew Jack, Financial Times, 26th November 1993.
94 Supra 89.
95 (1989) 5 BCC 729.
96 Supra 89
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performance for the year 1992-1993, by its own admission, fell short of the targets in previous
years.97
In particular, resources dedicated to specialist investigations had to be moved to initial case 
work to handle the unprecedented number of insolvencies and assure standards in that area. 
That, combined with the increasing focus on larger, more complex corporate failures resulted 
inevitably in the reduction of numbers in the prosecution and disqualification reports submitted 
by Official Receivers (916 compared with 1,391 in 1991-92), as well as in the timeliness of 
submission of those reports. Interestingly, while the number of directions for disqualification 
orders fell by 19.4%, the actual number of orders obtained increased by 36.8% in the face of 
more and lengthier defences to proceedings98 .
This last statistic belies the fact that during the period 1992-1993, the actual submission of 
reports for disqualification orders fell to only 80% of its previous year level.
The combination of these figures, in particular the seeming discrepancy between the number of 
directions issued and orders achieved, displays a narrowing in the Insolvency Service's 
decision to initiate proceedings.
A contrast can be made with bringing proceedings for disqualification under section 5 of the 
CDDA. Here, a disqualification order will be made for those directors who fail to return 
company accounts on time. The evidential burden for this is quite straight forward, as the 
absence of a return of the accounts ten months after the accounting reference date for the 
company will mean that some action will be brought, be it a fine, or in more serious cases, 
disqualification.
97 Supra 85 p 3 para 9. While acknowledging disqualification of 1700 directors the Agency 
points out that with the constraints of time, and identifying the basis for claims the service was 
not fully protecting the commercial world and the public at large against directors who abuse 
limited liability status.
98 Supra 16, Appendix 4.
82
Disqualification of Directors and the Insolvency Service
Magistrates seem to be increasingly keen to disqualify directors for the breach of this duty". 
Like so many other provisions of the Act, the underlying philosophy of whether the reason for 
disqualification is to penalise the directors or to protect the public, is uncertain. Nevertheless 
with the computerisation of the system the net results relating to fines and disqualification's 
have proven most successful. In 1992, 16 directors were disqualified for breaching S 5. 100
The examination of the relationship between the courts and the service has illustrated an 
inconsistency which prompts a more circumspect regard from the Insolvency Service as to the 
result of a case before it decides to embark upon a lengthy course of legal action.
The service has also faced criticism in the light of its report on Insolvency Practitioners (IPs). 
The report showed that out of 147 random visits carried out by its monitoring unit, 18 
practitioners were identified as having "significant compliance problems". These are currently 
being investigated by the Law Society, which is the professional body responsible for licensing 
IPs.
The report went on to show that during 1992-93, detailed special investigations were begun on 
nine practitioners while two practitioners and two managers received custodial sentences 
resulting from earlier investigations. Problems highlighted by James Lingard a partner at 
Norton Rose included the "sloppy or dishonest administration ...or inadequate supervision 
rather than the fault of the legal advice the IPs are getting."
The net result is that the service cannot continue to fulfil those tasks to a sufficient degree 
without something having to be compromised. The wrongful trading provision as well as the 
disqualification provision under section 6 of the CDDA, have proven expensive luxuries which 
the service has chosen to ignore in favour of securing the effective winding-up of companies 
and distribution of those assets already in the company. The risk of losing assets in the hope of
99 Elizabeth Hope: Maintaining an up to date Record, The Legal Executive Journal, December
1993.
100 ibid.
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obtaining more from the personal liability of directors is a real one as vast amounts of 
company capital can be swallowed up in fruitless litigation. 101
The initiation of section 214 Insolvency Act 1986, exemplifies the nature of the underlying 
problem faced by the courts and the Insolvency Service. It represents a move towards greater 
certainty in determining standards of practice, but in doing so, compromises that degree of 
flexibility which the courts and the Insolvency Service have considered as important in 
maintaining the desire to keep directors in business despite having made errors.
The Cork Report itself commented that:
"A balance has to be struck. No one wishes to discourage the inception and 
growth of business, although both are unavoidably attended by risks to 
creditors."
To mitigate this growth in the pursuit of greater and stricter policing measures, proves too 
draconian and inflexible102 .
One further point indicated by the Auditor General's Report is the lack of respect company 
directors have for the insolvency legislation 103 . Fifty eight per cent of directors are currently 
unaware of the provisions of the CDDA, and of those who are 53% consider the legislation 
unsuccessful in deterring unfit conduct. Forty three per cent also thought that proceedings 
were not brought against a sufficient number of directors. Seventy five per cent of IPs who 
also responded to the survey, consider that the Act is not proving successful jn putting 
directors out of action, while 73% consider that it does not protect the public interest. Sixty 
one per cent thinks that it does not deter unfit conduct.
101 The cost of winding-up an insolvent estate was recently viewed in the Maxwell case 
where the 1.5 million pounds was reduced to 68 000 after the expenses of the winding-up. This 
has prompted calls for a watchdog to be introduced. See The Times, July 1997.
102 "S214 Insolvency Act 1986 and the Private Company: Why it may fall short of the mark" 
Christina Williams, 1990, 11 Company Lawyer 222.
103 Supra 82, part 4, figure 7.
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Approved for 
Investigation
33(31)
28(15)
12(6)
5(-)
Refused
138(130)
25 (37)
12(4)
2(12)
Total Considered
171 (161)
53 (52)
24(10)
7(12)
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These figures show a demonstrable disaffection amongst the commercial community with the 
current state of the legislative aspects of commercial governance aimed at insolvency. This 
fact may increase in the light of some more figures released by the DTI. In a press note 
released in January 1994, figures emerged which illustrated some of the sources of complaints 
which acted as a basis for an application for director disqualifications 104 . The figures show that 
there is an expectation gap between the public and the DTI, in deciding what conduct is to be 
deemed sufficiently wrong to bring a disqualification order.
Members of the Public
Other divisions of the DTI
Other Regulations
DPP/Police
Totals 78(52) 177(183) 255(235)
Note: The figures in parenthesis represent figures for the previous quarter.
The ramifications for the Insolvency Service is that there will be an increase in the number of 
members of the public who will feel aggrieved with the actions of a director, but will be 
frustrated because their actions will on a vast majority of occasions be refused investigation by 
the DTI.
There are several different problems to be faced with achieving higher levels of corporate 
governance through the vehicle of the Insolvency Act 1986. Firstly, there is the problem of 
defining the perimeter of commercial activity which will prevent a claim for wrongful trading 
and/or any subsequent disqualification order. In this respect, the propinquity between realising 
the problem and taking action seems to be an all important criterion, yet no definite time 
element is produced. This contrasts with, for example the German system. There, the director 
is compelled to petition for what is termed composition proceedings, or Vergleichsverfahren,
DTI press notice - DTI Investigations Rise, 6th January 1994, p 94,95.
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within three weeks from discovering the insolvency. A failure to do so either intentionally or 
through the director's negligence will result in the director being faced with a criminal charge 
and the obligation to make restitution to those people with whom he traded after the date of 
insolvency. 1M
Second, there are the problems of resources which beset the Insolvency Service. It will depend 
on the number of insolvencies generally, whether the service commits itself to action against 
directors for wrongful trading and disqualification. The most recent figures from the DTI 
show that the number of insolvencies is falling from a high of 6,699 in 1992, to 5,276 for the 
last quarter 1993, although that in itself was a rise of nearly 100 on the previous quarter's 
figure of 5,195 106 .
The effectiveness of the service's policing abilities also depends on its capacity to monitor, 
those people who have been disqualified. Under S.I8 of the CDDA, the Secretary of State, is 
obliged to maintain a register of orders made under the Act. The register is then open to 
inspection so that anyone can discern whether a director is in fact disqualified. Despite the 
computerisation of the system, which deals so effectively with directors who fail to make 
proper returns, 107the same sort of efficiency does as yet not seem to be a part of monitoring 
disqualified directors, as the initiative for discovering who is disqualified is left in large to 
those who are in business with the disqualified director.
Third, there is the increase in the number of institutional shareholders. During the 1980s, the 
percentage of public company equity held by institutional shareholders, had risen from 34% in 
1969 to 66% in 1985 108 . This has awakened a new interest from the public in company 
management which will continue to be an area of concern for those directors who up until now 
have maintained an Utopian state of autonomy in the management of company affairs. While
105 Louis G Doyle: (1992) 13 Company Lawyer 96.
106 British Company Law and Practice, 96-222.
107 Brenda Hannigan - Disqualifying Company Directors, (1987), LMCLQ 188. 
108 A. Cosh et al "Institutional Investment, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control", 
(1989), 7 International Fed Industrial Econ 73, p 77.
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the DTI figures indicate that this may be no more than an increase in failed attempts to 
disqualify company directors, it still compels those directors to be more deferential in 
communicating with its shareholders, and broadening their responsibilities in this area.
As the path for the director becomes increasingly paved with extra considerations responding 
to the public's concern for proper managerial behaviour, the ability of any one service to 
police all aspects of corporate governance, currently expected from the Insolvency Service, 
becomes increasingly difficult. As the insolvency legislation denotes a universal degree of 
'penalty' as its consequence, any extra responsibilities placed upon a monitoring service may 
well fall outside the current ambit of court involvement. This leaves open the area of self- 
regulation, to fulfil those elements of corporate governance, which are at present not addressed 
by legislation.
Practice Direction (Companies Court: Directors, Disqualification)
At the end of 1995 109, the Vice-Chancellor issued a Practice Statement to streamline the 
procedure for disqualifying directors where there was agreement between the director, the 
Receiver and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. Until this Practice Statement, it 
was necessary for proceedings to be brought, which were costly and time consuming.
The Practice Statement, came as a result of the high growth in the number of disqualification 
proceedings that were instigated during 1995. In this respect, new amendments to the 
legislation through Statutory Instrument, would afford the courts greater flexibility in deciding 
which cases would come for trial and the question of disqualification would be dealt with as 
expeditiously as possible.
109 The Times, 21 December 1995.
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The direction extends the principles decided upon in the case of Re Carecraft Construction Co. 
Ltd. "°. Here Mr. Justice Ferris developed a summary procedure for disqualification cases in 
which there were no disagreements of the material facts and no dispute about the appropriate 
period for disqualification.
The judge also commented on the need to reserve court time for those cases which did involve 
a dispute and accordingly, the practice direction is to be read in conjunction with the Insolvent 
Companies (Disqualification of Unfit Directors) Proceedings Rules (SI 1987 No 2023) and 
The Chancery Guide (The Supreme Court Practice 1995 (volume 2 paragraphs 874-899).
Clearly, the Service demands more resourcing if it is going to react to the changing fortunes of 
corporate life. However, that is not the only change necessary to improve the effectiveness of 
the service. An overhaul of the legislation is required to give clarity as to when liability will be 
incurred by directors and discretion to the courts so that they can view the merits of a potential 
disqualification case individually. This has already been exercised with the use of the partial 
disqualification order. The two objectives for the service is to create greater efficiency in the 
objectives of winding-up the corporation and to create confidence that the malpractice of 
directors will result in action being taken.
[1994] 1WLR 172.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the amount of knowledge displayed by corporate 
directors of the current legal perameters which exact standards of behaviour from and impute 
personal liability to them. The questionnaire was composed in order to obtain this 
information and was directed at one hundred private and public corporations. It was answered 
in some detail by over 30% of those contacted. While this ostensibly low return illustrates 
the corporation's inability to provide time for the answers; a factor expressed in some of the 
letters returned, the detail of the returns provides enlightening evidence of the attitude of the 
corporation to the standard of directorial behaviour and the objectives of the current law and 
regulations which affect them.
The primary focus of the questionnaire 1 was to establish the level of director's knowledge, of 
the existing legislation concerning directors' duties. Of those directors who responded, 20% 
of them stated that they were very aware of the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, with a 
further 80% stating that they had some knowledge of the Act. Also, 33% said that they were 
very aware of the Companies Acts of 1985 and 1989, with 67% having some knowledge of it. 
Finally, 7% were very aware of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, with 67% 
having some knowledge with 26% being unaware. To exact how up to date their knowledge 
of the Acts is, the directors were further asked if they were aware of the currents provisions 
of the Acts, and the answers were 8% very aware, with 67% having some knowledge and 
25% being unaware.
Their awareness of the provisions of the Insolvency Act illustrates an encouraging level of 
knowledge relating to the provisions of fraudulent trading and wrongful trading (with which
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67% of directors were familiar and 33% unfamiliar). However, doubt as to the level of 
knowledge expressed by directors was raised in their attitude to the concept of "phoenix 
syndrome". Many of the returns expressed dissatisfaction with the law's ability to stop 
company directors from sequestrating assets from an insolvent company and starting afresh 
with those assets in a new corporation; freeing themselves from liability for the former 
corporation's debts. The Insolvency Act currently outlaws such practices under SS. 216 and 
217. This did not seem to be understood by many of the directors and their corporations. 
However, there is a possibility that the directors realised that the provisions were there but 
were making a comment on the fact that the provision is badly policed2 and were 
circumvented by many directors in practice.
The data seems to display a gap between the ideal expectations of the directors towards their 
understanding of the different laws (47% thought it very important that the laws be 
understood, and a further 40% thinking it important), and the actual knowledge of the 
directors. What directors showed however, was that they had a very different view on the 
ability of the legislation to affect them, illustrating their belief that the legislation does not 
achieve the objectives for which it was implemented.
This result directly affects the purpose of wrongful trading which was to act as a deterrent to 
those directors who would be fearful of incurring personal liability for being too cavalier with 
the corporation's, and often the creditor's, money. These figures therefore underline those 
researched by the Auditor's General Report 19933, which also indicated that there was a lack 
of faith in the ability of the legislation to be effectively enforced. There did however seem to 
be a greater awareness of the insolvency provisions than the indirect disqualification 
provisions of the CDDA. However, some larger corporations were keen to point out that the 
provisions had less effect on them because the structures of the corporations were such that it
1 For the full text of the questionnaire see Appendix 2, post.
2 See ante Chapters 3 & 4.
3 See Chapter 4. In particular at pages 2 and 3 of the report the figures indicate that nearly 
60% of directors had not heard of the 1986 Company Directors Disqualification Act, thus
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was difficult to tell who was liable. Clearly the personnel in these corporations felt 
"cushioned" from personal liability, further undermining the legislation's deterrent effect.
Two consequences were felt to arise from this last point. First, that directors who feared the 
consequences of the insolvency provisions were likely to have an assured view of their 
personal integrity. The insolvency provisions did not increase that integrity, but simply 
reaffirmed it. Second, the scope for abuse of the legislation, was greater in larger 
corporations, where the emphasis on policing bad mergers and ill advised policy decisions 
meant that a claim for wrongful trading would not be deemed an issue, even when the 
corporation had fulfilled the criteria for the initiation of the section4 . This is a disturbing 
consequence for the legislation as those directors in the larger institutions have greater access 
to public funds, through direct investment through advertising or through the indirect 
investment of pension funds.
Ironically, this is in complete contrast to the dicta in Re Produce Marketing Consortium 5, 
which reaffirmed the standard of care imposed by S.214 Insolvency Act as requiring a 
subjective criterion based on the experience and any special skills which a director may have. 
In his decision, Knox J stated that the court was to have regard to the particular director and 
the particular company, even though this was further subject to a minimum standard6 . The 
implication of this statement suggests that where corporations have a far reaching 
responsibility, because of the way they are financed, or because of the number of people they 
employ, directors should have at their disposal a better degree of care and skill than someone 
in a smaller corporation which has less financial resources and commitments.
undermining its ability to act as a deterrent. The report also pointed to the variation in 
researching evidence for proceedings as further undermining the objectives of the Act.
4 Only a few large firms such as Polly Peck actually go into insolvency, and so technically 
fulfil the prerequisite for the wrongful trading provision, under section 214 (1) Insolvency 
Act 1986. In most other cases, rescue packages would be available in the public interest as 
the affect on society in terms of lossed taxes and jobs would be much more acute than in a 
smaller corporation.
5 See ante Chapters 2 & 3.
6 Re Produce Marketing Consortium (No 2) 1989 BCLC 520 AT521 para b.
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The question for wrongful trading was whether it could effectively provide the commercial 
world with an objective standard for directorial behaviour. Clearly, the courts have 
recognised the provision as providing statutory objectivity for skill and care where the 
common law failed to make provision7 . For those directors which responded to the 
questionnaire however, the issue displays a dichotomy amongst the financial directors. In 
answering the question whether the law could provide an objective criteria for directors, 53% 
thought that the law was able, while 40% thought that it was impossible. Only 7% were 
undecided. For those corporations who thought that the objective standard was impossible, 
the breadth of the duty and the range of those expecting to benefit from that duty, were 
factors to be considered in concluding that the task of creating one standard, would be 
difficult.
It seemed apparent from those directors which had some knowledge of the legislative duties 
of the Companies Acts and Insolvency Act, that the best way of attaining the objectives was 
to increase the level of training afforded to directors both before they took office and during 
their employment. Of the replies received, 60% believed that some training was necessary, 
but this still left 40% believing that training was not essential. The majority view here 
clearly reiterates the objectives of inter alia , Pro Ned8, which emphasises the importance of 
creating effective communications between directors and those who are in a position to 
monitor their activities. Similarly, communication was at the vanguard of those corporations 
surveyed, in determining improvement in directorial skills.
Most strikingly, during the largest corporate collapse in recent years, the Queen Moat House 
failure of 1993/1994, its chairman John Bairstow, confessed that the corporation outgrew the 
size of the management and that the "loose" structure which resulted from this, prevented the
7 See inter alia, the judgement of Hoffman LJ in Re D'Jan of London [1994] 1 BCLC 561 
(Chancery Division).
8 The "Promotion of Non-Executive Directors", reporting annually, on the topic of
directorial training, 
outlined the importance of attending regular training sessions, in view of the increase in the
changing role of non-executive directors. Nevertheless, the theory here can be translated to
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effective communication and monitoring , essential for good management9 . However, it may 
be too prescriptive to conclude that legal training alone will provide management with the 
necessary skills to fulfil the expectations of inter alia, the shareholders. Obviously, there is a 
perceived need from within industry that more detailed training is part of an overall package 
to enhance directors' performances.
The concept of limited liability is the over-riding advantage of incorporation. Nevertheless it 
also raises some of the most important reasons for the drive to improve the responsibilities of 
directors that take its advantage. It is of no surprise therefore that there is overwhelming 
support for the use of the corporation as a means for conducting business. In response to the 
questionnaire on this issue, 67% of corporations lent themselves to the notion that to trade 
through a corporation was desirable, while only 25% thought that it was undesirable. Eight 
per cent were undecided. These figures, read in conjunction with the above figures on 
directorial training, bring with it some interesting attitudes of finance directors. First, there 
seems to be a substantial number of directors who are conscious of the advantages of 
incorporation, but who also realise that with these rights comes corresponding duties. One of 
the major points of scepticism regarding the court's attitude to directors and their position in 
the corporation, is that the advantages of corporate status are always utilised while the 
responsibilities are too often avoided 10.
Second, in justifying the use of the corporate form, the directors were aware of the 
advantages of limited liability in the corporation, and also, its structural efficiency within the 
commercial world. One of the major concerns from directors however, was the abuse of the
executive directors as a part of the general change to the legal position of directors. 
September 1992.
See "The Sunday Telegraph" 27th February 1994.
For a commentary on the reasons for ensuring that the corporation is used with equal 
amounts of responsibility, when declaring the concept of separate legal entity voidable, see 
inter alia, "Piercing the Corporate Veil and the Insolvency Act 1986" The Company 
Lawyer Vol 6 No3. Wilkinson, and "Lifting the Corporate Veil in the Pursuit of Justice" 
1990 JBL. Gallagher and Ziegler. These articles comment on the need to curb directors 
from utilising the corporate form for ulterior, often personal motives. Clearly, the 
corporation's integrity as a legal concept has to be upheld, resulting in the corporate veil 
being raised.
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corporate form by those larger corporations who set up subsidiaries to test the market, with 
the knowledge that the parent corporation remains safe upon the subsidiary's insolvent 
collapse. This problem, is indicative of the court's restrictive view to lifting the corporate 
veil to try and produce an equitable result, in forcing liability onto the parent corporation.
This fact was illustrated in the case of Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Company v 
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Limited." Here, the liquidator acting on 
behalf of the plaintiff subsidiary, sued the parent oil corporation to get at its wealth, which it 
was hoped would pay off the debts of the subsidiary. In the judgement, appeal to serve the 
parent corporation out of the jurisdiction was denied on the basis that there had not been any 
mala fides by the parent corporation in setting up the subsidiary and that only the inclusion of 
such mala fides would produce a lifting of the corporate veil 12 . As the corporation was not a 
sham ab initio, then the separate identity would remain13 .
This position contrasts with that in Germany, where under the German Companies Act 1965, 
a detailed and complicated provision relating to group enterprises, provides for inter-group 
liability. The concept is called integration (Eingliederung), and occurs where the parent 
corporation holds such a substantial share in the subsidiary that they can be treated as one 
economic unit14 . Under S.322 of the Act, a parent corporation will be liable for the debts of a 
subsidiary in a joint and several manner, and the concept is a recognition of the parent 
company's power over the subsidiary 15 .
"[1983J3W.L.R492C.A.
12 See ibid, Dillon L.J. p518, Lawton L.J. p501 and May L.J at p 511.
13 See Wedderburn . 1984 M.L.Rp92.
14 German Companies Act 1965, s.319. If the parent holds 95 per cent of the shares of a 
subsiduary it may acquire the remaining 5 % compulsorily. A similar provision is found in 
Section 429 of the Companies Act 1985,concerning a shareholder who has 90% of the 
company shares. See Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) [1992] BCLC192. The sections illustrate 
the presumption in corporate law that the practical consequences of such a large holding 
can produce a right to confirm that holding through consolidating the share ownership. 
Thus the economic reality of the situation is supported.
15 H. Wurdinger, "German Company Law (Oyez LONDON, 1975) p 145.
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The British position clearly requires something more than the control factor to try and raise 
the veil on parent corporations to settle the debts owed by their subsidiaries. The concept of 
wrongful trading 16 has it is hoped, been received as one of the legal devices to obtain such 
liability in the absence of fraud 17, and to mitigate the abuses of corporate veil, which has left 
many unsecured creditors without legal action while parent corporations prosper. As 
Templeman LJ stated in Re Southard & Co. 18 :
"To the dismay of its creditors, the parent company and the subsidiary 
companies may prosper to the joy of the shareholders without any liability for 
the debts of the insolvent subsidiary. "
The Cork Report19, raised the issue of inter group liability based on the German system of 
Konzern, but the initiation of wrongful trading, can be seen as an attempt to patch the 
problem of inter group liability in the absence of a formal set of principles which will state 
when group liability will take place.
The basis of liability for the parent corporation under S. 214 Insolvency Act occurs when the 
subsidiary trades while insolvent and the directors fail to wind the subsidiary up when there 
was "...no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid insolvent liquidation". The 
concept of director is defined in S.251 as "any person occupying the position of director by 
whatever name called". Under Schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978, "person" includes 
company, so that if the subsidiary acts in accordance with the management of the parent 
corporation it can be said that the parent can be a director which can be made liable for the 
wrongful trading of the subsidiary20 .
The success of the provision depends on how ready liquidators will be able to invoke the 
concept, to try and obtain liability from parents in a group. With the ambiguities already
16 See ante Chapters two and three.
17 See inter alia, Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832 and Re a Company [1985] BCLC 333, 
where the concpet of fraud was central to the decision to lift the veil in the circumstances.
18 [1979] 1 WLR 1198
19 See ante Chapters Two and Three
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surrounding the successful application of the section, it may be that the liquidator will be 
disinclined to try and unveil the parent, and to compromise the seemingly unassailable 
concept of separate legal personality. The time and expense of the claim for wrongful trading 
may also prove a disincentive for application21 .
In the meantime, while the enforcement of the provision is subject to financial and procedural 
difficulties, the strict position of the English law remains intact as was illustrated in the case 
of Adams v Cape Industries 22 . Here, a parent company, Cape Industries, could not be made 
liable for liabilities imposed on its subsiduary by the American courts. Here, there were 
several hundred plaintiffs who were claiming compensation for asbestos damage caused by 
the subsidiary of Cape, NAAC. In his judgement, Slade J, rejected that the companies were a 
single economic unit, and rejected the idea that a such a principle could generally be enforced 
in a group of companies. Instead, he re-enforced the view of Roskill LJ, in The Albazero^ 
that:
"each company in a group of companies (a relatively modern concept) is a 
separate legal entity possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities ".
While his Lordship had sympathy for the plaintiffs in the case and was aware of the fact that 
the lay-man would presume that the two companies were the same, there were in his opinion, 
too many injustices that could arise from making the group a legal single entity. They looked 
to legal technicalities for justifying the decisions of, inter alia, DHN Foods.
The expectation gap between the public's perception of corporate responsibility and the legal 
justifications for limiting that responsibility was illustrated in the Auditor's General Report 
(October 1993)24 . Here, of the 171 complaints initiated by the public against directors, only 
33 were investigated. The expectation gap represents a problem in that it shows that in their
20 Andrew Wilkinson. "Piercing the corporate veil and the Insolvency Act 1986." 1987 The 
Company Lawyer Vol 8 No 3 p!24.
21 Ante Chapter 4.
22 [1991] All ER 929
23 [1977] AC 744 at 807
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quest for justice, the general public will perceive the particular circumstances in which a 
corporate wrong has taken place as justifying a particular course of action; disqualification 
for example. However, the judiciary's approach to the corporation's management, ostensibly 
one of non-intervention, has to balance the needs of the general public, and the corporation's 
benefit to it, with the needs of the smaller group of individuals who at the time of the 
corporate wrong will feel aggrieved.
From the inception of its use, the corporate form will be treated by some of its directors as an 
engine for manipulation and even fraud. Where the courts have lifted the veil, the directors 
have been liable for such abuse25, but with the inadequate policing measures which are a 
consequence of the lack of funding and ambiguous and difficult legislation, the Insolvency 
Service is failing to act as the effective watchdog which the inherent powers of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 were designed to impose26 . In particular, corporations which responded 
to the questionnaire, were concerned for the use of the corporate status to offset then- 
liabilities, by going into insolvent liquidation, and then setting up a new corporation, using 
the assets of the previous insolvent corporation; the concept known as "phoenix syndrome."
This concept was made illegal under SS. 216 and 217 Insolvency Act 1986, which banned the 
use of the corporate name of the company which had gone into insolvent liquidation, for a 
period of up to five year after the insolvency27 . The result of trading in contravention of this
24 ante 19
23 See inter alia, Gilford Motors Co Ltd v Home (1933) Ch 935 (Court of Appeal), and Jones 
v Lipman [1962] 1 ALL ER 442
26 "Efficient Disqualification : Auditor's General Report on the Insolvency Service Executive 
Agency: Company Director's Disqualification." Tim Pryce-Brown. (1994) International 
Banking and Financial Law Journal.
27 Section 216 (3) Insolvency Act 1986. This states: 'Except with leave of the court or in 
such circumstances as may be prescribed, a person to whom this section shall applies shall 
not any time in the period of 5 years beginning with the day on which the liquidating 
company went into liquidation -
(a) be a director of a company that is known by a prohibited name, or
(b) in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned to take part in the promotion, 
formation or management of any such company, or
(c) in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the carrying on of 
a business carried on (otherwise than by a company) under a prohibited name.
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section is a fine, imprisonment or both28 . This illustrates two factors about the section. 
Firstly, the quasi criminal nature of the activities displays the problem of defining this sort of 
directorial behaviour and then applying an appropriate set of legal principles to it29 . In 
particular, the time limits in which an action can be brought and the problems of trying to 
define an appropriate objective for the legislation, has meant that cases are often not brought 
against directors for fear of wasting public money when not being able to secure a 
conviction30 . The commercial community seems to be in tune with the perception of being 
able "to get away" with "phoenix syndrome", and clearly commercial expediency will 
demand it, where the subsequent corporation proves to be a success.
This produces a fundamental second problem of corporate monitoring, based in the 
construction of appropriate degrees of monitoring and repercussions, for different 
corporations. Clearly, within the legal framework in which we currently find the corporation, 
the application of the appropriate areas of the Insolvency Act are proving inadequate, too 
prescriptive and poorly funded31 .
Prescribing one formula for the future of governance will be perhaps the most difficult and 
controversial issue in the future of corporate control.32 The use of the Cadbury Code with its 
emphasis on the initiation of different committees and sub-committees, 33 has indicated the 
strength of the reaction to a prescriptive formula for governance34 . The responses to the 
questionnaire indicated a similar pattern. Of those directors questioned, 53% were familiar 
with the Cadbury Code, while 7% were neutral, and 40% were not familiar.
28 Section 216 (4) Insolvency Act 1986. States: If a person acts in contravention of this 
section, he is liable to imprisonment or a fine or both.
29 ante 26.
30 ibid
31 ibid
32 See inter alia.Tricia Gardom, Group Marketing Direrctor, F I Group pic. Fabian Society 
Conference, St Ermin's Hotel London, September 20th 1995. She argues that the future of 
governance was to recognise the subjective needs of different corporations and to 
recognise that the nature of the concept of stakeholder will be different for each 
corporation.
33 Post Chapter Seven.
34 In particular, criticism has come from Sir Owen Green, and others who see the imposition 
of such committees, as a costly and time consuming restructuring programme.
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The thrust of the Code, was aimed at listed corporations and large public and private 
corporations, although it was hoped that the objectives would filter through to the medium 
and small corporations35 . It seems however, that the Code has only been incorporated by 
those who are large enough to undertake the cost of the Code's recommendations, and even 
within that group, the recommendations are incorporated on a piece-meal basis and not 
embraced in full36 . The split in the familiarity with the Code thus reflects the growing 
diversity in the attitude of corporations to the non-legal governance devices which are 
currently advocated in the corporate community and which can be seen as further evidence of 
a non-intervention policy of the Government37 .
However, while only half of those companies questioned were familiar with the Code, an 
overwhelming 73% of responses, approved legislation as an appropriate device to enhance 
standards of corporate behaviour, and only 20% approved of the voluntary code. The reasons 
for this are several, but in particular, the Code does not give the sort of clarity which can be 
afforded by legislation. Legislation has the ability of first defining the group of corporations 
which will be effected by the Code and perhaps more importantly, the penalty for non- 
compliance. The Cadbury Code is vague on both concepts, but in particular, the reaction to 
non-compliance is to be treated with scepticism.
In the Code, non-compliance has to be indicated to other corporations, by the insertion of a 
clause in the corporate returns indicating that compliance with the Code is not complete, and 
to give the reasons why38 . However, such a "penalty" can hardly detract from a prestigious 
commercial performer which decides not to implement some of the Cadbury provisions, 
because, it may actually have better in house provisions. A trading partner will not be 
deterred from dealing with the non-complying corporation if there is a profit to be exacted
35 ante 33.
36 ibid
37 ibid
38 ibid
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from the relationship. In this respect, the Code's credibility is undermined but also, it fails to 
compel corporations to address the issue of governance in general.
Yet, the concept of governance is something with which the overwhelming number of 
corporations are familiar. In response to the questionnaire, 67% said they were familiar with 
the term, 20% said they were undecided as to what the term meant and only!3% said that 
they were undecided. This reply gives the most significant illustration that the concept of 
governance is one of the most important issues to dominate corporate life in the nineties. 
This consciousness however, raises issues at the very core of governance which creates some 
confusion amongst those who are affected by the corporation.
First, what do directors mean by the term corporate governance. The answer to this question 
lies in the expectation of the officers, and of society to the concept of the corporation itself. 
There has clearly been an enormous increase in the number of corporations listed in the UK. 
The figure has changed from 14,000 in 1891, to over 1 million today39 . The corporations 
range from 25% having more than 5,000 employees and a turnover of £250 million, while at 
the other end of the scale over 25% have less than 50 employees, and one in five have a 
turnover of less than £1 million.40 With such a broad cross section of corporate entities, it is 
not surprising that the definition of governance to one director will be quite different from 
that of another.
Yet there are some important definitions that have been furnished to try and at least carve an 
outline for the concept. At the broadest definition, the concept is "... the issue of the 
relationship between the stakeholder in a company and those who manage its affairs (the 
board of directors)41 . Here, the duties of the directors are broadened beyond the traditional
39 Figures taken from a paper given by Professor Stephen L Bristow. "Corporate 
Governance-A cross-Sectional View. 1995 Conference of the ICSA Alberta Branch.
40 ibid
41 Professor D D Prentice "Some Aspects of the Corporate Governance Debate" from " 
Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, 1993 (25)".
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duty to the corporation and the shareholder, and are placed in a more circumspect category 
having regard for, inter alia, employees, creditors, the environment and society in general.
In a narrower sense, the concept has been viewed as expressing the relationship between the 
directors and the non-executive directors, whose job it is to ensure that the directors are 
accountable for their actions. In this respect, the non-executives are acting on behalf of the 
shareholder. Thus the answer to the question of who monitors management (thus creating 
governance) "...: independent outside directors elected by shareholders"42 .
For the Cadbury Committee, the definition lent towards the narrower definition, describing 
corporate governance as:
"the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards of 
directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors 
and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in 
place. "4$
This perception of governance coming from inside the corporation, is one which visualises 
governance with management. The two are so close that they must invariably interchange. 
The influence of the unitary board in the British and American systems of management has 
encouraged this introspective evaluation of governance. The citadel has been challenged, 
from various areas44, who confront this "good housekeeping" approach to governance, and 
who reject the argument that a change in governance requires not a managerial change but a 
philosophical change, encouraging greater input from other strands in the corporate nexus45 .
The question of governance is affected by the expectations of those who have an interest in 
the corporation, and the perspective that comes with a particular input. The shareholder may
42 ante at 39, p4. The quote is taken from Frederick G Hilmer "The Governance Research 
Agenda: A Practitioner's Perspective" Corporate Governance Vol 1 Nol, January 1993.
43 See post Chapter Seven.
44 "Corporate Governance: An Action Plan For Profitability and Success" Thomas Sheridan 
and Nigel Kendall. 1992.
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have a blinkered perception of governance as one which exacts more profit, while the 
employee will emphasise the need for greater management input from an elected stakeholder 
body. The creditor may emphasise the need to protect his security. All part of the 
corporation as a going concern, and all with their own agenda.
Yet within this struggle for choosing an acceptable and circumspect prescription for 
governance, there has been some cohesion, that the purpose of a corporation is to make a 
profit. The emphasis for how much and when may be influenced by the particular group's 
agenda in the corporate nexus, but to survive as a whole the corporation must make a profit.
tsatThis again has been challenged46 on the basis that corporations are not there to make profit! 
all but rather to make things, of which the profit is only one part. Professor Handy has 
described the corporation as an "hexagonal ring", with pressures coming from all those who 
constitute the stakeholders. Within these groups, the corporation stands as a separate legal 
person, and its purpose should be to fulfil itself "to grow and to develop the best that it can 
be, given always that every other corporation is free to do the same."47
Yet the traditional perspective of the relationship between the different stakeholder groups, 
has put a barrier to allowing the stakeholders to reassess their position viz. a viz. each other. 
The contrast is illustrated in the attitude of the different groups in the German and Japanese 
nexus with that of the British position. For the foreign counter-part, the corporation is their 
to facilitate society and to encourage investment for the future. It becomes an intrinsic part of 
the society and not a forum for the polemic structure within society.
The objective for governance is thus to marry the requirement of the efficient running of the 
corporation with the balancing act of protecting the interests of the different groups within
45 See for example the role of shareholders and employees in the larger German corporation 
which constitute Supernisoy Boards. For a full discussion on these see chapter six
46 Ante at 39 p5.
47 ibid
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the corporation. In considering that balance however, the traditions and cultures imposed by 
a particular society will be most important48 .
Perhaps the most revealing discovery from the directors who responded to the questionnaire, 
was that the commercial world believes that the current available choices for incorporation 
are sufficient. Of those directors who replied, 80% thought that there was a sufficient variety 
of corporate forms from which to choose, while only 20% thought that more choice could be 
made available.
Satisfaction with the traditional corporate forms that are on offer, illustrates an attitude 
amongst corporate managers, that the company merely facilitates the objectives of best 
performance and profit. In the survey, these were the first and second most important 
objectives respectively. With these objectives firmly set above the others, the issue of 
extending more information to shareholders, and improvement in managerial structures are 
placed in lower priority.
Perhaps the contentment is a product of the fact that the law has been modified for different 
types of corporations, according to their size, and that tailoring a particular corporation to its 
individual needs in practice, is something which can be achieved49 . However, the ad hoc 
approach to corporate evolution illustrated in the reforms to the Companies Act 1985 50, are an 
indication that company law recognises the importance of sensitivity to the tailoring of
48 "Shareholder Protection-A Cultural Quagmire" Tim Pryce-Brown. The Company Lawyer. 
1995 Voll6No.4
49 In particular, smaller corporations can benefit from the use of the elective resolution, which 
gets rid of some of the more cumbersome requirements for a general meeting. Small 
corporations can also submit abbrieviated accounts, under Section 246(1 A) Companies 
Act 1985 (inserted by SI 1992 No.2452, reg.4), providing the director can show that the 
corporation could take advantage of the provision. The small corporation can also dispense 
with the need for an annual audit (s249(A). Companies Act 1985. On the other hand, 
larger listed corporations will find themselves subject to the City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, The Cadbury Report and The Greenbury Report on Directors Pay, all influential 
as to best practice, but without legal authority.
50 ibid
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commercial requirements and that the corporation in law is still too unrefined to achieve 
this51 .
However, the response of directors to the need for more restrictions when the corporation 
increased in size, indicated an inconsistency. Here, most financial directors believed that the 
directors should be subject to greater controls when the corporation increased in size. 
Directors seemed to fail to recognise that the problem of translating greater controls that can 
be focused on a particular group of companies, lay in the fact that while there is a bifurcation 
of limited corporations in practice, the nature of the controls envisaged necessitates further 
refinement in the legal construction of corporations. Only then can law be applied effectively 
to the appropriate corporation.
As part of the improvement in monitoring, directors were asked if the following were 
important:
a) Director's duties
b) Communication with shareholders
c) Communication with creditors
d) Financial intake, i.e. credit
Corporations seemed to emphasise different priorities here, influenced by the size and nature 
of the corporation. Director's duties were however something which most corporations felt 
could be improved and clarified, with some corporations emphasising the public interest
51 The DTI have already initiated a proposal for a new type of small corporation, in its 
document :"Company Law Review: The Law Applicable to Private Companies, A 
Consultative Document. November 1994." Here, a proposal of a hy-brid between the 
partnership and the small corporation was advocated to engender a commercila animal 
which is both commercially efficient and provides some limitation as to liability.
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element in this area. This represents the current debate in managerial circles concerning the 
establishment of a best practice for boards and their managers52 .
However the problem with the managers response to the debate on good board practice, was 
that it focused on making the board more efficient, and did not deal with the more 
fundamental questions concerning who should benefit from the improvement in the director's 
performance. Another issue not dealt with was how corporations should develop in their 
responsibilities to those who constitute the contractual nexus of the corporation in the future.
The debate is set to continue, but the DTI has produced a discussion document on the 
improvement of shareholder activity in the AGM53 . In doing so it recognises that the future 
of good corporate governance requires a more circumspect relationship between the director 
and others in the corporate nexus, which will have the consequence of encouraging 
discussion and debate within the corporate structure.
For the corporations that responded to the question of whether greater regulations should be 
placed on the corporation as it increased in size, the emphasis was on improvement of the 
directors duties, and those who answered affirmatively to this were also keen on greater 
communications with shareholders.
However, the issue of communication with shareholders was considered less important by 
many of the corporations than with other groups in the corporate nexus, in particular creditors 
and secured creditors in particular.
52 Inter alia,"Standard of Good Practice for UK Boards of Directors." Focus Group 13: 24 
June 1994. Also,"Good Practice for Boards of Directors" Henley Management College, on 
behalf of the DTI. April 1996.
53 "Shareholder Communications at the Annual General Meeting" A Consultative Document. 
Department of Trade and Industry. April 1996.
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In this respect, the responses indicate the general reaction to progress on the issue of 
extending directors duties54, as the differing groups jostle for supremacy. However, progress 
in the Commonwealth on a general duty to creditors is still in advance of the British 
position55 . The use of the wrongful trading provision being perceived as too limited a 
concept to be interpreted as a device for establishing a general duty to creditors56 .
This is an indication of a more general feeling of despondency towards the effectiveness of 
the Insolvency Act to act in the effective orchestration of good governance. In responding to 
the question of whether insolvency law was an effective mechanism by which to monitor the 
director's performance, 40% stated that it was an effective mechanism, while 40% thought it 
ineffective with 20% undecided. These figures are in fact better than those collected by the 
Insolvency Service, which indicated that nearly 70% of corporations thought that the present 
insolvency legislation was ineffective57 .
The difference can be explained by defining the remit of the question. For corporations 
which are facing insolvency, we can look at the legislation as a code for action at that time, a 
breach of which will render the directors personally liable for the company's' debts as well as 
being subject to a disqualification order58 . However, when Section 214 is broadened to act as 
the statutory definition of the director's common law standard of care and skill , it can be 
viewed as a "Sword of Damocles" which may fall on any occasion. While there are doubts
54 Riley. "Director's Duties and the Interests of Creditors." The Company Lawyer Vol 10 
No.5 1989
55 ibid and ante Chapter Four.
56 ibid
57 ante 26
58 For wrongful trading, this is a compulsory order under Section 10 Company Directors 
Disqualification Act (CDDA) but for actions which may render the director unfit to be a 
director, the evidence which may be furnished by an action for wrongful trading, will 
result in a dismissal under Section 6 (CDDA). The major difference in application of the 
two sections is that while wrongful trading has a disqualification order which only looks at 
the actions in the present corporation, Section 6 of the CDDA takes into account director's 
actions in another corporation, thus giving the director an opportunity of proving himself 
worthy of being a director with reference to other actions. See also Norman v Theodore 
Goddard (a firm) [1991] BCLC 1028 in which Hoffman J stated that he was "willing to 
assume" that the test for a director's duty of care allowed the court to take into account the 
knowledge skill and experience which he actually had in addition to that which he ought
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that this will be a cutting provision, clearly it is sending a message to some directors that the 
law has moved on from the days when a rudimentary subjective approach was taken to the 
director's duty of skill and care59 .
The continuing evolution of this process, has resulted in a fundamental overhaul of the basic 
philosophy behind the use of the corporation. This has necessitated the law to look at that 
philosophy and to exact changes which fulfil the often conflicting themes within it60 . In 
response to the questionnaire, corporations did not in fact look solely at profit as the most 
important objective of the corporation. Instead, the performance of the corporation was 
considered to be the most important.
The difference between the two is subtle but significant. The sole objective of profit, 
signifies a short term perspective of the corporation which is designed to return a dividend 
annually. This includes in its objective, the opportunity of using the corporation merely to 
fulfil a financial commitment for one or two years, and does not necessitate any deeper 
consideration of the corporation's future. Monitoring performance however, while providing 
the corporation with the profit it needs, does so with further objectives in mind. This is to 
preserve the medium to long term future of the corporation. In doing so, the benefits of profit 
are contextualised in a greater objective which has as its beneficiaries more groups within the 
contractual nexus of the corporation than the shareholder61 . Governance has thus been 
defined in broader terms than the efficiency motivation for profit.
to have as a person carrying out his function. Again the submission was based on section 
214 (4) IA 1986.
59 For example, Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Corporation Ltd. [1925] Ch 407 and Re 
Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd. [1911] 1 Ch 425. These cases have recently 
been challenged by the wrongful trading provision which has been defined in the case of 
Re D'Jan of London [1991] (ante 5) as providing the statutory definition of director's duty 
of skill and care, as being a partly subjective and partly objective test see post Chapter 
Four.
Ireland "Corporate Governance, Stakeholding, and the Company: Towards A Less 
Degenerate Capitalism?" 1996 Journal of Law and Society.
61 ibid
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How that objective is broadened will remain subject to the directors placing their own 
security against the rigours of personal liability, in front of corporate communication and 
administration. The lessons of Queen Moat House62 and the recent reports on the appropriate 
input from shareholders at the general meeting" illustrate that director's liability may well 
depend on the efficient and well developed use of both these areas of corporate activity.
Clearly, the motivation for changing the director's obligations to the corporation and its 
contractual members, indicates a need to incorporate the changing corporate structures and 
expectations of post war Britain64 . So far the ad hoc approach to raising standards of practice 
by the Board, has resulted in a dichotomy in the perception of corporate governance by 
corporate directors. The questionnaire affirms some of the misgivings with the present 
policing devices which the law has at its disposal to control director's behaviour, but it did 
show that the commercial world is prepared for change and in this change the need for 
improved director knowledge.
62 See post Chapter Seven.
63 ante 53.
64 See the debate in Chapter Four on the evolution of the directors duties in the context of the 
diversification of ownership and control, illustrated by inter alia, Berle and Means.
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DIRECTORS DUTIES AND GOVERNANCE
DIRECTORS DUTIES TO THE SHAREHOLDERS AND CREDITORS
The aim of this chapter is to reflect upon the legal position of the director in exercising his 
duties during his time in office. Within this chapter the development of that duty will be 
assessed as it responds to the changing economic and social relationship which exists between 
the director and those other groups both inside and outside the corporation who claim to 
constitute the structure of the corporate nexus.
The orthodox position relating to director's duties is founded in the concept of the director as 
trustee and that that duty of trust implies fiduciary obligations to his company as opposed to 
any particular group within the corporate nexus. This traditional position was illustrated in the 
now famous case of Percival v Wright '. Here the plaintiff shareholders offered the defendant 
directors their shares in the company, which the directors agreed to purchase at price of 
£12.50. After the sale the shareholders discovered that the company was in negotiations to be 
taken over and that the directors knew this. The court confirmed that the directors were under 
no legal duty to inform the shareholders of the impending take-over, as their duty was to the 
company and not to the individual shareholder. Swifen Eady J. stated :
"The contrary view would place the directors in an invidious position, as they 
could not buy or sell shares without disclosing negotiations, a premature 
disclosure of which might well be against the best interests of the company. I am 
of opinion that directors are not in that position. "2
1 [1902] 2 Ch 421.
2 ibidatp426.
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The judge's quote has since been subject to some refinement, where the disclosure of 
information to shareholders prior to a take-over bid was deemed necessary. In the case of Re 
Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd. 3 , there was a purchase of shares in a public corporation with the 
intention of converting the company back into a private corporation. Here Sir Nicholas 
Browne-Wilkinson VC concluded that in a situation where the plaintiff was demanding the 
compulsory purchase of shares under S.429 Companies Act 1985, the court under S.430(c) 
could take into account the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers, which required the 
plaintiffs in the case to owe a duty to shareholders to give full disclosure of the corporation's 
performance before any acquisition of the shares was made4 .
This case has several points to note in considering the ambit of directors' duties to 
shareholders. First it illustrates that British courts are prepared to imply a duty from the 
director to the shareholder in certain circumstances. This is in line with Commonwealth 
decisions which have implied such a duty for some time5 . However, Sir Nicholas Browne- 
Wilkinson V-C made it clear to the defendant's solicitor in Re Chez Nico, that these cases 
would not be the reason for the shift in emphasis on the issue of directors' duties, but rather the 
extension would be based on the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers6 . The importance of 
this is that it confirms the evolution of company law into the area of non legal regulation, 
which has become far reaching and controversial7 .
It also highlights the debate concerning the relationship between the director and the 
shareholder. The case of Re Chez Nico indicates that in certain circumstances, a duty to 
shareholders is necessary, but any general duty should also be sensitive to the fact that the
3 [1992] BCLC 192
4 ibid para i.
5 See inter alia, Coleman v Myers [1977] NZLR 225 and Allan v Hyatt (1914) TLR 444 (Privy
Council).
6 ante 3 .
7 See post Chapter 7, and inter alia, Dine "The Governance of Governance" 1994 The
Company Lawyer Vol. 15 No 3.
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director has obligations to others in the corporate nexus and that can not be undermined by 
placing one group in priority8 .
The problem which exists for the director is that the relationship with the shareholder no 
longer reflects that closeness which was a charaterisitc of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuary attitude towards the shareholder/director duty. This position has been illustrated in 
several cases on the subject of directors' duty of care and skill9 Today, the directors of large 
and medium sized corporations will have very little knowledge of the shareholders, far 
different from the notion that the shareholders were the ones with intimate knowledge of their 
director hence their decision to appoint. Any duty based on such a narrowly focused group 
may also limit the director's perspective on the corporation acting as a vehicle for all the nexus 
groups.
The challenge for the law relating to directors duties is that it has developed the legal 
relationship between the directors and those inside the corporate nexus on a piecemeal basis; 
responding to one group at a time and often in response to a particular set of circumstances 
which has led the court to reflect upon the status quo of the director's duty towards one 
particular group.
This is particularly true in focusing on the directors' duties to creditors which has followed a 
similar path towards clarity in establishing whether a similar duty is owed to that towards 
shareholders. The traditional position was illustrated in Multinational Gas and Petrochemical 
Co. v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd. 10 . Here a duty to creditors present or 
future, was emphatically rejected. The position is similar to that in the US which has also
8 See report by Philip Basset "Boardrooms - too biased towards the shareholders". The Times, 
December 30th 1996. This follows a report backed by the Stock Exchange and headed by 
Sir Ronnie Hempel, ICI chairman. The focus on serving the current shareholders, the report 
concluded, was likely to leave the director in breach of his fiduciary duty. 
9 See post Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company (1925) CA and Re Brazillian Rubber 
(1911)
[1983] Ch 258, [1983] 2 ALL ER 563 (Court of Appeal) per Dillon LJ and also Kuwait Asia 
Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187, [1990] 3 ALL ER 404 
(Privy Council).
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shown that beyond any contractual obligations, the director owes no duty to creditors." The 
position has however been challenged in the case of Winkworth v Edward Baron Developments 
Co. Ltd.*2. Here Lord Templeman stated :
"...A duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the creditors of the 
company to ensure that the affairs of the company are properly administered 
and that its property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the directors 
themselves to the prejudice of the creditors".
However it is conservatism which is evident in the attempts to extend the duty of directors to 
the creditor. In the case of Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd.", the court 
was not prepared to include creditors in the list of those to whom the director owed a duty of 
care. Lord Lowry in his judgement affirmed that directors do not owe a duty of care to 
creditors even when as in this case there was a prima facie case against the directors for breach 
of trust. However the position would be different if the directors had assumed a special duty of 
care to creditors as a result of a special agreement or representation.
The court in Asia Bank concluded that the directors had such a duty to the creditors here 
because the directors had knowledge of a monthly report to which they should have responded. 
However, the bank was not vicariously liable for the directors because they had not acted as 
agents for the bank but for the plaintiffs company AICS in which they owned a 40% share. 
The result of this was that the bank was not held liable as a shadow director and thus should 
not be made to make a contribution to the £4 million claim by the plaintiff.
The cases commenting on the proposition of a duty to creditors are important for several 
reasons. First it confirms the position of the director not owing a general duty to the creditor 
but that that position may change as the company moves towards and into insolvency 14 . This
11 See Pittleman v Pearce, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
12 [1987] 1 ALL ER 114 at 118.
13 [1991] 1 AC 187, [1990] 3 All ER 404 (Privy Council)
14 This position reflects a similar change of emphasis as that displayed in the US. There, the 
Chancellor of the court of Delaware has ruled that " a director of a solvent company in the 
vicinity of insolvency should realise that they have a duty to the corporation which includes 
creditors and all corporate constituencies, not just shareholders" (Credit Lyonnais Bank
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philosophy is central to the provisions of wrongful and fraudulent trading 15. However, it also 
illustrates that the orthodox position relating to directors duties stays very much in place where 
the court considers the position of the bank as a shadow director thus preventing the creditor 
from seeking redress from a source with far greater funds.
The court has already displayed some willingness to incorporate the creditor into the group of 
insiders to whom the directors owe a duty. In the case of Winkworth v Edward Baron Ltd. 16. 
Lord Templeman states:
" A company owes a duty to its creditors, present and future... the company owes 
a duty to keep its property inviolate and available for the repayment of its 
debts...". 17
The case is peculiar in its facts. Here a wife wanted to enforce her equitable interest in the 
matrimonial home, owned by the company of which she and her husband were directors and 
shareholders. The application failed firstly because it was a matter of construction for the 
criteria of obtaining an equitable interest in the property. A reduction of an overdraft for 
which the house was security was not a sufficient payment to constitute an equitable interest. 
Second and more importantly, it was ruled that the wife failed in her duties as a director to the 
company and its creditors by failing to ensure the company was properly administered, in that 
she had not been aware of her husband's fraud in obtaining the new finance. 18
Perhaps the idiosyncratic nature of the case lead to the judge making the comments 
concerning the commitment to the creditor. The case has since been over ruled19but it shows
Nederland N.V. V Pathe Communications Corp., Civ Act. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277 613, at 
34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec.30, 1991). This has been dubbed "the footnote of the year" by some 
academics, as it clearly raises the problem of defining what constitutes the "zone of 
insolvency". However, this case is seen not as establishing a direct action for contract 
creditors against directors, but rather to highlight the potential conflict that will arise where 
an agreement has taken place between the company and a major lender to give that lender 
voting rights.
15 See ante Chapters Two and Three.
16 [1987] 1 All ER 114, [1986] 1 WLR 1512.
17 ibid respectively at p 118 and 1516.
18 Supra 16
19 Supra 13
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that their is at least a minority group which is prepared to broaden the ambit of directors duties 
to others within what is the traditional groups constituting the corporate nexus. In doing this 
the UK will be consolidating the position already illustrated in the Commonwealth20.
The US has also developed the principle of the 'trust fund doctrine' in which directors will be 
liable to the creditor on the basis of committing a tort or a conversion while acting in the role 
of agent for the company with the creditor being the wronged third party.21 However this 
doctrine requires some act which goes well beyond commercial misjudgement such as fraud, 
in order to make a successful claim against the director personally. 22 The doctrine is however 
more of an awareness of the potential conflicts that may occur between creditors and the 
corporation near insolvency and is not to be viewed as a signal for direct action by a creditor. 23 
The duty of directors towards the creditors changes as the corporation moves towards 
insolvency, increasing, to reflect and hopefully fulfil the attitude to risk intrinsic to the 
creditor's position.24
The debate concerning how the conceptual extension of directors duties is to be achieved, will 
reflect the philosophical understanding of the concept of the company25 . This extension will 
have to challenge the presumptions made about the concept of the company and the role of the 
board of directors26. How this is achieved in legal terms will be looked at in the following
20 In the Australian case of Walker v Wimborne (1976) ALJR 446, Mason J. stated that in a 
group of companies the directors of company A owed a duty to the shareholders of that 
company, as well as the company itself, and did not owe a duty to the other companies in 
the group. The marrying of the two distinct groups; shareholders and creditors , in the same 
conclusion illustrates that the courts were prepared to perceive the value of the creditors as 
equal to that of the shareholder and to impose upon the directors, a general duty towards 
them.
21 See "Does a Corporation's Board of Directors Owe a Fiduciary Duty to its Creditors?' 
Beveridge St. Mary's Law Journal. 1994. Vol 25:533.
22 In particular it has been used in conjunction with Sections 4-5 Fraudulent Transfer Act 
1984, which provides that insolvent debtors defraud their creditors if creditors do not 
receive adequate value in exchange for transfers.
23 Supra 14 and Clarkson Co. Ltd. V Shaheen 660 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. Denied, 455 
U.S. 990(1982).
24 For further reading see "Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Coporate Insolvency: Proper Scope 
of Directors' Duty to Creditors", Laura Lin, (1993), Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol 46: 1485, 
p!485.
25 Post 53.
26 Supra 1.
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chapters but clearly any attempt to make objective the standard of care which will be required 
for a director either solely or as part of a board, will have to be circumspect recognising that 
the concept of risk inherent in the perspective growth of any corporation. This will not always 
lend itself to the establishment of a particular commercial morality or the production of an 
objective moral code27 .
These challenges have not detracted from the restricted ambit of the director's 
performance as a trustee of the corporation. 28 . The company may have received 
separate legal identity under the principle illustrated in Salomon v Salomon & Co. 
Ltd.29, but in the eyes of the Victorian lawyer, the corporation was referred to as "they" 
rather than "it". "They" (meaning the shareholder) would be responsible for the 
director's appointment, and "they" would be liable if the director turned out to be 
incompetent.
It is reflecting this closeness which the Victorian and Edwardian lawyers chose to maintain the 
idea that the director's duty was owed primarily to the corporation but that this meant to the 
shareholders as a whole whose legal powers had lead to his appointment.
Two cases in the early part of the twentieth century which illustrates this attitude to the
relationship between shareholder and director are Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and
Estates Ltd?® and Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd.3t . In these cases,
the emphasis on the standard of care and skill expected from the directors was
determined by his own abilities to perform and not to subject him to an objective
paradigm.
As Romer J. stated :
"It is indeed impossible to describe the duty of directors in general terms 
whether by way of analogy or otherwise. The position of a director carrying on
27 Supra 13
28 Sealy "Directors "Wider" Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural. 
Monash University Law Review [ Vol.13 September '87].
29 [1897] AC 22
30 [1911]lCh425
31 [1925] Ch 407 (Court of Appeal).
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a small retail business, is very different from that of a director of a railway 
company... In one company, for instance, matters may normally be attended to 
by the manager or other members of the staff that in another company are 
attended to by the directors themselves... The manner in which the work of the 
company is to be distributed between the board of directors and the staff is in 
truth a business matter to be decided on business lines. "^
These cases are the basis for what has become almost an ambivalent attitude towards 
changing the overall standard of care to one which implies a more professional 
responsibility33 . It also disenfranchises other groups within the corporate nexus to 
whom it is felt a director ought to owe a duty of care34 . Basing a standard of care on the 
decision in Re Brazilian Rubber, the director would be liable for acts of negligence and 
gross negligence but the standard employed in determining whether the director was 
liable for either was that of the reasonable man and not the reasonable director35 . For 
the reasonable man, a lack of understanding of the area in which the director was 
trading would mean that there was no necessity to be good at your job. This meant that 
no professional concept of a 'director' was presumed.
If a director acted negligently in a large corporation because he had no experience of 
such a corporation then he was safe so long as he acted honestly. Such an amateur view 
of the director was acceptable on the basis that only the shareholders who appointed 
him would lose out as a result of the director's incompetence. This is no longer the
Thus the criteria for assessing director's liability for tortious acts is subjective and not 
objective which would imply that the director in tort is a professional person. This was
32 ibid
33 Finch "Who Cares about Skill and Care?" (1992) 55 MLR 179.
34 Parkinson "Corporate Power and Responsibility", Chapter 3. In particular, Parkinson looks 
at broadening the basis for the establishment of corporations to include the duties to 
employees and society as well as the more traditional groups, to establish the idea that the 
corporation becomes a good person within the community it operates.
35 Neville!Supra 15.
36 See post
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illustrated in the case of Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v Heller & Partners Ltd. 37. 
However, the principle in Hedley Byrne has been illustrated in the case of WB Anderson 
& Sons v Rhodes . Here where a third party asked the defendant buyer for a credit 
reference for a mutual client the court held that the company was liable for the 
negligence of its manager and buyer when the information given caused damage to the 
third party.
The claim failed against the buyer and the manager because the former had only acted 
on the information given by the manager and the manager did not know for what the 
information was to be used . However it seems implicit from the judgement that had 
the manager known the purpose of the information he would have been liable39 .
Problems are inherent for the optimistic third party who wishes to rely on this case to 
enforce a judgement against the director who negligently misstates. First the principle 
will only arise where the director's advice is made in the context of the business or 
profession of giving that advice or where he has held himself out as being competent to 
give that advice40.
Thus the position is that there is still no general duty in law or equity which requires the 
director of a company to meet a professional standard of care to a third party. This 
factor was underlined when in 1982, The Supply of Goods and Services Act expressly 
exonerated directors from having to act with reasonable skill and care under Section 13 
of that Act. Rather what the director states or does not state, does or does not do, will 
result in him being legally responsible only once the nature of his actual job, work
37 [1963] 2 All ER 575. This case established the principle that where a special relationship 
arose between the two contracting parties and one party suffered damage as a result of the 
other's negligent misstatement, damages could be awarded to the person relying on that 
statement.
38 [1967]2A11ER850.
39 Stanton and Dugdale "Recent Developments in Professional Negligence - iv :Directors 
Liability (1982) 132 New Law Journal 251.
40 Mutual Life & Citizens' Assurance Co. Ltd. v Evatt [1971] 1 All ER 150. The majority 
decision in this Privy Council decision was stated by Lord Diplock.
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contract and the client with whom he is dealing has been assesses.41 Also that the 
relationship with the party is such that the law or some device which influences the law 
demands that the director ensures full disclosure of the correct information.42
However where the director is an executive director and he is under a contract of 
employment, then he must give the company the benefit of any professional knowledge 
concerning the corporation. Any third party who loses out as a result of any breach of 
this duty however will invariably sue the corporation and not the director.43 . This 
means that where the director is acting as an employee of the company, the company, in 
its contractual position with the third party will be liable for the negligence (and no 
doubt pay for the damage through its insurance), and the director will not be liable. 
Should the action be based on the director's failure to comply with his contractual 
obligations then the director will be in breach of contract. This fact was illustrated in the 
case of Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. Ltd.**. This however does not alter the 
position at common law concerning the director's general duty of care and skill.
The director can still find himself liable for damages even after these restrictions. In the 
case of Williams & Another v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd & Another^-*, a director 
was so liable to a purchaser where he gave misleading advice about his own experience 
with a health care franchise he was selling, and the purchaser had relied on this advice. 
In this case the courts stated that the plaintiff had to show that there was a special duty 
owed by the director which went beyond the usual contractual duty. In giving advice
41 ibid.
42 Supra 3.
43 Sealand of the Pacific v Robert C McHaffie Ltd. ([1974)] 51 DLR (3d) 702). Here the court 
emphasised that the director would only be liable where a duty was owed separate from the 
company. Where there was a breach of the contract based on the negligence of the 
employee, then that constituted a breach of contract viz. a viz. the company, and not the 
director.
44 [1957] AC 555.
45 The Times, January 9th 1997. This decision was reversed by the House of Lords on April 1st 
1998 where a more conservative view of directors' duties to purchasers for mis statement 
was concluded. Here the distinction was made between information which the director gave 
in the capacity of a director, from which there would have been a duty, and information
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about the potential profits which could be made the director had not mentioned that the 
profits were of that particular sum because of the fact that he as the vendor owned the 
shop from which he traded and therefore the overheads were lower.
The importance of this decision is that the director can be made personally liable where, 
as in this case, the company had become insolvent and thus unable to pay 
compensation. It also further broadens the basis for personal claims against the director 
which will have a preventative effect on the director who wishes to be manipulative in 
his position. In the US, manipulation was the focus of the decision in Davidowitz v 
Edelman"'. Here, directors who delegated a decision on whether the board of directors 
should be personally liable to shareholders for loss of corporate assets had summary 
judgement in their favour denied because the special committee dealing with the 
question of liability was not made up of independent parties47 .
The net result for the director is that he faces greater exposure to personal liability. As a 
result of this directors may increase the Director and Officer (D&O) liability insurance 
cover. The standard wording for this covers:
"...loss arising from a wrongful act in the capacity of a director" 
and does not cover:
"breach of any professional duty owed to any third party"
which will prompt the director to act in a professional capacity when dealing with a 
third party. Any breach of this duty will be covered by professional indemnity 
insurance.
given as a vendor from which no duty arose even where there were unreasonable 
ommissions in those statements.
46 583 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
47 The importance of this decision is that it underlines the court's commitment to looking at 
the reality of the situation and not following blindly the structures which albeit legitimately 
created have an underlying objective at odds with general principles of commercial reality.
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Clearly there is still a grey area which exists illustrated in the Williams case as to what 
type of indemnity should cover that particular scenario. A director's duty of care and 
skill will result in personal libility where he has acted beyond his position as director, 
but this does not mean that any knowledge which he gained in his personal capacity 
will be an inherent part of duties in the company.48The question of insurance keeping 
the director's duties at a professional level, are undermined by the fact that the 
insurance is curative. The thrust of law and regulation relating to director's duties has 
been preventative.
The directors and officers liability insurance further strengthens the principle that unless 
a director has a particular professional capacity, he is in fact not a professional at all. 
This in many situations will create an expectation gap between the director and others 
in the corporate nexus.
The position of trust together with the almost ad hoc evolution of directors' duties, has 
meant that any extension of directors duties has to reconcile the fact that if the director 
does have a duty to the shareholder it may well be at the expense of another group in 
the corporate nexus. Thus where the extension of the duty has been made, the 
extension has to carry with it qualifying conditions.
In the case of Coleman v Myers49 for instance a director was held to have a duty to the 
shareholder, but not simply because of their relationship. There had to be something 
more. The closeness of the company, the dependence of the shareholder on the 
director, the existence of a relationship of confidence, the significance of the transaction 
to the parties and the extent to which the director promoted the specific transaction,
For further discussion see Liability of Professional Officers and Directors, Kirsten 
Thompson, (1993) Tort & Insurance Law Journal.
48 Dugdale "Directors' negligence: new horizons". Tolleys Professional Negligence. 1997 Vol 
13 No.4
49 [1977]2NZLR225
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were deemed to be factors which would broaden the scope of the director's duty to the 
shareholder50.
The reasoning in this case has been replicated in the decision of Ebrahimi v Westbourne 
Galleries^. Here the underlying personal relationship between the directors who were 
also the major shareholders in this "quasi partnership" meant that the dismissal of one 
of the directors justified the winding-up of the company. His position in management 
became an integral part of him remaining a shareholder and to oust him as a director 
was to undermine that presumption. The case indicates that the concept of the 
corporation and the duties exercised by those within it can be altered to respond 
equitably to the factual scenario of different types of company.
A more recent example of extending the duty to shareholders is found in the case of 
Heron International Ltd. v Lord Grade*2 . Here, the qualification for extending the duty 
to shareholders was that a take-over was taking place and the directors owed a duty to 
the present shareholders to obtain the best possible price. The court's presumption that 
in such a situation extending the duty to only current shareholders has been viewed as 
too restrictive and that in measuring the future performance of the company, directors 
should also consider future shareholders53 . In doing this the directors would be forced 
to think about the mid to long term performance of the corporation rather than its 
immediate profit.
To promote the benefit of one of the groups in the present or indeed future corporate 
nexus is perhaps a balancing act which invariably will engender discontent from those
50 ibid.
51 [1973] AC 360
52 [1983] BCLC 244 (Court of Appeal)
53 See ante Chapter 5. In particular, the reaction of directors to the fact that performance and 
not profit is the most important part of the objectives. This suggests that management is 
aware that the corporation is not two dimensional with the objective of making a profit, and 
that they do in fact have responsibility for the corporation as a diverse implement for those 
who are affected either directly or indirectly by it.
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who see their position compromised by that other group. In this respect the directors' 
duties are more circumspect if as Lord Greene stated :
" Directors must exercise their discretion bona fide... in the interests of the 
company, and not for any collateral purpose. "$4
This simple formula worked adequately in the nineteenth century where corporate structures 
were simple and the shareholder could state that his interest in the corporation were effectively 
being managed by his trustee ; the director. Today however the economic reality is different. 
The perspective on the position of the corporation as an institution and directors as 
protagonists have shifted to one more sensitive to public opinion and social welfare55 .
The importance of using the trust principle here is that it gives the court the opportunity of 
creating flexibility. Where measures concerning the extent of the directors' duties have proven 
draconian, changes to reflect the commercial reality of the day are made. For instance in the 
case of Aberdeen Railway Co. v Blakie Brothers 56, the agency principle was strictly applied by 
the courts in finding that a director could not be a party to a contract with a company when he 
had an interest in that company. Here Lord Cranworth LC, emphasised the potential conflict 
which would arise from the objective of good management board to obtain the lowest price for 
any quantity of goods which the company purchased with the objective of any director to 
ensure that the company in which he had an interest made the best profit.
The presumption of an interest constituting a conflict was however refined in the case of 
Northwest Transportation Co. Ltd v Beatty 57 . Here the court was prepared to allow the 
company shareholders to ratify the director's contract with a company in which he had an
54 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch 304 at 306.
55 See Berle "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust" 1939 Harvard Law Review 1049. Here 
the importance of equity in the background to modem statutory remedies for inter alia 
shareholders, is considered in the debate as to how the development of these principles 
should be made. In commenting on the courts interpretation of statutory remedies 
however, it is imperative that judges invoke the equitable principles of trust to apply 
definitions to the law.
56 (1854) 1 Macq461 (House of Lords). 
37 (1887) 12 App Cas 589 (Privy Council)
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interest but also afforded the minority shareholder the right to bring an action if the ratification 
was for an improper purpose. Flexibility was created between the need to protect the 
shareholder while ensuring that no draconian inhibition was placed on the corporation's ability 
to make a profit. Ratification can be seen as perhaps the most potent measure available to 
directors to prevent them from being subject to personal liability for breach of duty. 58
The position concerning the director's interest today, is illustrated in S.317 Companies Act 
1985. Initiated by S.199 Companies Act 1948, it allows the director the opportunity of 
dealing with a corporation in which he has an interest if he declares the interest first. This 
provides the other directors and shareholders with an opportunity of concluding whether or not 
the director in question should be allowed to vote on the issue, or if he was in fact acting for 
his own benefit and not that of the corporation. In the case of Guinness Pic v Sounders59 a 
consultancy fee of £5.2 million could not be kept by one of the directors, Mr Ward, because he 
had not disclosed the fact that he would have a particular interest in the contract which gave 
him the opportunity of providing the consultancy to the correct body in the corporation.
The nineteenth century cases created legal standards which have been built upon in the form of 
new legislation60 and non-statutory regulations61 . The basis of these principles is that the 
directors armed with great autonomy particularly in larger corporations may be tempted to 
circumvent his legal obligations namely that the director must act bona fide in the interest of 
the company, and to exercise such power for the 'proper purpose' for which it was intended.62
58 "Limiting Directors' Liability : Ratification, Exemption and Indemnification", Centre Point 
at The Centre for Commercial Law Studies Queen Mary and Westfield College, University 
of London. Edited by Ross Cranston.
59 [1990] 2 AC 663 (House of Lords)
60 See Chapters Two and Three ante.
61 See post Chapter Seven and also The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers which 
illustrates the extra duties of disclosure which are imposed upon a director when the 
company is facing a take-over. These duties are to the shareholder (Re Chez Nico ante) and 
illustrate the problems for directors who wish to keep their position in the company, but 
who are likely to face dismissal as a result of a take-over (see post Chapter Six).
62 Hogg v Cramphorn [1967] Ch 254 [1966] 3 All ER 420 (Chancery Division). In this case 
the court concluded that the improper purpose of the directors was capable of ratification
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The main challenge to these principles has come from the change in the corporate structure. 
Today, 48.4% of companies are classed as small63 with a further 0.5% being of medium in 
size64 . Such a large tranche in the corporate field has meant that in certain circumstances, the 
presumptions that have been made in the eighteenth century to the corporation are now 
anachronistic.
DIRECTORS DUTIES AND EMPLOYEES
Amongst the evolution of directors duties to shareholders and creditors is the more 
controversial issue of a duty to emplyees. The attitude of British management to the inclusion 
of employees in management is illustrated in the ambivilance shown towards those directives 
which have proposed in the European Community.63 This ambivilance is a product of a 
traditionally uncircumspect attitude to employees which has resulted in a pro shareholder 
attitude which prioritises that group against the interests of the employee.
The British approach has been to introduce legislative measures designed to protect the 
interests of the various groups within the company from director mismanagement. These 
measures include a duty owed to creditors66, employees67 and minority shareholders68 . These 
sections share no uniform objective but accumulativly they suggest a broadening of the 
philosophical concept of the commercial trading company.
by the shareholders, implying that the latter was to be the check on the actions of the 
directors.
63 Source is the DTI: 'Companies in 1994-95.'
64 The definition of small company is inter alia found in S247(3) Companies Act 1985 and 
include (i) a turnover of £2.8 million or less (ii) a balance sheet total of £1.4 million or less 
(iii) 50 employees or less. For medium sized companies, the position is £11.2 million or 
less, £5.6 million or less and 250 employees or less respectively.
65 See post Chapter Eight.
66 The provisions in sections 213 Insolvency Act 1986 and Section 214 Insolvency Act 1986; 
fraudulent and wrongful trading. These concepts have extended the notion of personal 
liability to the director and create an objective standard of care for director activity. For 
criticism of these sections see ant Chapters 2 and 3.
67 Section 309 Companies Act 1985. See post
68 Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985. See post
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The duty to the employee, in section 309 Companies Act 1985 states that:
"(I) The matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the 
performance of their functions include the interests of the company's employees 
in general, as well as the interests of its members.
(2) Accordingly, the duty imposed by this section on the directors is owed by 
them to the company (and to the company alone) and is enforceable in the same 
way as any other fiduciary duty owed to the company by its directors "
The section illustrates the recognition of directors duties lying in trust for the company and that 
the duty imposed is an extension of the traditional position of the director's relationship with 
the corporation. However, the section as been criticised as "toothless" for while compelling 
the director to act in regard of the employee it still subjects it to the overall duty to the 
corporation. The result is that where directors have acted in the interest of the employees, it 
will open them to protest from shareholders who see the duty as mitigating their profit69. 
However in the case of Re Welfab Engineers Ltd. 70, Hoffman J held that a company's directors 
had not acted improperly when they sold the company for a lesser price to someone who was 
prepared to take on the existing employees. The application in this case was from the 
liquidator, and the peculiarities of the case may prevent it from being a basis for creating a 
general duty.
The section indicates an awareness for the increase in directors' duties to the employees, but 
this is a provision which remains ambiguous in its application, joining an implicit judicial 
conservatism towards the extension of the directors' duties71 .
69 An example of the friction that a duty to employees can develop is illustrated in the case of 
Parke v Daily News [1962] Ch 927, [1962] 2 All ER 929. Here a payment to employees 
who were to loose their jobs, was successfully challenged by a shareholder, who saw that 
this would deplete the company's assets leaving less for the shareholder once the company 
had been dissolved. The intention of the directors, was to provide a form of redundancy 
before the legal right of redundancy was initiated.
70 [1990] BCLC 833.
71 See Boyle and Mordsley. "The Companies Act 1980 (4)' (1980) The Company Lawyer 280 
and Xuereb ' The jurisdiction of industrial relations through company law reform' (1988) 
51 MLR 156.
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THE TRADITIONAL VIEW UNDER CHALLENGE
The groups within the corporate nexus which are closest to the directors have seen their legal 
relationship with the director alter and the debate concerning more changes has gained 
momentum as the interest in director activity continues to accelerate. Apart from pressure 
from different groups within the corporation, the courts have also begun to look at certain 
circumstances which will alter the traditional duty of the director.
The view that the director owes a duty solely to the corporation has already been undermined 
in part by the non-statutory regulations on take-overs and mergers72 and by the concept of 
'quasi partnership' 73 . The problem for further development in this area, is trying to establish a 
set of legal principles which reflect the expectations of those which constitute an integral part 
of the corporate nexus, as well as developing a new agenda for the concept of the modern 
corporation74.
In evolving a formula to achieve these objectives, principles of agency, contract, restitution, 
tort, statute and non-statutory regulation have been developed. The conceptual problem has 
however indicated that the basis upon which further development will take place is itself 
subject to debate. Should the process extend those principles of equity and trust to different 
groups in the company and beyond, or should the concept of the corporation be re-interpreted 
so as to develop the extension of these duties as an integral part of the corporation as a legal 
unit75 .
72 Supra 3
73 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd.[1973] AC 360, [1972] 2 All ER 492 (House of 
Lords). Here, the close nature of the corporation meant that the directors had a duty to Mr. 
Ebrahimi to ensure that he would remain part of the directorate, or that he would be bought 
out, or the corporation wound-up.
74 For a selection of writing on this point, see Lord Wedderburn, "The Social Responsibilities 
of Companies" (1985) 15 M.L.U.R4
75 See Supra 55 and Dodd "For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?" , 1932 Harvard 
Law Review 1145, and Berle "For Whom Corporate Managers Trustees" 1932 Harvard 
Law Review 1365.
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The following chapters will consider in particular the function of non-legal codes to establish 
an objective standard for the director. Berle amongst others76 has indicated that leaving the 
development of corporate governance to self regulating codes is to trust in the altruism of the 
directors and is not as appropriate as legislation.
76 Supra 54.
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CHAPTER 7
CADBURY AND THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE DEBATE
The issue of corporate governance is the issue which represents that gap between ownership 
and control of the company, which necessitates exacting directorial standards of excellence, 
and ensuring that the interests of the shareholders are kept at the apex of company policy1 .
However, the term shareholder is too limited for those who prefer the ambit of the company to 
reflect more diverse interests, such as employees, creditors and society generally. These groups 
have their nexus in the corporation, hence the wider concept of 'stakeholder'. The aim of 
balancing these interests is reflected in the divergent aspects of the Companies Act 1985, 
relating to employees (section 309) and the Insolvency Act 1986, relating to creditors (sections 
213 and 214 amongst others).
To disregard those aspects of the company which furnish a true definition of the company's 
ambit as a commercial entity is not to understand the basic legal structure of the company. 
Even the shareholder is a generic term for a fluid group of people for whom the directors act 
not just on the basis of the present grouping but also for future groupings2 .
The debate concerning the issue of corporate governance is provocative for those who see its 
whole remit as undermining the underlying philosophy of free trade3 . To admit too much 
statutory governance to the market is seen as inhibiting corporate freedom which, through the
1 W. Carl Kester "Industrial Groups As Systems of Contractual Governance", Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, Vol 8, no. 3, 1992.
2 John W Mayo, "Corporate Governance and Directors Liability", The In-House Lawyer, 
April 1993.
3 Daniel R Fischel, "The Corporate Governance Movement", Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 35,
no.6, November 1992.
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objective of wealth creation, permits its own form of corporate governance and ensures the 
efficient activity of directors.
Such a scenario is not universally held and the decline in US company performances in the 
past ten years has led to a call for an increase in the amount of statutory regulation to be 
employed to ensure that companies become more competitive4 .
The change from a 'laissez-faire' attitude to corporate governance to one in which both 
Parliament and the courts intervene has the problematic balance of meeting the needs of those 
shareholders who demand that company policy be more readily available for their inspection 
while keeping those aspects of directorial privilege and autonomy which are required for good 
corporate management5 .
The cultural background for corporate governance in the UK commercial markets has been 
contextualised with the high number of take-overs during the 1980s. The importance of the 
take-over factor cannot be underestimated. The consequence has been to provide the markets 
with a device which prompts directorial efficiency, even though this may only be for the 
period which directly precedes the take-over and post merger empirical research has been 
critical of the economic efficiencies achieved. The perspective of the director becomes one 
known as short-termism.6
For the British market this has meant that the turnover in the number of directors in large 
corporations has been considerably high . Between 90-95% of company executives are 
changed within the two year period after the take-over7 . The UK markets have produced four
4 Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch, "A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate 
Governance", 1992, The Business Lawyer, Vol. 48, p 59.
5 Ira M Millstone, "The Evolution of the Certifying Board", The Business Lawyer, Vol. 48, 
August 1993, 1485.
6 "Takeovers" John Steadman. 1993 Longmans. LONDON.
7 Tim Jenkinson and Colin Meyer, "The Assessment: Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 8, no.3, p 1.
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times the amount of take-overs than that of Germany which has had an almost negligible 
amount of hostile take-overs since the Second World War.
Another factor which has influenced the desire for better corporate control, has been the 
number of shareholders in the market which has risen from 3 million in the late seventies to 
over 10 million by the early 1990's8 , With this increase has come a rise in the public interest 
of company management. Again the debate about shareholder intervention surrounds the 
desirability of the shareholder to actually involve himself in the running of the company. For 
Fischel9, the debate concerning shareholder intervention does not provide a suitable response 
to the objective of widening shareholder numbers and using that group in the corporate 
governance debate as a watchdog. Too many shareholders enter the market with the 
expectation that the company will be controlled by the directors and the Board and their 
position is to remain passive.
There are several reasons for this passivity amongst private investors. Certainly the law 
presumes that the shareholder is in the position of ultimate sanction, as with a majority vote at 
the GM, he can dismiss any director10. However, the practical restrictions significantly reduce 
the power. First, the shareholders may not be able to come together to form one voice to vote 
out a particular director".
Second, finding a venue big enough to cope with the particular vote may prove difficult for the 
company, although this may be circumvented with the use of tele conferencing which has been 
held to constitute a meeting 12 .
8 Stanley Wright, "Two Cheers for Institutions", Social Market Foundation 1994.
9 Supra 3.
10 This provision is found at s303 Companies Act 1985. A meeting has to be held in order to 
execute the provision, which has proven a mitigating factor in the power of the shareholder.
" This problem has been met in the US with shareholder groups coming together on certain 
issues to prevent the management from selling out to a particular company. The 
formulation of these groups are a product of the general evolution of broad based share 
ownership and represent am increase in confidence for the shareholder.
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Thirdly, it may prove politically damaging for the directors, or indeed the board, to be sacked. 
This would have an adverse affect on the share price again intimidating the shareholder from 
acting towards the director.
Finally, the shareholder may be outvoted by the institutional shareholders who act in greater 
harmony with the board as beneficiaries of 'soft' information which acts as an incentive not to 
be too rigorous with the overview of directorial activity 13 .
Nevertheless the issue of governance for the private shareholder who uses a nominee or who 
acts for himself is at the vanguard of the governance debate in Britain' 4 . The major issues are 
who is to fund the cost of the increased information to be received by the shareholders, and 
perhaps more onerous, what that information is to be.
For the orchestrators of corporate regulation, these factors have meant that three major issues 
are to be reconciled in the search for effective and efficient corporate control 15 . The first is the 
cost of implementing any system of corporate governance. This is important in determining 
the overall profitability of the company, as a high degree of agency cost, which is the cost 
connected with the role of management implementation structure, will eat in to the profit costs 
of the company.
The second is finding an appropriate role for the shareholders in company monitoring. The 
diversity of ownership and control, was initially highlighted in the famous debate between
12 Byng v London Life Association Ltd. [1990] Ch 170, [1989] 1 All ER 560 (Court of 
Appeal).
13 See post. Also note that in 1994, British Gas awarded a controversial pay increase for its 
chief executive, Cedric Brown. At the GM, the split between the institutional investors, 
who voted in favour of the increase and the private shareholder who did not, was marked. 
This dichotomy is a further illustration of the expectation gap which arises between the 
shareholder and management, in cases of profit relating policies and corporate 
accountability.
14 See DTI, "Private Shareholders : Corporate Governance Rights.", A Consultative 
Document, November 1996.
15 Prof. D.D. Prentice "Some Aspects of Corporate Governance Debate", Contemporary Issues 
in Corporate Governance 1993.
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Berle and Means 16, who recognised that in the growth of shareholder numbers their capacity to 
act by themselves as an efficient mechanism for directorial control was limited.
Thirdly, there is the structure and function of the board itself to be determined. The balance of 
power and the use of sub-committees and monitoring boards, have been suggestions for 
effecting a more accountable system of corporate management 17 .
Within these objectives, the aim of corporate governance is to create longterm successful 
business operations which are in the interests of the company as an entity and not one 
particular group within the corporate nexus 18 .
For commentators like Dodd 19 :
"...assumption of social responsibility by industrial leadership necessarily means 
assumption of such responsibility by corporate managers. "
However, the manifestation of such responsibility in terms of the acceptance of greater 
regulation, is subject to social and political dogmas which extend beyond the issue of corporate 
governance. For example, the move for greater environmental protection is to be balanced 
with the over-burdening of companies with compliance to expensive 'green' mechanisms of 
waste disposal and manufacture.
This problem shows that corporate governance is often a term used by a particular class of 
corporate membership to justify protecting the particular interests of that class. To overcome 
this problem, any code wishing to represent the true nature of corporate governance must first 
fulfil that balancing act which prevents it from being heralded as a poodle of any particular 
interest group.
16 Inter alia 1932,45 Harvard Law Review, 1145.
17 supra 1.
18 supra 2.
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The answer for most commentators has been to look to the Boards for greater accountability 
and structure in the system of corporate governance, as these provide the managers of the 
company with guardianship based on an objective to ensure the protection of the shareholders. 
One recent example of a Board changing from a passive acceptance to managerial supremacy 
to active intervention occurred in General Motors, which acted as a watershed for the 
restructuring of high powered quality Boards20 . Such a Board was felt to provide "that vision 
thing" which would instil into the company the competitive edge which the broad entity of 
managerialism could not provide. The result of this would be to make more cohesive the triad 
relationship of shareholder, Board and manager.
As Chancellor Alien stated in the Delaware Court of Chancery21 :
"The conventional perception is that Boards should select senior management, 
create incentive compensation schemes and then sit back and watch the 
organisation prosper. In addition board members should be available to act as 
advisors to the CEO [Chief Executive Officer]w/ie« called upon and they 
should be prepared to act during a crisis: an emergency succession problem, 
threatened insolvency or an MBO proposal, for example. "
He concludes:
"The view of the responsibility of membership on the board of directors of a 
public company is, in my opinion, badly deficient. It ignores a basic 
responsibility, that of the duty to monitor the performance of senior management 
in an informed way. Outside directors should function as active monitors of 
corporate management, not just in crisis, but continually; they should have an 
active role in the long-term strategic, financial and organisational goals of the 
corporation and should approve plans to achieve these goals; they should as 
well engage in the periodic review of short and long term performance 
according to plan and be prepared to press for correction when in their 
judgement there is nee
19 " For Whom are the Corporate Managers Trustees?" E. Merrick Dodd Jnr. 1932. Harvard 
Law Review. Vol XLV No.7. pi 145 at p 1162.
20 Supra 6.
21 Chancellor William T. Alien, Delaware Court of Chancery, "Redefining the Role of the 
Outside Diresors In An Age of Global Competition, presented by Ray Garrett Jr., Corporate 
and Securities Law Institute, Northwestern University, Chicago (Apr. 1992). Taken from "A 
Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance" Lipton & Lorsch, 1992, The 
Business Lawyer; Vol. 48, November 1992.
22 Chancellor William T. Alien, Delaware Court of Chancery, "Redefining the Role of Outside 
Directors In an Age of Global Competition", presented by Ray Garrett Jr., Corporate and 
Securities Law Institute, Northwestern University , Chicago, April 1992.
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Commentators have recognised that while this did not automatically lead to good corporate 
governance, it did act as a safety valve if the company was under performing23 . There were 
also limitations on the board's effectiveness which were attached to the size of the board and 
the means for implementing the views of the shareholders. The role of the strong 
Chairman/Chief Executive, also inhibited the board from taking a strong line on corporate 
policy.
Proposed changes in the United States prior to the initiation of the UK's Cadbury Report 
(detailed below) looked at the duties of the different members of the company with the hope of 
making the way clear for boards to determine the scope of their responsibilities and to end the 
ambiguities which up to that time had compromised their role as corporate governors. Some 
of those responses were translated into the British proposals for changes in the corporate 
governance of companies.
In response to the present deficiencies in the current systems of British corporate governance, 
Sir Adrian Cadbury chaired a committee whose findings were finalised in a report entitled, 
"The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance" (1992)24, which has suggested methods of 
achieving those standards of behaviour which at present are being circumvented by the 
inadequacies of amongst others, the insolvency provisions on the policing of directors25 .
The Committee was set up in May 1991, by the Financial Reporting Council of the London 
Stock Exchange, to address those aspects of financial governance which were vulnerable to the 
exploitation of The City's' barons, which had and have since included Nadir and Maxwell, for 
example. In that respect the Code like the Insolvency legislation of 1986, was a response to 
the current issues of corporate governance, rather than the product of a clearly defined policy
23 Supra 5.
24 "The Report of the Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance' was first 
Published 1st December 1992. It was chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury. See Appendix 3.
25 See Chapter Four.
132
Cadbury and the Corporate Governance Debate
on financial regulation,26 thus a reactionary tone and a strong sense of urgency pervaded the 
proceedings.
Although the committee aimed its principles at public companies, it was hoped that the 
regulation it promoted as an indication of commercial good practice would eventually filter 
through to the larger private companies and even beyond that.27 The committee realised the 
importance of the company to the economic drive and efficiency of the nation, and saw the 
Code, as a way of making those institutions strengthen their internal controls and thus make 
them more accountable to the public28 .
The Code proposed by Cadbury splits into four main sections dealing with:
a) The structure of the board. Paras 4.1 - 4.6
b) The role of the non-executive. Paras 4.10-4.17
c) Directors remuneration . Paras 4.40 - 4.46
d) Reporting controls through the establishment of an effective audit committee29 . 
This involved the directors reporting to the company that it was complying with 
the Code. Paras 4.33 - 4.38.
The Code's basic principles, were sensitive to the needs of balancing openness in the company 
while at the same time protecting information which would be sensitive to company's 
commercial integrity (para 3.2). It also saw the need to reflect this openness in a more integral 
report on the company's performance, by improving the quality of information received by the 
company from the directors, auditors and accountants (para 3.3).
The Code also felt that there was a need for companies to establish a more structured company 
framework which will allow it to be more efficient, in the passing of information from one
26 Supra 2, Chapter One, Fletcher "The Genesis of Modern Insolvency Law-An Odessey of 
Law Reform".
27 The Cadbury Code. Para 3.1
28 The report of the committee on "The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance", The 
Cadbury Report, December 1992.
29 "Restoring Trust and Confidence in the Corporate System", Sir Adrian Cadbury, Opinion.
[1992] 12 ICCLR, p 403.
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body to another (para 3.4). This was not to implement a new structure for the company, but to 
build upon the existing structure and in doing so make it more responsive to the needs of the 
directors and shareholders30.
The Committee hoped that this would achieve two things. First, it would raise the level of 
confidence in Boards by making them more responsible to shareholders and creditors, through 
furnishing those two groups with clear and accurate reports on company strategies. This 
would increase confidence in the Board. Second, that this standard of behaviour would be best 
achieved if those who were incorporating the Code could show to the rest of the commercial 
world that the standard practise did have a positive effect on the running of the business 
(para3.6).
The basic objectives of the Code illustrate the recognition in the commercial world that to 
disclose everything about the company's welfare is not in the best interests of the company and 
thus its shareholders and creditors. However, to reply to any criticism that this could be used 
as a means of circumventing the Code, the Code recommended that it be revised and kept up to 
date with accounting standards, so that the company's strategy for ensuring the best 
communication to its members, be of the most dynamic in form, if not in content (para 3.13).
Board Structure and Content
The committee stressed the importance of the structure of the Board in establishing a 
sufficiently high calibre of personnel and performance (para 4). The report advocating the 
Code, saw as a prerequisite to the establishment of a higher standard of practise, the initiation 
of a training scheme which would establish greater professionalism (para 4.19 & 20). This is a
30 "A Critical Analysis of The Recommendations of the Cadbury Committee" Christopher 
Stanley, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 2, no. 1, June 1993.
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recognition that the role of director is a professional one even though it is not designed with 
the furbishment of a professional examination analogous to accountancy or law.
Wrongful trading's position in this context is to be compared to a solicitor sitting L.P.C. exams 
at a time when a negligence suit is pending.
The Cadbury Committee supported new courses for directors, which will provide guidance on 
areas of recommended practice illustrated in the report. Pro-Ned, for instance, the champion 
of the non-executive director, has published a comprehensive set of booklets which give a 
guide to the successful implementation of Audit Committees, and Remuneration Committees 
(post), as well as providing a general guide for non-executive directors; their responsibilities 
and duties31 .
The objective was to establish a balance of power which would prevent one person from 
having an "unfettered power on decisions"32 .
The non-executive director was seen by the Cadbury Report as an essential element to Board 
control (para 4.10). Research undertaken by Pro-Ned33 , illustrated that there is too much 
informality in the appointment of non-executive directors. Of those non-executive directors 
appointed, only one-third had received a formal letter of appointment, and two thirds of 
appointees, took their position with insufficient knowledge and understanding of what was 
expected of them34 .
A BIM survey in 1972 found that most large companies saw the role of the non-executive 
directors:
" First, as a guarantor to the shareholders that the company is being run in a 
reputable and competent fashion and, second as an objective force able to
31 Pro-Ned "Promotion of Non-Executive Directors", Information File, 1993.
32 Comment On Cadbury Report, News Section [1993] 2 ICCLR C-35, Jane Ballantyne.
33 Pro-Ned 10th Annual Review, September 1992.
34 Ibid, commentary of Sir Adrian Cadbury.
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offer the board independent advice and criticism on general policy and 
specific subjects such as salaries. "35
The expectations of the non-executive director have thus been recognised for some time as 
being central to the policing of the company - "Great Expectations" 36was the title of a lecture 
by Sir Owen Green made in reponse to Cadbury. It was as a result of this that the institution 
Pro-Ned was initiated in 1982, on the initiative of the Bank of England, with sponsorship from 
a group of institutions "representative of industry and finance".
The report sought to utilise this perceived power by advocating a Board in which the executive 
and non-executive members would complement each other, requiring more careful selection of 
non-executive directors. This would lead to greater integration of the non-executive directors, 
and create an atmosphere of being an integral part of management rather than a separate entity. 
The search should thus begin with the objective of finding someone to fulfil a task rather than 
choosing a prestigious name.
Nevertheless, the main aim of such a scheme is to establish independence in non-executives, 
and to decrease the "old boy" network which Pro-Ned revealed constitutes some 60% of non- 
executive appointments. This is seen as compromising the concept of a professional non- 
executive in favour of a mentality which is only interested in whether the individual will fit 
into the general ethos of the company. The net result of this is the creation of an "in-house" 
mentality more disposed to self-congratulation than of establishing a sound independent check 
on the activities of the Board.
In their guide for the effective non-executive, Pro-Ned points to several areas to which the 
non-executive should pay attention37 . The structure of the organisation should be examined to
35 Reported March 1972.
36 The lecture was entitled "Corporate Governance : Great Expectations" reported inter alia 
The Times 25th February 1994. Here he criticises the ability of the non executives to act as a 
complete response to the question of remuneration, demanding full disclosure of director's 
pay.
37 A Brief Guide to Recommended Practice on Non-Executive Directors, Pro-Ned file on 
information 1993.
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discern the relationship between one unit and another, thus providing the non-executive with 
an overview of the planning and decision making process of the company. This will afford the 
non-executive ample scope in deciding when that process is not being used and to discover if 
there is a sinister reason for this.
There should also be full understanding of the system of financial control in the company so 
that the non-executive can indicate whether they are satisfactory, in the Annual Report. This is 
designed to create greater efficiency, and for the same reason, to develop an awareness of 
markets for the company's1 products would provide the Board with individuals who could 
assist on targeting company promotion38 .
The use of the non-executives to fulfil such an important advisory capacity in corporate 
management has negative as well as positive motivations. While the non-executive can effect 
a more structured construction to board policing, the fact that he and not the company's other 
advisors such as solicitors and accountants are being promoted, illustrates the difficulty with 
keeping company employees independent when they are being paid by the board39.
The position of the non-executive is also subject to the problem of their loyalty to the company 
compromising their role as an effective independent policing entity. Pro Ned stated in its code 
(1987) that independent non-executives could best be achieved by a professional adviser "not 
being retained by the company" and who is "not a significant customer of or supplier to the 
company."
The guides issued by Pro Ned illustrate a move towards greater assistance in corporate 
governance with the objective of greater management supervision and efficiency. Similar 
advisory bodies are also underway for the general directors of companies with the backing of 
the Bank of England, the CBI, and the Institute of Directors. Such courses are currently being
38 A Practical Guide For Non-Executive Directors : ( Janet Morgan Pro-Ned Conference 
1993).
39 Supra 17.
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run by Sunbridge Park and Egon Zehnder. The aim of these courses is to establish a basic 
knowledge of company procedure from which a director can like his legal counterpart enter the 
large, specialising multinational or the small high street firm.
This training would also discipline the company director to reading those journals, which 
would keep him up to date with developments in company law, and any procedural changes he 
would have to implement in order to stay in line with standard practices.
Indeed determining standard practice has itself been open to much debate. Perhaps one of the 
most important aspects of the report is the requirement that companies report on the 
effectiveness of their system of internal control (para 4.5 of the code). A working party 
established to deal with the criteria in the report reached its 17th draft before asking that the 
committee be given more time to debate the salient points. This has meant that companies 
have waited to implement this provision until the guidelines have been clarified40.
More recently The City has witnessed one of its most dramatic company failures, when Queen 
Moat House Hotels collapsed with losses of over £1 billion. In a report published by the 
company accountants in May 1996, examining the problems which the company was facing, a 
complete replacement of non-executive directors was seen as vital for the viability of the 
company to continue, and that the company structure for dealing with board meetings was 
completely inadequate41 . It recognised the importance of the non-executive board as a policing 
body in the company, and at QMH, this meant a complete change of the existing non-executive 
directors42 .
Nevertheless, the approach of using the non-executive as a corporate regulator is open to 
criticism. Firstly, while the code issued by Pro Ned focuses on the structure and objectives of 
the non-executive, it does not give substantial guidelines as to how those objectives are to be
40 Cadbury Requirements: Internal Control, David Pimm, The Administrator, October 1993, p 
29.
41 The Sunday Telegraph, 27th February 1994, Patrick Weaver, 29th November 1993,
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fulfilled, or how the non-executive will get his point of view imposed upon the board. Also, 
there is no distinction at law between the executive and non-executive director, which makes 
the establishment of different duties for both seem inappropriate.
In the Australian decision of AWA Ltd. v Daniels (trading as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) and 
Others43 , Rogers C.J Comm D., took great care to distinguish the legal expectations of the chief 
executive and the non-executive. He commented on the role of non-executive directors:
"in contrast to the managing director... are not bound to give continuous 
attention to the affairs of the corporation. Their duties are of an intermittent 
nature to be performed at periodic board meetings of any committee of the board 
upon which the director happens to be placed. Notwithstanding a small number 
of professional company directors there is no objective standard of the 
reasonably competent company director to which they may aspire. The very 
diversity of companies and the variety of business endeavours do not allow for a 
uniform standard. "**
Suggestions for the improvement in the capacity of non-executives, have included a clear 
definition of their role in the company. Since the Cadbury report, the role of the non-executive 
director has grown in importance, but this has not been reflected in legislation recognising the 
distinctive role of the non-executive45 . Such a definition would inevitably lead to greater 
formation of recognised standards of care for the non-executive.
To ensure that the independence of the non-executive is maintained, there would be a 
limitation on their fees so that they would not include benefits such as pension rights which 
would prompt them to be less independent in their analysis of the company's performance. 
With such a heavy responsibility placed on the shoulders of the non-executives; discerning 
management resources, forming management structure and dealing with a host of sub- 
committees, the problem for companies will be finding people of sufficient calibre to 
undertake the task successfully46.
42 The Times, 29th November, 1993.
43 (1992) 7 A.C.S.R 759; 10 A.C.L.C 933.
44 The Duty of Care of Non-Executive Directors, Sally Sievers, September 1993, Company 
and Securities Law Journal, p 321.
45 City Comment, Stephen Rosefield, 1993, 90/41 Law Society Gazette, p 34.
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Other recommendations are that the number of non-executives in PLC's should not be less 
than two and not more than six, as any more would dilute effectiveness and influence. To 
enhance their profile in the company as a decision making unit, they should be able to circulate 
their views on company policy at the company's expense. This is indicative of a more general 
view of where the cost of corporate governance ought to be met.
Further proposals are that the non-executives be elected every two years and that there should 
be an annual comment from the non-executives to the shareholders on the policy decisions of 
the board.47
To complete their position in the balance of company power, the DTI, the Bank of England, 
the Stock Exchange the Securities and Investment Bureau (SIB) and other bodies acting under 
the Financial Services Act should be required by law to bring directly to the attention of the 
non-executive any misconduct in the company.
However, the controversial nature of these provisions would be strongly resisted by 
management who see them as being too restrictive. The code for the non-executives as well as 
these recommendations can act as a useful guide for legislation, but in this respect also show 
the problem of enforcing a regulatory code and whether the only real solution would be 
legislative measures.
Cadbury; Reforming Board Structure and Remuneration
Further proposals of the Cadbury Code suggested the decentralisation of power at board level, 
ensuring that the offices of Chief Executive and Chairman, be separated (para 4.9). The role of 
the Chairman is to ensure that the board is run properly, and that shareholders are fully aware
46 ibid.
47 Cadbury Code paras 4.16 & 4.17
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of those aspects of the board agenda which require then- approval48 . Thus the role of the chief 
executive, augmented by having the power over these aspects of board control, would lose the 
discretion to implement policies without the necessary approval of shareholders, through 
delaying those administrative aspects of the company designed to give effect to efficient 
shareholder notice. This will provide redress for mismanagement, but its objectivity is 
mitigated by the ability of the shareholder to be circumspect to the other interests in the 
corporation, such as employees and creditors.
In the decision of the DTI into the affairs of Blue Arrow pic,49 one of the major criticisms of 
the company, which had successfully taken over the Manpower Inc., was the amalgamation of 
the role of Chairman and Chief-Executive, in the hands of Tony Berry. If the power of this 
one individual had in fact been reduced, it has been suggested that the governance of the 
company would have been improved, and that the costs relating to Blue Arrow's involvement 
in the Blue Arrow Challenge for the America's Cup, would have been scrutinised by the board, 
and less controversial50. In this particular instance, Berry was able to commit the company 
without the shareholders or any other stakeholder being able to discuss the policy.
This particular aspect of Cadbury however, has been criticised by those that see the separation 
of the two roles as undermining strong leadership which is felt to be necessary for effective 
company management 51 .
Sir Adrian Cadbury has fielded these criticisms by arguing that the debate on the effectiveness 
of board structure has now been opened and that this was one of the most important objectives 
of the committee52 .
48 Shareholder passivity has resulted in this aspect of governance being eroded in practice. 
However, the need for communication with shareholders has been highlighted most 
recently, in two reports, "Private Shareholders: Corporate Governance Rights" A 
Consultative Document DTI November 1996 and "Shareholder Communication at the 
Annual General Meeting; A Consultative Document", DTI, April, 1996.
49 "The Blue Arrow Report", DTI, September 1992.
50 Blue Arrow. Lessons on Corporate Governance, Helen Shilling, Practical Law For 
Companies, June 1993.
51 Commentary in "The Times' by Matthew Lyn and Rufus Olins, 27th June 1993.
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Nevertheless, in the years succeeding the implementation of the code, a number of the major 
companies have split the roles of Chairman and Chief-Executive. These including Ladbroke, 
Kingfisher, Pearson and Reed, underlying the recognition of its importance in the 
establishment of a more effective board.
The balance of power in the board was felt by the committee to be best consolidated by 
establishing stricter procedural requirements for board meetings (para 4.23), and for the 
establishment of new sub-committees dealing with amongst other things, directors 
remuneration and auditing.
The Cadbury Committee felt that the character of remuneration would keep company 
personnel, including non-executives objective and independent. It was suggested that 
remuneration for non-executives should not include share options or pension schemes. This 
would effect a distance between the non-executives and the commercial interests of the 
company, thus affording greater scope for criticising objectively any failure of the company to 
act in accordance with the Code of Practice which Cadbury suggests.
Concern for what is seen as the excesses of director remuneration has increased, criticism 
coming from shareholders and the Association of British Insurers. The criticisms of the ABI 
show that the incentive for higher performances, should be justified by a long-term 
performance scheme of at least three years, and that options for the purchase of shares should 
phased in to encourage a longer involvement period with the company. In the same vein, 
remuneration committees should specify that the directors retain their options for at least three 
years, and that investments from bonuses should be kept for a similar period53 .
52 ibid.
53 The Times, 25th May 1994 Martin Flanagan, and 'The Independent', 25th May, Louise
Randell.
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The Cadbury Code suggested that remuneration be dealt with by a remuneration committee, 
which would be managed under the auspices of the non-executives (para 4.42). In this way the 
newly independent non-executives would be able to restrain the excesses of directors and 
validate their remuneration by constant dialogue with the shareholders.
A survey carried out by "The Times' for 1993, showed that in spite of the recession, the 
number of executives that had taken a pay cut of more than 10% was only 5%, the number of 
executives who had received a pay increase of over 10% was 41%, indicating the lack of 
sensitivity to the commercial markets, trends in director's pay illustrated54 .
A further indication of the compromises that can be made of the effectiveness of remuneration 
committee was seen in the Body Shop's decision to award the managing directors, Mr and Mrs 
Roddick, a pay cut of some £150,000, for the financial year ending April 199655 . While 
ostensibly this seemed to be a way of capping the pay of directors, it belied the fact that the 
Roddicks along with only two non-executive directors constituted the remuneration committee, 
and that the effectiveness of the committee was subject to the will of the two major directors. 
A pay cut seemed less gracious in view of the fact that as the two major shareholders, they also 
received dividends increasing their income to almost £1 million each.
The capability of the shareholder to act as a restraint on the directors is limited to the matters 
on which they are routinely called to vote at the AGM. These include receiving and 
considering the Annual Reports and Accounts for the previous year; to declare a dividend; to 
elect directors appointed by the Board since the last AGM or re-elect other directors; to 
authorise directors to fix the auditors remuneration; to appoint or re-appoint the auditors; and 
to authorise directors to issue new shares, for cash within the constraints agreed by the 
institutions' Investment Protection Committee56.
54 London Times Business Section, report by Phillip Bassett, 14th July 1993.
55 Reported inter alia, "The Times', June 1996.
56 Supra 17.
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These items tend to be retrospective in their content, and do not allow the shareholder to 
involve himself in the policy decisions of the future. However in Table A, shareholders 
perform in theory an integral part of the decision making process for director's remuneration".
The ability of the shareholder to influence the remuneration of directors was illustrated in the 
case of Guinness Pic v Sounders 58 . Here, one of the directors, Ward, was promised a 
payment of £5.2 million, on the understanding that the bid to take over Distillers Pic proved 
successful. Later, Guinness argued that the payment had not been authorised and sought to 
recover the payment. Ward argued that the power had been delegated to the committee, but 
the House of Lords rejected Ward's argument, stating that 'the power to grant remuneration 
lay with the Board and not a sub committee' 59.
The importance of illustrating the Articles' central role in authorising the power of the Board 
to decide on the remuneration of the directors, means that theoretically, the shareholder can 
alter the articles at any time to take away that power. The problem for the shareholder is 
forming the requisite majority to alter the articles60 . This problem has all of the hallmarks of 
the shareholders general handicap in creating an effective police force within the corporation61 .
Nevertheless, shareholders are the obvious beneficiary from the legal requirement that 
authorisation has to occur before remuneration can be validated. The underlying rule of equity 
also precludes directors from receiving payment on any other legal basis where there has not 
been due authorisation, and the equitable doctrine of "quantum meruit" which was argued by
57 Article 82 provides that the shareholder will determine the remuneration of the directors at 
the AGM. For the managing director, the position is dealt with under Article 84, and is the 
remit of the board to decide.
58 [1990] 2A.C. 663.
59 See in particular the provisions of Articles 90 and 91, Table A.
60 Section 9 of the Companies Act 1985, requires a special resolution (75%) of shareholders to 
approve the alteration, which can then be challenged by 15% of the minority shareholder. 
The alteration can also be subject to judicial intervention, on the basis that alteration was not 
in the interests of the corporation. (See inter alia, Dafen Tinplate v Llanelli Steel [1920] 
2Ch 124). These particular problems beset the shareholders exercising their powers granted 
under Article 82, Table A.
61 See ante Chapter 5.
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Ward in the Guinness case was rejected by the House of Lords62 . The cases were distinguished 
on the basis that the Boardman case did not result in a conflict of interest with application of 
the rule whereas in the Guinness Case there was an obvious conflict which occurred as a result 
of Ward trying to obtain a particular result for the company and having an input into the 
decision on his remuneration package once that objective was obtained63 .
For the directors, a lack of authority in granting remuneration, will result in personal liability 
for any loss to the corporation and the corporation being free from liability. The shareholders 
can still go on to ratify any such award64 . For the Board however, shareholder protection can 
be undermined if there is a liberal judicial interpretation on what constitutes an authorised 
process. In the case of Runciman v Walter Runciman Pic. 65, directors were allowed to act 
informally in extending the chairman's contract to five years even though a formal board 
meeting was required to do this, because there was nothing in the articles specifically stating 
that the board had to meet formally. The result for the shareholder is that such flexibility may 
be manipulated by those who would wish to take advantage of a 'Guinness' type scenario.
The case validates de facto the use of committees to do the work of the board. It did not matter 
that some of the directors had not given their formal approval to the amendment to the 
Chairman's contract. As Simon Brown J states:
" [their] involvement went beyond mere informal acquiescence...when they were 
acquited with the proposal following approval by the non-executive directors 
they, as directors, had the opportunity to query them. The mere fact that they 
never apparently did so and that their views were not more explicitly canvassed 
seems to me nothing to the point: by the time of the implementation of the 
various salary increases, and more obviously still by the time [R] came to assert 
his notice term, such terms were indeed "as determined" by the other board 
members and none of them could have been heard to assert the contrary. ""
62 See ante at 42. The principle of "quantum meruit" was established in the case of Boardman 
vPhipps[1967]2A.C.46.
63 See speeches [1990] 2A.C. 663, 689 (Lord Templeman), 701 (Lord Goff).
64 See "Director's Remuneration: Constraining the Power of the Board. Andrew Griffiths. 
Lloyds Maritme and Commercial Law Quarterly. August 1995. Part 3.305-432.
65 [1992JB.C.L.C. 1084.
66 [1993]B.C.C220at223.
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The Companies Act provides for the director to have his remuneration policy scrutinised for 
any "hidden agenda" it may entail. This is achieved by compelling the director to disclose any 
interest he may have hi a particular vote (inter alia a vote concerning a remuneration package). 
Section 317 Companies Act 1985 requires a director to make it his statutory duty to "declare 
the nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the company"67 .
The effect of the section was illustrated in the case of Guinness68 where the House of Lords did 
not treat the terms of the enabling article which provided for a self dealing vote on the basis of 
prior disclosure as a condition of the board's power to award remuneration, but rather as a 
condition of the enforceability of the award by W. Thus failure to disclose a personal interest 
in the remuneration does not make the decision void, but instead makes its enforcement 
voidable.
In Runciman69, Simon Brown J concluded that the statutory duty of disclosure applied even 
where the interest of the director was obvious to the other directors, and failed to recognise that 
such an obvious interest as voting on the amendment of your own service contract, could act as 
an implied disclosure of your interest. Nevertheless, Simon Brown J concluded that on the 
balance of justice, the board's decision should not be set aside, even though it was voidable, 
because it would provide the new controllers of the company with an unexpected gain, which 
was a product of the omission of a legal technicality. To allow the new owners to benefit he 
declared,
"would be to sacrifice [R 's] legitimate interests on the alter of slavish adherence to ritualistic 
form". 70
67 Schedule 4 Companies Act 1989 requires the notes to the accounts to disclose the aggregate 
of director's emoluments received during the relevant financial year. This includes 
emoluments received in connection with any subsidiary. A separate disclosure is required 
for the Chairman of the company. The notes must disclose emoluments in bands of £5,000.
68 ante 46. 
59 ante 53. 
70 ante 64
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Once again the case provides an example of the attrition that often exists between the efficient 
running of the internal structure of the corporation and the corporation's legal responsibility to 
its shareholders and other groups in the corporate nexus71 .
The economic consequences of directors' pay influence the input of the incentive remuneration 
in the overall remuneration package72 . A too liberal package which does not include incentive, 
will prohibit the director from taking any lucrative risk with the corporation. However, too 
motivated a package, will detract from the director reinvesting and developing in the 
corporation seeing the prospect of a greater dividend as a prerequisite to his 'bonus' salary73 .
The overview of judicial discretion may result in an inconsistent approach to the difficult 
decision of looking at the legal duties as opposed to the commercial expediency of the 
corporation74 .
The balancing exercise, however, can be seen as needing to uphold the duties of public policy 
for which such statutory provisions were created. In the instant case, the only reason for 
holding the meeting was to discuss the alteration of [R's] contract, and thus the disclosure of 
his interest would it is argued be superfluous to the rest of the directors who would have 
known about his position.
71 The bad publicity of conflict in the shareholder's input into determining the pay of 
director's was particularly illustrated in the Cedric Brown case in British Gas. Here, the 
smaller investor and the institutional investor were split in their respective disapproval and 
affirmation of the pay rise.
72 Directors and Officers Remuneration: The Role of the Law. I.Ramsay. Journal of Business
Law. July 1993.
73 P.M. Dechow and R.G. Sloan, "Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem : An 
Empirical Investigation (1991) 14 Journal of Accounting and Economics" 51.
74 See Tim Pryce-Brown "Directors in Company Asset Transactions", The Company Lawyer. 
Vol. 16, no.7, July/August 1995. The article explores the strict legal requirements relating 
to the purchasing and selling of assets between directors and the corporation and focuses on 
the decision of Duckwari Pic v Offerventure Ltd & another. Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) 7 July 1994 (unreported). Here the provision of s320 on substantial property 
transaction was rigidly enforced even though the company like the instance case of 
Runciman, had changed ownership.
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Nevertheless, the duties of law provide for the public to be protected from the unscrupulous 
behaviour of the director and not to adhere to those duties is to undermine the trust in the 
public corporation which is central to the relationship between the shareholders and the board.
In the case of Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) v Fitzgerald ", Lightman J held that the 
statutory duty of disclosure had three purposes. The first that all directors should know or be 
reminded of the interest. Secondly the making of the declaration should be the occasion for a 
statutory pause for thought about the existence of the conflict of interest and the duty to prefer 
the interests of the company to the directors' own. Thirdly, disclosure or reminder must be a 
distinct happening at the meeting, which therefore must be recorded in the minutes of the 
meeting under section 328 Companies Act 1985 76.
With the rise in shareholder awareness in the activities of the board and the public policy 
duties of the corporation enshrined in the Companies Act 1985 provisions relating to 
disclosure, the momentum for any change in the law on disclosure would have to take account 
of the increased expectations of the shareholders and particularly those institutions which 
represent a large input of corporate capital, in public corporations.
Methods of improving shareholder control have suggested a wider ambit for shareholder 
involvement particularly in the approval of take-overs and the validating of dividends, where 
75% of votes would be required before a dividend could be issued. This it is hoped would 
prompt the shareholder to be more pro-active in his commitment to the company and to realise 
that as well as rights he also has duties77.
75 [1995] B.C.L.C 352.
76 For further discussion see inter alia, "Disclosure of Directors Interests", Richard Nolan, The 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 16, no.7, July/August 1995.
77 See inter alia, DTI Consultative Document on Shareholder Communication at the Annual 
General Meeting, April 1996. Also "Law Commission Paper 142 on Shareholder Remedies' 
1996 which looks at changes in Section 459 Companies Act and related provisions to the 
concept of unfair prejudice.
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However, such limitations would be controversial but if past by legislation, would not be 
inconsistent with the underlying philosophy of the free market, as it would not involve 
intervention by the Government but only by those who own the company78 .
The effectiveness of shareholders as a corporate police force, is seen as having its future in the 
form of the institutional shareholdings, held by the bigger financial institutions79 . This would 
introduce a new dimension into the role of those institutions, which up until now have seen 
their position as being that of administrators of share acquisition and not to oversee the 
conduct of the different boards with which they are dealing.
The advantage the institutions have concerning the policing of companies is that they have 
immediate and sensitive access to a wide range of companies. This would enable the 
institutions to command a panorama over company structure and performance, and to 
intervene in those companies which are not 'keeping pace' with the general standards of 
accountability and board structure being implemented by the other companies.
Two factors which mitigate the excitement for such a new panacea for the corporate 
governance lie in the relationship between the institutional shareholders and the board. Firstly, 
the institutions have no direct financial interest themselves in the companies, and even though 
their reputation depends on obtaining successful investments, the presumption cannot be made 
that the institutions will want to get too involved in the direct management of the company. As 
R.E. Artus, a leading investment manager stated:
"any conceivable increase in [institutional] activity will not amount to a major 
new element of accountability in our system matching that of the bank-based 
economies, since share ownership unaccompanied by the additional involvement 
in providing finance and other services, will never provide the depth of 
knowledge and commitment that arises with the combination of banking and 
property interests. "80
78 Supra 17.
79 J.E.Parkinson : Corporate Power and Responsibility, Chapter 6. Oxford Clarendon Press. 
1993.
80 R.E.Artus (Group Chief Investment Manager of Prudential Corporation pic) in "Creative 
Tension?" (1990) at 14. It has been suggested that institutions increase their holding in the 
companies to say 25% in order to increase the enthusiasm for company monitoring.
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This factor is closely linked with the second. The 'soft' information which the institutions 
receive from directors of many of the boards allow for financial planning amongst the 
institutions. Such material, including the potential profit ratio of the company for the next two 
or three years, furnishes the institutions with advice which enables them to provide their 
principals with the most effective investment programmes, and such information would be 
difficult to lose, if the institutions became too inquisitorial into the way the managers of their 
information were actually conducting the management of the company.
One final element in the relationship between the shareholders and the company is the capacity 
of the smaller shareholder to no longer see his reaction to any discontent in the company as 
being limited to selling his shares; the 'Exit' phenomenon. In the USA, recent "voices" have 
been raised by those pension fund holders, to take-overs of the company. This change from 
the traditional passive role for the shareholders, to an interventionist part in the corporate triad, 
reflects the decline in the internal finance markets in the USA and the UK, and a greater need 
for the smaller shareholder.
This change of emphasis cannot therefore anticipate the former deference which stood at the 
forefront of the shareholder's relationship with the board81 .
However, with this newly discovered political power, there is still the option of releasing 
shares at a financially unstable point in the company's life, which undermines the shareholder's 
capacity to monitor the company effectively. It has been suggested therefore that the 
information which is furnished to the shareholders by the company contains the long-term 
prospects of the company, which will make any decision to sell less servient to the short-term 
results of the company, and thus much less volatile.
81 Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, John C. Coffee 
Jr, (1991) Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91, no. 6, p 1277.
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The implementation of statutory limitation on selling shares is a more controversial but 
effective way of also ensuring the consistency of shareholder commitment to the company, 
which is a prerequisite for corporate control82 .
Furthermore, institutional share ownership has witnessed an increase in its vocal concern for 
the remuneration of directors, and in particular concern lies in the area of the 'golden 
parachute' given to directors, should they be asked to leave the company before the expiration 
of their contract. For the NAPF (National Association of Pension Funds), this has been 
labelled as a "reward for failure". 83 However, if the rules relating to the director's contract on 
early release are implemented this may very well result in even a larger contractual claim for 
the corporation via wrongful dismissal.
This cost is an inhibiting factor to an early termination to the contract84 . The Cadbury Report 
went some way to ensuring that the bill for an early termination be limited by requesting that 
director's service contracts be shortened to three years unless shareholder approval was first 
sort and obtained85 . The Remuneration Committee and the disclosure requirements on all of 
the directors' emoluments are of course other elements to try and control the way in which 
directors are paid86.
The Stock Exchange in its 1993 revised set of Listing Rules (aka the "Yellow Book"), extends 
the disclosure of directors' emoluments even further. It requires that the details of the 
directors' service contracts must include "full particulars of each director's arrangements for 
salary and other benefits", "any commission or profit sharing arrangements", and "any 
provision for early termination of the contract". This last provision must include anything 
which will enable the shareholder to estimate the liability of the corporation for early 
termination of the contract.
82 ibid.
83 "Fair Shares?", Alexander Pepper, Accountancy, April 1995, p 158.
84 ante Chapter Five.
85 Cadbury Report, published 1992, Para 4.41.
86 Cadbury Report. Paras 4.39 - 4.46.
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Cadbury was further extended by the 'Yellow Book', when the recommendations of Pro-Ned, 
concerning the independence of non-executive directors who sit on Remuneration Committees, 
were complied made compulsory. Here in particular, the Chief Executive was felt to be a 
witness to the proceedings but was excluded from voting with the committee.
As well as the recommendations of the NAPF87 to the subject of director remuneration, other 
institutions like the Association of British Insurers88 (ABI) and Accounting Standards Board 
Urgent Issue Task Force (UITF)89 have also made contributions to the future moulding of the 
remuneration of boards. However, it was the Greenbury Report90, which has created the 
greatest amount of debate in this area.
Like Cadbury, the Greenbury recommendations were designed for large public companies, 
with a view to obtaining a code of best practice which would become a ruling for listing on the 
stock exchange91 . The shareholder was seen as being central to the need to provide greater 
information on the subject of director remuneration, and for this reason, Greenbury felt it 
necessary to give shareholders an account of what compliance had in fact taken place92 .
For Greenbury93 the efficient use of the Remuneration Committee is an important aspect to the 
formulation and structural application of the director's remuneration. Remuneration 
Committees should be given the power to discharge those powers held by the board 
concerning the payment of directors, necessitating a change in the articles of association if 
required94.
87 The NAPF paper "Directors Service Contracts" was issued in December 1994.
88 Report published in May 1994, entitled "long-term Remuneration for Senior Executives".
89 Report was issued in September 1994, entitled "Disclosure of Director's Share Options".
90 Report published on 17th July 1995.
91 Greenbury Report, para 2.1-2.5.
92 ibid.
93 Code of Best Practice. The Greenbury Report 1995. Gee Publishing LONDON.
94 ibid, para 4.3.
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Weaknesses in this process unveil themselves when the remuneration device for the non- 
executives, who exclusively form the remuneration committee are considered. Here, the 
Committee decided that this matter should be dealt with by the Board, and confined to the 
limits placed in the articles of association95 .
This format may be considered as a potential mitigating device in the effectiveness of 
implementing a structure which can satisfactorily be perceived as being objective and 
independent in its method of defining a policy on director remuneration. With their own 
salaries subject to the will of the Board (which may also alter any articles of association), the 
remuneration committee will have considerations about its own well being in the process of 
deciding the remuneration of directors, which may not be in the best interests of the 
shareholders.
The shareholder's position is further weakened as the Remuneration Committee, decides on an 
annual basis whether the shareholder's approval should be sought on the policy for 
remuneration in that year96 . The process is open to manipulation and extra policy 
consideration which may be very politically charged. The net result is that again in practice 
the role of the shareholder is undermined.
The disclosure and approval provisions within the Greenbury Report do go some way to 
invoking a broader perspective for the shareholder to have his views at least heard. The 
remuneration committee must not only disclose the full policy reason for remuneration to the 
shareholder97, but the decision was taken in connection with the code of best practice98 .
Perhaps even more difficult for the board to explain, is the question of long term share options 
which may be granted to directors in one lump sum rather than phased over a period of time.
95 ibid, para 4.13.
96 ibid, para 5.28-2.32.
97 ibid, para 5.4.
98 ibid, para 5.25.
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In this case, the board must explain and justify the awards to the shareholder". This goes on to 
raise the issue of how deep an explanation is required. In the report to the shareholders, the 
board may feel that a substantial share option award is justified on the basis that the director 
has worked hard, although controversially. The shareholders may disagree but may find the 
hard evidence of profit too great an argument to be off-set by other more socio-economic 
reasons for disallowing the award. There may also be a tendency to blind the shareholder with 
science in coming to the conclusion concerning the policy reason for the award.
It is clear from the British Gas pic decision to award Cedric Brown a substantial increase in 
salary, that the shareholder can be far from passive in his response to the question of director's 
pay. Nevertheless, with the influence of the institutional shareholder, and its relationship with 
the board, the small shareholder's voice is lost100 . The result is a frustrating expectation gap 
between the shareholder who wishes to be more active in the corporation, and the seemingly 
impenetrable board and institutional shareholder.
The Greenbury Committee's report highlights some of the considerations to be taken into 
account when formulating a policy on director's remuneration. Most importantly, is the 
commitment of the company to offer incentives that will attract retain and motivate directors of 
the quality required but paying more than is necessary for this should be avoided101 .
This paragraph leaves the decision of what is necessary to the board, and clearly, this may 
result in a subjective and highly political interpretation being made. The report goes on to 
consider that the remuneration should reflect the performance criteria of the corporation as a 
whole 102, and which compares with other similar corporations.
Finally, there is the matter of compensation payments for, inter alia, early termination for poor 
performance. Here, the Report preferred a shortening of director's contracts to one year, in
99 ibid, para 6.29.
100 ante, Chapter Five, and The Times, 1995.
101 ante, 70, para 6.5-6.7.
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order to limit those contractual compensation payments which are necessary for early 
termination103 .
While this may limit the compensation payments for early termination and make the director 
more responsive to the issue of management it also encourages a shorter term perspective of 
the corporation's policy on reinvestment and development which may be viewed in deference 
to the over-riding objective of making a profit, in order for the director's performance to be 
viewed well by the shareholder.
The Greenbury Report, thus places emphasis on the use of the remuneration committee, to act 
as an independent monitor for the policies on directors' payments. The structure, while 
ostensibly applaudable, looses momentum when the inter-linked relationship with the board is 
considered. The non-executive's body Pro-Ned recommends that the remuneration committee 
deal with all aspect of director's remuneration 104. In expressing this wish the body would 
presume that the committee would act as an independent monitor for the shareholders and 
those other interested groups in the corporation. The structural flaws in its application 
however may well serve to mitigate the effectiveness of the committee.
Communication in the Company
102 ante, 70, para 6.38-6.40.
103 ibid, para 7.11-7.18.
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A further problem associated with the increase in shareholder activity is the extent to which 
communication is considered as an important factor in the successful execution of company 
policy, by the board. For it is the board which decides what information is given to the 
shareholders in the annual and six monthly reports. This is an area which Cadbury suggested 
more openness and far greater definition was felt to be needed in the responsibilities of 
accountants, auditors and directors. (Chapters 4.0 and 5.0 respectively).
Another criticism forwarded by Queen Moat's accountants focused on "the absence of 
consolidated management information...made it extremely difficult to identify trends or to 
interpret the overall financial position of the Group." Also directors were unable to furnish 
detailed papers of the half yearly profits for 1992. The company has been observed as having 
grown so quickly, that it had failed to ensure that an internal communication structure had 
grown sufficiently. The result was that management became unable to respond to the 
company's problems in the absence of efficiently produced information available for inspection 
in a timely manner.
Cadbury suggested that this be dealt with by an official agenda (see below). In the case of 
Blue Arrow 105 the lack of information concerning company policy resulted in a piecemeal 
approach to the whole issue of communicating to shareholders. This also deters the non- 
executives from fulfilling their role with greater integrity through furnishing them with 
complete information concerning the company's activities.
In the respect the Code also recommended stricter guide-lines on seeking professional advice. 
This was felt to be better orchestrated, by allowing the director to obtain that advice at the 
company's expense. This would also lead to more Board meetings, which would be structured 
by using the formal schedule of duties defining clearly the expectations of the company from 
the different managerial groups. Such codification, would contain the duties of the directors
104 "Curbing top pay bonanza", Saleem Sheikh, The Company Lawyer, Vol. 16, no. 4, April 
1995.
105 Supra 39.
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which would be placed in a statement before the auditors Report. The major consequence for 
the company is that it would give itself a check-list of items which it would have to raise at 
Board meeting to comply with an accepted form of practice undertaken by all companies. The 
Code felt that such a schedule would include the acquisition and disposal of company assets, 
and any capital projects which would involve risk, (para 4.24) 106 .
The emphasis is clearly upon Boards making themselves more available to discuss matters 
which are of material importance to the company's financial position, and to establish a 
procedure for determining a particular matter as significant in ensuring that the company acts 
in accordance with the Code.
The report was also critical of the procedure for directors' appointments, and the principles 
upon which the appointments were made. In particular, it was felt that individuals were 
chosen for their personal suitability to the company's existing management rather than for then- 
experience in company management, thus undermining the philosophy of the report to 
establish a professional class of directors.
To enable a more objective criteria to be employed when determining directors' appointments, 
the report suggested the establishment of Nomination Committees, which would have a 
majority of non-executive directors. The independent committee would be responsible for 
Board selection, and because of the independent nature of the non-executive Board, illustrated 
in its selection process (ante), this would lead to an objective criteria for selecting the new 
directors. The result would be more directors being chosen for their professional expertise, 
thus raising the standard of directors' practice generally.
The ambit of determining expertise and suitable candidates for management is still a 
contentious issue as the broad notion of corporation defines a considerably differing degree of 
commercial activity and thus a wide degree of expectation of directors from different groups in
106 inter alia, Commentary by Ashurst Morris Crisp, "Director's Responsibility for Financial
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the company. There have been a variety of committees and working groups which are trying 
to establish a standard of corporate management which would act as a blueprint for anyone 
deciding to trade through the means of a company 107 .
Once this more efficient and better trained mechanism is put in place, the report suggested that 
it would provide greater opportunity for Boards to make more reports to the company, beyond 
that of the half yearly reports currently furnished. This would be extended to any significant 
intervening act which the Board undertakes. The Board, on these occasions, would meet with 
the Auditing Committee, to discuss the question of cash flow, for those future requirements 
finalised at Board level. Perhaps such a procedure would be the ultimate guard against any 
proposition that the company had not taken every step to minimise the loss to creditors - the 
defence to wrongful trading - by showing that it had frequent and detailed discussions with 
relevant parties, in relation to fresh sources of finance.
The Audit Committee
In connection with this new, more dynamic level of communication, is the report by the 
auditors. This report giving a true and fair view of the company's performance 108 , is central to 
the responsibilities of the directors and auditors, to the shareholders, and the creditors. One of 
the problems for auditors is that in times of trouble they are left being scrutinised by all 
effected by the poor performance of the company, as to why that performance was not detected 
sooner, in the end of year report. The Cadbury Committee's report, expressed its concern with 
the expectation of the commercial community to the role of the auditor.
Statements", Practical Law for Companies, January/February 1994.
107 Henley Management College are devising a booklet which deals with many issues which 
should be addressed by the director before he takes up his position on a board. Aimed at the 
middle sized company it makes representations an a wide range of issues from setting out 
the aims of a good board to overseeing the successful implementation of the of the 
objectives. The booklet is entitled "Good Practice for Boards of Directors", **date, 
publishers etc**
108 Section 235 Companies Act 1985.
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Clearly, an auditor is not an accountant who can work by himself in concluding the position of 
the company. His report is based on the information which is given to him by the company 
director. Shareholders however look to the auditors as being the safeguard of their interests. 
The auditors, will be helped in fulfilling this role, by the implementation of those 
recommendations already outlined, concerning the director's responsibility to communicating 
the company's current financial position.
However, the report also felt that an Audit Committee would facilitate greater enthusiasm, in 
protecting the shareholder's interests. At present two hundred and fifty listed companies use an 
audit committee. The main purpose of these committees, is to liaise with the external auditor 
about the half-yearly financial statement submitted to the Board, and to comment on any 
reservations arising from the audit without the executive board members present. This 
provides the company with a greater amount of openness and honesty when dealing with their 
auditors, which will have a positive effect on the position of the shareholder's understanding of 
the company's current position, and financial expectations for the coming period of trading.
The position of the shareholder's understanding of company matters is further strengthened by 
the report's desire to see greater director accountability. This would manifest itself by 
shareholders being allowed to submit written questions to the Board concerning company 
objectives and policy. In the age of popular capitalism, this would resolve the sometimes 
opaque argument that the shareholder is prevented from expressing an opinion because of the 
practical difficulties in holding a general meeting for such a large number of people. The main 
effect of this proposal is that shareholders will be able to comment on the strategies proposed 
by the Board. This fulfils a traditional and perhaps forgotten criterion that ownership and 
control of the company are not best married by being mutually exclusive 109 .
' Supra 74
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The Code initially sets out standards for listed companies, but clearly the report envisages its 
guidelines being adopted on a much wider level, as their effect on company trading standards 
is realised. The success of this self-regulating report, depends upon the willingness of the 
commercial community to enshrine it into its constitution. A survey carried out by Manches & 
Co. Solicitors, suggests that the code is receiving mixed reviews from companies. Their 
corporate survey indicated that in response to the companies being asked if they would be 
implementing the Cadbury Code on Corporate Governance, stated:
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YES
1. Appointment of an audit committee
2. Split of activities between chairman and chief executive
3. Appointment of independent non-executive directors
4. Three year maximum service contract for dirctors
5. All of the above four issues
85%
75%
83%
84%
57%
NO
15%
25%
13%
15%
43%
Table 1: Results from survey conducted by Manches & Co. Solicitors 1993 by kind 
permission of Mr Stephen Goldstraw (19th November 1993)
These figures show that while the commercial community sees the advantage of more 
regulation in their company structure, it also shows that the code is viewed as being too 
inflexible, particularly in its demand for all of its suggestions to be implemented. The main 
reason for such qualified success is that companies see the code as being insensitive to the 
financial capabilities of the smaller listed companies to, in effect, re-structure to come in line 
with the code.
In analysing the effects of the code on building societies, The Building Societies Association 
(BSA), published its response to the Cadbury Report110. It welcomed the general thrust of the 
report, but pointed to a number of areas which it felt were inappropriate to the needs of 
building societies. In particular it felt that it was unacceptable to omit the chief executive from 
the audit committees altogether, as under Section 71(11) of the Building Societies Act 1986, 
the chief executive is required to sign the report of the audit committee, relating to compliance 
with the requirements concerning accounting records.
The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, produced 30th July 1992.
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It also felt that the measures in section 6 of the report fostering a closer relationship between 
the shareholders and the board were inappropriate for building societies.
The report reflects the data in the Manches survey in that there are clearly a great many aspects 
of Cadbury which are welcomed by the different bodies effected by it. The criticism is based 
in the objectivity of the report in relation to those structural and procedural aspects of Cadbury. 
Yet, the BSA decided to issue guidance for governance which were in the words of its 
commissioner, Terry Matthews, "are as rigorous as those for companies'".
Those who have been central to the orchestration of the code will admit that companies openly 
criticise the report as being too intrusive. However they also recognise that privately owned 
companies are prepared to accept the report suggest in the light of shareholder pressure, raised 
public interest and peer group pressure. It now seems clear that companies will incorporate the 
code into their constitution, but only when it is economically expedient to do so. This will 
perhaps hamper the code's effect filtering through to the smaller listed and unlisted companies 
who will see it as being more expensive red tape.
The thrust of the code must not be to compromise the conditions which make the director 
enthusiastic to pursue a challenging entrepreneurial objective" 2 .
Clearly, the code is an attempt to move the philosophy underlining market morality to one of 
prevention rather than cure. The provisions in insolvency legislation come too late to keep a 
regular and diligent check on the activities of the directors and tries to establish a standard of 
behaviour at a time when the ramifications of mismanagement are translated into the economic 
adversity of the company. At that point the formula prescribed by Cadbury for effective 
corporate governance becomes obsolete.
111 London Times, Business Section, report by Lindsay Cook, Money Editor, 2nd June 1993.
112 London Times, Business Section, report by Pennington, 24th February 1994.
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Challenges to Cadbury
Inspite of the overall acceptance of the Cadbury report, it has faced a number of criticisms 
from those who see it as not going far enough to ensure shareholder control over directors 
performance" 3 . In particular it is felt that remuneration of directors should be fully published 
and that directors should be re-elected every two years. Cadbury recommended three. 
Shareholder approval should also be required for take-overs, and at a General Meeting a 
resolution should not be passed valid until 75% of voters entitled to vote have done so, or their 
proxies have been considered instead.
These rather more draconian measures illustrate the importance placed upon the new political 
strength of the shareholder, and are quite naturally an anathema to those who traditionally have 
experienced autonomy within the company structure, the director.
For this group, the display of contempt for the report from amongst others, Sir Owen Green, 
illustrate that Cadbury is still not clear of those aspects of corporate management which it is 
felt are the ambit of the directors" 4 .
Governance as Regulation or Legislation
The major advantage of implementing regulation through non-statutory means, is that it is 
quicker and cheaper, and provides a certain degree of flexibility in determining the scope of its 
ambit. For Cadbury, the detail of the committee's report and the rigidity of the structural and
113 Two Cheers for the Institutions, Stanley Wright, for The Social Market Foundation, 1994.
114 In a press release issued by the Institute of Directors in December 1992, an approval was 
made of Cadbury but only on the basis that the roles of the non-executive and executive 
director were not completely separate, undermining the unitary system of corporate 
governance. This factor alone has prevented any harmony in Europe on the question of 
corporate governance, and will be dealt with in the Chapter Eight.
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procedural effects it offers, would seem to undermine these paradigms for non-statutory 
regulation.
The objective of such regulation, was to facilitate better financial reporting and not to initiate a 
complete overhaul of the corporate governance structure. In that respect however, Cadbury is 
again outside such limited expectations. So much of the regulation afforded by the code is 
prescriptive. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and the chief executive, the 
role of the non-executive, the length of the directors service contracts and the objective of 
making professional the whole concept of directorships. This has led commentators to suggest 
that a statutory response would be more appropriate" 5 .
In particular it was felt that the objective of defining the different roles of the Audit committee, 
the non-executives and the executive directors would benefit from the extra gravity of the 
statutory model.
Critics of Cadbury argue that the code only applies to those large institutions that would not 
harm the public anyway. The result is that the Code becomes too thorough in its objective, but 
fails to cover those smaller institutions which would actually benefit from an increase in 
corporate governance"6 .
For those institutions which will circumvent the Code, with the hope of not being found out, 
the Code without the back-up of statutory penalty will be perceived as a soft centred and half 
hearted attempt to initiate higher standards of corporate procedure and accountability.
One way of establishing a compromise is to effect a more detailed code like that advocated by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with a much more interventionist approach 
by an overseeing body to the effective use of the code. Perhaps a hybrid approach would meet
115 Corporate Governance and Cadbury : Self-Regulation and Alternatives, Paul L.Davies and 
John P.Lowry, Journal of Business Law, January 1994.
164
Cadbury and the Corporate Governance Debate
those anxious to create more responsibilities for those professional groups which are used by 
the corporation. In particular, the more rigorous governmental role of the auditors would be 
placed in statute, while other aspects of the code would remain in its non-statutory form.
The Cadbury Code has been reviewed by the Hampel Committee" 7 to determine its 
effectiveness the changes needed. In its final report, the Hampel Committee emphasised 
certain recommendations in the pursuit of good corporate governance. These included a 
narrative in the annual report on how provision was being made to comply with broad 
principles of governance. The use of the word principles as opposed to rules recognises that to 
be prescriptive about the structure for good governance is to ignore the peculiar characteristics 
of each corporation. This failiure was one of the criticisms of Cadbury. 118 The emphasis for 
the report was to place responsibility for explaining how broad principles of governance in a 
particular corporation were being implemented in practice (para2.1). The route for each 
corporation would be different and application would apply flexibility with common sense 
(Chapter 7 para 2). A complementary device to the Listing Rules is envisaged by the report 
(para2.1).
The role of the non-executive is still perceived as the main device for Board control and the 
raised profile given to them by Cadbury while supported by the Hampel Committee 
nevertheless carries with it the caveat that non-executives have become too intrusive in their 
monitoring role.(para3.7) "9. Connected with this reservation is whether the non- executive
116 Financial Services Regulation-Time to Stop and Think ?, Dennis W.Cox, Butterworths, 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law Journal, April 1994.
117 The Committee issued a series of questions concerning reforms of Cadbury in October 
1996. The final report was published in January 1998: 'Committee on Corporate Governance' 
January 1998, Gee.
118 See ante.
119 The dangers of this materialising were envisaged by Cadbury which stated: 
"The emphasis in this report on the control function of non-executive directors is a 
consequence of our remit and should not in any way detract from the primary and positive 
contribution which they are expected to make, as equal board members, to the leadership of the 
company' (Cadbury para 4.10).
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director has too broad enough agenda when monitoring whether the board is taking into 
account the interests of others in the corporate nexus 120.
Remuneration of directors and the length of their service contracts, still remains at the 
forefront of concerns which the commitee feels it has to address. The report makes it clear in 
its recommendations however that the company will not benefit from the director having a 
lengthy service contract and directors should seek re election avery three years. (Chapter 7 
recommendation 17). While emphasising the need for efficiency the report clearly supports 
the short term profit orientated objective for directors by taking away any security they may 
have in valuing a long term service contract.' 21 .
Expediently, the question of long term incentives being correctly regulated illustrates the need 
for balance between harnessing the effectiveness of incentives for the director which is for the 
best interests of the corporation, and avoiding the use of such incentives to ostensibly massage 
the slaries of directors which might not reflect their contribution to the corporation's well 
being.
The Hampel Committee is keen to maintain the status quo within the corporation, seeing no 
reason for an extension of the stakeholder corporation envisaged by the Labour Government. 122 
In particular, there has been no support for a strong code which will outline the role of the 
Chairman and the Chief Executive with a view to balancing power within the Board. 123The
120 The Hampel Report makes it clear that the role of the non executive is to assist in the 
strategy planning of the company and that this should be the priority for them over the role of 
monitoring. The independence of such non executives is supported (para3,8) but this may be 
compromised by the nature of how the non-executives are paid. See ante.
121 For a discussion on the entrenched position of Japanese directors who are brought up in a 
culture of long termism see Chapter One 'Keeping Good Company' Johnathan Charkham. 
Butterworths.
122 The relationship between the director and the shareholder is considered as being different 
from the relationship between the board and others in the corporate nexus because of the 
shareholder's residual power to hire and fire directors (paral. 17). However it places firm 
restrictions on the involvement of the shareholder in, inter alia approving the remuneration 
report (Chapter 7 recommendation 32).
123 Para 5.10 Hampel Report. Concern has come from inter alia, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants. Here, Andrew Carey of the ICA has stated that while a rule book is not required
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emphasis in the report throughout is on the level of information given to the shareholder which 
will afford him the opportunity of having an informed choice from which he can decide his 
own future in the corporation. 124
The role of the institutional shareholder is also raised and at present is being dealt with by the 
Department of Trade and Industry in its consultative document relating to the the more 
effective use of the AGM and the communication of the shareholder 125 .
The response to the issues raised in Cadbury has illustrated a conservatism in the Hampel 
report. However the report does raise those important issues which will remain the focus of 
the governance debate. Importantly the role of the shareholder and the appropriateness of his 
involvement in corporate management and the role of the non executive in acting as a 
monitoring device for the Board. The problem of choosing appropriate levels of governance 
further illustrates the need for greater sophistication in corporate structuring before the 
imposition of governance structures can be made.
corporations should not be left with a "do it youself' agenda when it comes to how 
shareholders respond to corporate policy . See The Times Wednesday August 6th 1997.
124 ibid. The Times .
125 Supra 42. The report clearly emphasises the need to ensure that with their power in 
corporate equity, institutional investors actively get involved in voting so that a void does not 
exist which emphasisesBoard autonomy in the corporation providing an imbalace of power 
(para5.7).
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CHAPTER 8
EUROPE: WORKER PARTICIPATION IN 
MANAGEMENT AND THE GOVERNANCE
DEBATE
The importance of the European perspective on the ambit of directors' duties and the expectations 
of the public and Government towards management practices is based in two related factors. First, 
there is the comparison to be drawn between the different cultural attitudes of the Continental 
countries to the role of the director and how this reflects the broader expectations of the company. 
Second, the EEC proposed Fifth Directive 1 and related directives reflect and even magnify the 
problems of the differing cultures to the role of the director in the company and the whole issue of 
corporate governance.
In making a comparison with other European countries towards the issue of corporate governance, 
it is possible to deduce that the conclusions reached would act as an appropriate paradigm for our 
own system of governance. This may also illustrate why there is such a divide between our 
expectations of the harmonisation of company law within the Member States.
THE GERMAN POSITION
The emphasis in German commercial culture is on the importance of co-operation. This has an 
historical base in the post-war ostracism which Germany felt acutely. The context in which 
commerce is undertaken is also influenced by the political background of Germany. Despite the 
right-wing politics of the Nazis, the attitude towards industry was rooted in a socialist objective of 
mass benefit, even though the ideal was subject to much abuse. The result of these attitudes
OJ 1972 No. C 131/49. This was later amended (see post).
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towards post-war commerce was to create a welfare orientated free market, which is long-term in 
both its objectives and its policies.2
One of the more obvious signs of this cultural characteristic is the structure of the company itself 
in Germany and the relationship between manpower and the management. Unions, while having 
their power emasculated during the past fifteen years in the UK, play an important role in the 
running of the corporation in Germany and works councils are compulsory for companies which 
employ over 100 employees. 3 These entitle the employees to information on a wide range of 
corporate ploicy.
Within German public companies (the Aktiengesellschaft), co-operation is further illustrated by the 
composition of the Supervisory Board (Aufsichstrat) which deals with, amongst other things, the 
composition of the Management Board (Vorstand.) . The Supervisory Board must contain an 
employee representation where the company consists of more than 500 employees and is a family 
company or where the company is a mining, steel or iron business of more than 1000 employees. 
Employee representation is also found in private limited companies, (Gesellschaften mit 
beschrankter Haftung - the "GmbH") or mining companies with over 2000 employees. These 
provisions were established between 1951 and 1972 in a series of "Co-determination Acts", which 
reflects the importance of the employee culture in the role of the larger, national corporations.45
The employee element in the supervisory board often brings the board to life as it plays an active 
and indeed vigilant role in monitoring the activities of the Vorstand. It does this by reviewing 
policies adopted by the Vorstand three or four times a year at formal meetings of the board. The 
actual power of the Aufsichstrat includes:
2 Corporate Governance in Germany : Keeping Good Company. Johnathan Charkham. 1994 
Oxford University Press.
3 See post.
4 Directors Duties and Responsibilities in the EEC : Germany. Hags Schimmelpfennig.
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i) Supervision of management6 
ii) Appointment of the management team7 
iii) Approval of the annual accounts8
Discussion concerning the role of the supervisory board, in light of the fact that there are no 
statutory guidelines to assist it in the fulfilment of its powers and obligations, centres on the fact 
that there is too much power with not enough accountability or indeed a sufficient regulating 
check on that power.9
The monitoring process in the German company is further strengthened by the fact that the 
number of smaller shareholders is considerably less than in comparative British and US 
companies. The structure of German company ownership is detailed in Table 1 below.
Private Households
Enterprises
Public Sector
Foreigners
Banks
Insurance Companies*
1960
27
44
14
6
6
3
1970
28
41
11
8
7
4
1980
19
45
10
11
9
6
1990
17
42
5
14
10
12
(* this includes pension funds)
Table 1 - Company Ownership with Germany for period 1960 to 1990
5 These acts were respectively Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz 1951, Germany 2 (1954), 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952, Germany 6 (1955) and Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976, (Cologne 
1976).
6 AktGparalll(l).
7 AktG para 84(1)
8 AktG para 171(2)
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These figures contrast sharply with the percentage of smaller, institution represented investments 
which make up over 60% of public company equity in the UK. 10 There are several reasons for the 
contrast. First, the state pension in Germany is relatively high so there is less demand for private 
pension schemes. In addition the pension system works on a pay-as-you-go basis which provides 
for no large capital sum upon retirement which can be invested.
Second, the German company treats its pension provision for employees as a long term liability 
and will only invest one third of the requisite value of the prospective pension fund in another 
company. The result is that there is less capital in the market to invest. If the company becomes 
insolvent and thus unable to pay its pensions, the scheme will be covered by the "Pension 
Guarantee Association", membership of which is compulsory."
Thirdly, insurance companies, which have a statutory investment ceiling in companies of 30%, do 
not exploit this investment potential and their aversion to risk is illustrated by the fact that 
investment levels are around 10%. 12
The importance of this investment structure lies in the effect it has on the objectives of the 
company. The low level of smaller investors means that there is less emphasis on obtaining a 
dividend. This is particularly important in times of economic recession where the German 
company can continue to re-invest and develop monies which comparative companies in the UK 
and the USA will utilise to pay a dividend.
The cultural effect of this is to create a long-term focus within the company which can survive 
changes in the economic and political barometer. Connected with this is the high percentage of 
company investment directly with other companies. This creates an atmosphere of co-operation 
and not of competition which creates an added security for the company. It enables the company
9 See "Controlling directors the German way" J Shearman, (1997) The Company Lawyer, Vol 18 
No.4.
10 See Chapter 5
11 See supra 2 and Industrial Groups as Systems of Contractual Governance. W. Carl Kester. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Vol. 8, No.3.
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to achieve its main objective of going beyond the maximisation of company profit and towards 
investing in what is in the best interest of the company as a whole.
Another important characteristic of German corporate philosophy is the company relationship with 
the banks. Unlike the UK where banks are more disposed to take a charge over company property 
when granting the company finance, German banks get more involved in the company by buying 
equity in the form of shares. This means that the expertise in the banking community can be 
called upon as part of the company and not just as a reference in times of company difficulty. The 
closer relationship between banks and industry produces a more cautious and prudent policy 
towards company money, again more disposed towards long-termism.
This fact is illustrated in the accounting standards which are based on prudence rather than a "true 
and fair view". 13 Such a philosophy has led to the creation of a reserve fund which is understood 
and validated by the Aufsichstrate. 14
The co-determination principle based in the idea of a cross fertilisation of manager and employee 
works effectively in this area as it provides an atmosphere of circumspection within the company. 
This has generated a good management/staff relationship. However this has recently been under 
strain caused by the effects of the re-unification on German industry, in particular the effects of 
the financial markets attaining greater international freedom.
The effects of the in-house mentality is thus manifested in three ways: employee representation on 
the board; the closeness of the company's relationship with the banks; and the co-operation
12 Supra 2
13 See post
14 The Aufsichstrate, or "Supervisory Board", is an integral part of the German governance 
model, and is designed to oversee the works of the Vorstand. In particular, it elects members 
to the Vorstand, and includes representatives from the different groups within the corporate 
nexus, including the controversial element of employee representatives. It applies only in 
corporations employing more than 1000 employees. See ante at 3,4 &5 and post.
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between companies based on the tightly structured relationship of company ownership with other
companies. 15
The major difference this produces in any comparative study with the British system of corporate 
governance is the relevance of take-overs in the production of efficient management. In the UK, 
the threat of take-over has been central to the reactions of management to company policy. The 
short-term devices employed by company directors in Britain are to inflate the company's profits 
and avoid the company becoming vulnerable to a take-over. However, while these devices 
produce rich pickings for the short term speculator, they are also devoid of the consistency and 
endurance of the policies adopted by the German directors who do not have the constant threat of 
take-over.
There are several reasons for this contrast with British management. Firstly, because of their inter- 
relation with other companies, German directors often find themselves on the supervisory board of 
several companies in the same commercial area. As there is a long tradition of this, the position of 
management becomes entrenched and the objective for a take-over mitigated. With the inclusion 
of the banks in the equation of corporate ownership, the corporate groupings suffer less conflict in 
determining the financial needs of one member of the corporate grouping.
The second reason, closely connected with the structure of corporate ownership in Germany, is the 
effect of the inter-relationship of companies on agency costs. The closeness of companies has led 
to contractual efficiency based on a more informal system of trust. With an interest in fellow 
companies, management is less likely to delay on contracts and open up to being sued for breach 
of contract. The informality also allows for greater flexibility in the contractual relationship 
between companies which means that they can be more responsive to changing commercial 
activity.
15 This structure is similar to the Japanese Keiretsu, in which a cross fertilization of corporate 
ownership produces a group identity with mutual interests in preserving the best performance 
levels for everyone in the group. For further reading see "Understanding the Japanese 
Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization" Ronald J.
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Thirdly, there is the effect of shareholders on the policing of the company. Unlike the diversity of 
ownership in the UK and the USA, ownership of shares by private individuals or families is 
concentrated. As a result it can be called upon to act as a more effective check on corporate 
power. The concentration of power by a small number of individuals can be seen as the source of 
creating a long term perspective which Germans have taken to investment.
The culminate effect this has on the German corporate board is to create a culture based more on 
reputation than form. This is the result of the informal approach to contract. Secondly, by a 
process of establishing a long-term culture in the working of the company, the German population, 
just like its British counter-part, has emulated the corporate ethos by ensuring that investment is 
long term. Thirdly, the socio-economic background to the German corporation has created a 
culture less disposed to the idea that profit alone is the sole objective of the corporation. In order 
to keep this tradition alive, the corporate managers, by the process of self-discipline, have created 
a culture which is less dependent on formal means of corporate governance.
Having established the cultural context of German corporate activity, it is important that the 
position of the banks is highlighted to demonstrate the underlying stability in German corporations 
which make them less prone to the British and American controlling device on corporate activity: 
the company take-over.
In 1984, banks in Germany's top 100 largest companies, held over 50% of company stock which 
constituted nearly 25% of the nominal value of German stock corporations. 16 This gives the banks 
an entrenched power base in the corporation in view of the restrictions placed on other 
shareholders' voting powers
Gilson and Mark J Roe (1993) 102 Yale Law Journal 871-906, taken from The Law of 
Business Enterprise (editor Sally Wheeler) Oxford University Press 1994.
16 These figures were produced by Gottschalk, in data entitled "Deer Stimmrechtseinfluss deer 
Banking in der Aktionarsversammlungen fohn Grossuntemehmen" (1988) WIS-Mitteilungen.
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Under self-imposed company policy voted in by the banks in their capacity as shareholder, no 
shareholder may vote more than 5% of the company shares, regardless of the size of the actual 
share holding. In this respect, banks have a huge advantage in that the restriction does not apply 
to them in the context of their capacity as proxy holder for the different clients. This means that 
banks who hold more than 50% in proxy-holding shares will have complete control over one of 
the most important powers of the Supervisory Board, the election of management.
There is also no limit to the amount of share capital which a bank can hold in any one company. 
Although it can not invest more than 50% of its capital in any one company. 17 As the banks are 
the most powerful financial institution, it is feasible that they could use this financial strength to 
take complete control of the company in a direct shareholding capacity. This rarely happens in 
practice.
Once the powerbase is established, banks can set about the task of appointing members of its 
organisation to the Supervisory Board. The maximum number is ten, and frequently, there is 
cross-interlocking of bank members on different company boards. The only restriction here is that 
a bank can not cross interlock one member of one company on a supervisory board as a member 
of a management board of another company. 18
In his study on bank involvement in German companies, 19 Brohm provides conclusive evidence of 
the strength of bank involvement. Of the top 100 companies, 92 had supervisory boards and 
banks were represented on seventy-five (81%) of them. They held more than 10% of all seats and 
more than 20% of all shareholder seats on the board. More than 61% of bank seats were held by 
the three major or "Gross" banks. The key position of the President was held by bank 
representatives on 20 of the 92 boards.
The data was complimented by J Bohm in "Deer Einfluss der Banken auf Grossunternehmen",
(1992).
17 S13(4), s 19(1), No.6 Kreditwesengetz (Banking Act). This was modified by the EC Second 
Directive, and the percentage was raised to 60%.
18 Aktiengestz 1965 para 105(1) et al. This is designed to retain the independence of the 
Supervisory Board.
19 Supra 15.
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The incentives for the large banks to keep this degree of interest in the structure of the company 
are mutually beneficial for both the company and the banks. For the banks, the representation on 
the supervisory board means that they become privy to the information over which the supervisory 
board monitors. This information is, however, confidential and the members of the bank that sit 
on the board are not at liberty to volunteer the information to the banks.20
The expertise which the bankers bring to the corporation further strengthens their belief that they 
have a strong influence on the supervisory board and even though the board only meets three or 
four times a year as a whole, meetings of part of the board meet on a more informal basis to 
discuss current issues in the company on a regular basis.21
As part of the underlying co-determination philosophy of German commerce, bankers who sit on 
the supervisory board will not wish to upset those members of the board who represent the 
employees. Confrontation between the two parties produces a negative atmosphere in which to 
trade. As the reputation of the company is based in its ability to act informally on the basis of 
trust, it is important for the company to act in a manner which indicates stability.
This is a further reason why management will only be removed where there has been a criminal 
offence. There has to be a good reason for the removal of management if it is to be before the end 
of the term of the contract.22 There has been a significant amount of involuntary changes in the 
management of companies, but this does not denote that the supervisory board is acting 
effectively. Changes may be too late or even inappropriate altogether. 23
There are however significant incentives for the banks to play a key role in the control of director 
performance. First there is the protection of bank credit. Banks can do this by choosing
20 S 404 Aktiengegesetz. The maximum penalty for disclosure is one year imprisonment
21 Empirical studies of the constitution of the supervisory board, was undertaken by Gerum, 
Steinmann and Fees in Der mitbestimme Aufsichtstrat: Eine empirische Untersuchung (1987)
22 S 84(3) Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act)
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managers who it thinks can best take care of the company's financial policies. The power to do 
this comes from its influence on the supervisory board, either directly or as proxy holding 
members for its investors.
Second, for the bank, the inclusion of the company in one of its services will mean that the 
company will use the bank for its other services. As most banks offer similar rates of interest, the 
establishment of a relationship with one of the banks is important. A company will seek to further 
strengthen that relationship and thus improve its chances of incurring a more flexible financial 
understanding with the bank.
One of the disincentives for too much bank involvement with the management is the detrimental 
effect this might have on the relationship between the bank and the managers. Banks will be keen 
not to be too domineering in their supervision of the management, as they will want the expertise 
of the management to furnish commercial information important for the other financial services 
which banks offer to its own shareholders and principals. As companies themselves, banks will 
also be sympathetic to the conditions, expectations and weaknesses of the company management.24
This close relationship between the banks and companies has however been the source of criticism 
from laissez faire commentators who see the closeness as stifling the company from viewing 
other financial institutions as a source of company financing. This may mean that the company's 
profit margin may be compromised by the feelings of loyalty or commercial pressure of the 
existing bank or financial institution connected with the company.
Banks may also want dividends to be kept high for two reasons. As a shareholder, it wants a 
profit, but more importantly, the bank will want to ensure that the company will not become self- 
emancipated; i.e. to reduce its dependence on the bank by being able to expand through its own
23 "Takeovers v Institutions in Germany", Professor Theodor Baums. "Contempory Issues in 
Corporate Governance". Prentice and Holland.
24 ibid
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capital. This effect on reinvestment and development (R&D) will ultimately have a detrimental 
effect on the long-term policies traditionally associated with German companies.25
The cultural effect of the relationship between banks and industry which stands at the centre of the 
structure of the German company is important in determining the objectives perceived by and 
expected from the company. These objectives, unlike those in the British and American corporate 
systems, do not have the maximisation of profit as their sole aim. Instead, the co-operative 
policies adopted by companies which have mutual interests in other companies create a stability 
which affords the directors the luxury of viewing the ambit of their work as broader than making a 
profit. There is, as a result, less motivation for self-help policies which will be to the detriment of 
the company, but are designed to entrench their position and make them less vulnerable to the 
consequences of a take-over bid.
As a result of this, there is less scope for the issue of corporate governance to be raised. The 
directors are actively checked by the owners through the representation of the bank and are less 
prone to those pressures which motivate British directors to use their practically autonomous 
position in the company to impair the effectiveness of the company's control mechanisms.26
The consequences for the insolvency provisions in German law are also affected by this cultural 
approach to the structure of the company and the calibre of the management.27
The loss of legal personality which has the effect of exposing management to damages is found in 
Book 1 of the German Civil Code at sections 42 and 43. It deals with the constitution of the 
smaller, private company (the GmbH). Under these provisions, management will become liable 
for loss to creditors only where it has caused a delay in instigating bankruptcy proceedings once it 
was known that the company was insolvent. There is no analogous provision to the wrongful
25 Corporate Control in Germany : Ellen R. Schneider-Lenne. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy.
26 See above in Chapter Six.
27 See post
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trading provision 28 which tries to determine an objective criteria by which the directors of the 
company ought to have concluded that the company could have avoided going into liquidation. 
The presumption in German law is that, in the absence of intention to cause damage to the 
creditors, the directors of a company will act in the best interests of the company. Included in this 
broad ambit is the interests of the creditors. As a result, the protection of the directors under the 
concept of limited liability is maintained.
The requirement of some purposeful wrong is further illustrated in the following section, which 
withdraws legal personality on the passing of an illegal resolution or on the basis of some illegal 
conduct on the board.29
The director will also be liable in tort for any loss caused to the creditor where he has been 
culpable of not initiating insolvency proceedings when the company has become insolvent.30 As a 
result of the offence the director will become personally liable.31
The position of the director of the larger public company (the AG) is covered by the Stock 
Corporation Act 1965 (Aktiengesetz) and the Insolvency Act (Konkursordnung) most recently 
updated in 1997. Under S 92 of the Stock Corporation Act, the board of directors must call an 
extraordinary meeting of the shareholders in the event of losses in the company amonuting to 
50% of the company's authorised share capital. If at that point the company is insolvent, the 
directors must declare the company's bankruptcy immediately or within three months and can then 
file a petition under section 208 of the Insolvency Act. A creditor or liquidator may also file this 
petition.32
For the directors, the implementation of the Insolvency Act does not automatically mean the 
termination of their service agreements. The administrator does, however, have the right to
28 Section 214 Insolvency Act 1986, see ante.
29 German Civil Code.Ref incomplete
30 S 64 of the Companies Act (Gmb HG).
31 S 823 par 2 BOB
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terminate and such termination is automatically viewed as showing good cause for the director's 
dismissal. Under the Stock Corporation Act, the director can stay on in the company to deal with 
the liquidation.
These provisions, while offering the courts a choice as to the control the directors will have over 
the company once it is in liquidation, nevertheless, have a clearly defined timetable of how long 
the director has in order to do something about a company which is financial difficulty. In 
addition, the provisions lay down the consequences of non-compliance, the most important of 
which is the loss of limited liability.
The emphasis within the insolvency rules and procedures is on the speedy liquidation and 
distribution of assets and not on the punishment of directors. Nevertheless, problems have arisen 
in the German insolvency provisions relating to costs which often out-weigh the assets because the 
latter cannot be used as part of the liquidation. The use of the Romalpa type clause, for instance, 
often puts many would-be ordinary creditors into a privileged position, by keeping title to the 
goods until they are paid for in full allowing them instant access to the goods if payment for them 
is defaulted.
Reforms have taken place in Germany, in the form of the Referentenenwurf of 1989 and the 
Regierungsentwurf of 1991. Principles which have followed from these rules have been creditor 
orientated. They give the creditor wide powers in any decision which will keep the company as a 
going concern. The power struggle for supremacy in these provisions is illustrated by the 
criticisms that have come from both management and employees about the extent of the creditors
new powers.33
THE ROLE OF INSOLVENCY LAW
32 Germany : Hans Schimmelpfennig. "Directors Duties and Responsibilities in the EEC." 
Complied by Jane Whittaker and Alex Roney.
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For Germany, the use of insolvency provisions to exact standards from directors, is an important 
aspect to the balanced perspective which insolvency law has to achieve between the creditors and 
the debtors.
Firstly, the ambit of management liability in the AG, is outlined at section 93(1) Aktiengesetz (AG 
Act). It provides that the management are under a duty to act to the level of a "well-organised and 
conscientious manager" in providing the supervisory board with information on inter alia , future 
business policy, the profitability of the company, the performance of the business, and the general 
situation of the company and its business, in so far as such could be of substantial importance. 34
Any breach of this duty renders the director liable to the company for damages, but not to the 
individual shareholder. Thus if the company's insolvency is not detected at the earliest possible 
point, subject to the corporate structure and to the legal duty of care, the director will face personal 
liability. This is an incentive for the director to keep the Supervisory board informed to the best of 
his ability.
The comparative provision for the private company, the GmbH, is governed by s 43(1) of the 
"Gesetz betreffened die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung" (GmbH Act). These provisions 
require that the standard exercised by the director in the performance of his duties is that of a 
"well organised businessman". This contrasts with the provision in section 214(4) Insolvency Act 
1986 which defines the legal standard of care and skill as that of the "reasonably diligent person", 
thus not making reference to a business person at all.
Shareholders also have a greater ability to make an input into the control of the management 
composition than their British counterparts. A minority of over 25% may veto the dismissal of a 
member of the supervisory board of the management board. In contrast, in the UK, any dealings
33 Harry Rajak : Insolvency law. Theory & Practice (1991).
34 Kurt G Weil, DROSTE Rechtsanwalte and Graham J C Vincent, Solicitor, Brussels. European 
Corporate Insolvency.
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with the composition of the manager, including a dismissal must have 50% of the shareholder's 
approval which has to be sought at a general meeting. A minority of 10% can call for the 
dismissal of a supervisory board member. Thus the composition of the board which chooses the 
management can be more easily influenced by smaller groups of shareholders. Coupled with the 
fact that concentration of share ownership in Germany is greater than that in the UK, this has the 
effect of being an effective device for management monitoring. 35
Further liability for the corporate officers arises where there has been loss to the company when 
the company is insolvent but as yet, liquidation proceedings have not taken place. The situations 
are as follows: the officers were late in applying for the commencement of compulsory liquidation 
proceedings or the commencement of judicial arrangement proceedings 
("Konkursverschleppung"); the officers undertook contractual performances which reduced the 
size of the company's assets; the officers entered new obligations. Breaches of the AG or GmbH 
Acts may result in civil or even criminal sanctions.
For the officer in the AG, the time limit in which an application for liquidation must be made is 
"without culpable delay" or, at the latest, three weeks from the events which justify the prohibition 
of making any such payments. The supervisory board must oversee that the directors are 
observing their statutory duties. If this is not the case, members of the supervisory board are liable 
to pay damages. 36
The same three week maximum is imposed on the management of the GmbH. 37 Both the 
company itself and the creditors can claim damages from making the directors liable.38 The 
director is further liable to compensate for payments made for the company after confirmation of 
the company's over-indebtedness and where the payments are not compatible with the duty of a 
proper businessman. 39 The underlying philosophy of the provisions is that the creditor is
35 See ante
36 Sections 116 and 93(2) AG Act
37 Section 64(1) GmbH Act.
38 ibid
39 Section 64(2)
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protected.40 German legislation is much less ambiguous than the factual consequence of the 
British legislation.41
The German insolvency system is however in the process of reform. A new Insolvency Act 
planned for 1997/8. The process of German insolvency law is that like British law iS constantly 
seeking to ensure that the company is kept going where possible, while trying to combat any 
abuses which a too pro debtor law may engender. One advantage of German insolvency law is 
that it is not subject to the greater pressure of having to act as a statutory measure which will 
produce an objective paradigm for corporate activity.42
With the advent of two separate acts to create a general legal standard for the different directors in 
both private and public companies, the German system has gone some way to recognising some of 
the necessary alterations which will be required in the law. The legal definition of a director is to 
correspond with the expectations of the broader nexus of groups which the director serves in the 
corporation and beyond.
THE FRENCH POSITION
The French philosophy underlying the issue of corporate governance, is rooted in the centralist 
commitment to the protection of society. As Baker & Brown illustrated in their report on the 
French system of corporate governance (1977), the French Government "... is intimately involved
40 See ante 24
41 See ante Chapter 2
42 See ante Chapter 4, in particular Re D'Jan of London (1994) 1 BCLC 561
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in business organisation and governance. It participates significantly in economic endeavour ... 
and in 'societe d'economie mixte'.43
The influence of the state may be illustrated by examining several central controlling institutions 
which underpin the commitment of the French system to central control of corporate management. 
These include :
i) Centrale des bilans. This is a central database contributed voluntarily to by 40% of 
France's biggest companies. The information contains an overview of the company's 
performance including the balance sheet and a director's report on the company's annual 
performance. The information is open to public scrutiny at a cost of about £1000.
ii) Centrale des Risque. This contains information about the company's lending and is a 
good indicator of the company's indebtedness. The information is compromised by the 
fact that only French banks contribute to the data.
iii) Fichier bancaire des entreprise. Where companies have a turnover of over 5FF million , 
their position concerning repayments is scrutinised to see if they have fallen into 
arrears. This provides further information for the potential business client as to the 
credibility of the company's trading position.
The effect of these influences in the French system of corporate governance is to create a 
management elite in the form of highly powerful ruling families who contribute to the system by 
controlling the voting shares in the company. In addition it creates a management structure which 
sways most favourably to the advantage of the chief executives and the directors.44
The French equivalent of the public limited company is the Societe Anonyme. The company is 
able to choose the structure of corporate governance it wishes to adapt. For example, they may
43 Baker & Brown, taken from "Keeping Good Company", Johnathan Charkham, 1994
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adopt a traditional board of directors (whose Chairman is also the general manager) or a two tier 
system which is very much like the German model introduced for the first time in 1966.
The traditional model displays the centralist attitude to the system of corporate governance as it 
emphasises the power of the company's chief executive: the "president directeur-general (PDG)." 
The main thrust of the PDG's power is that he can choose the management board. The strength of 
his relationship with the board depends very much on the character of the PDG but the day to day 
management of the company will be strongly influenced by the PDG's ability to construct the 
constitution of the board.
The PDG is the head of the Conseil d'Administration (the board) who in turn re-elects the PDG. 
Obvious political decisions as to the construction of the board will mean that the PDG will 
sometimes be able to entrench his position. However, like Great Britain, France has witnessed 
increasing shareholder activism in the past decade, particularly through the medium of financial 
and investment institutions. Apart from these formal representations with actual board power, 
shareholders can also be represented by censors who petition the board with policy decisions 
which take into account the interests of the shareholder.
The increase in shareholder activity has made the board more shareholder sensitive, but in the 
traditional form, the French company does not have the formal supervisory role of a second board 
containsing a representation of all the constituent parts of the company. Such a company structure 
is now available to French companies by the introduction of a new company structure initiated in 
1966. The structure emulates the German system in that a supervisory board determines 
membership of the management board. This board is known as the 'Conseil de Surveillances. 
The board over which it sees is known as the 'Directoire.' "5
44 Company Law in Europe : Pommel & Thompson, 1975
45 Supra 1.
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This newer system of corporate structure has not proved popular in France and its adoption by 
companies is the exception.46 There are certain situations, however, where the system has been 
implemented (including post-mergers) to represent a turning point in the company's life and as a 
means of dividing power among two or more governing families. The system can also be used at 
a particular point in the company's history followed by a return to the original system once that 
situation has passed. For instance, the transition from a partnership to a SA to ensure that the 
procedure does not produce an unfavourable result for one of the parties involved. 47
The incorporation of this new corporate structure into the French system allows for flexibility 
when companies from Germany and Japan decide to establish subsidiaries or new ventures in 
France. The two tier system allows them to feel "at home" and provides a degree of continuity 
from the principal company.
The disadvantage of the new system is that while shareholder activity has grown in France 
providing a degree of policing over the directors, the majority of shares constituting the major 
companies are state owned. The centralist philosophy of the state has been more disposed to the 
traditional system of corporate structure.
Criticisms voiced over the new system of corporate structure have included the lax approach 
adopted by the 'board de surveillance' and the continuation of the centralised power of the PDG.
The French system could be viewed as a system which understands the advantages of both 
German/Japanese and UK/USA approaches to the corporation. The choice afforded to French 
companies after 1966 illustrates that both systems have certain elements which can offer 
advantages to the effective running of the board. However, the reluctance to accept the new 
system, by the vast majority of French companies shows how imperative the cultural background
46 By September 1990, only 7.6% of companies had adopted this new system, and the use of the 
new system has been in decline since then. These figures were reproduced by CREDA (the 
Paris Chamber of Commerce.)
47 Prentice & Holland. Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance. 1993.
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of corporate governance to any response from the government or society to the issue of director 
policing remains in France.48
The new system actually affords the directors more security by ensuring that any decision to 
dismiss them is not the product of PDG's politics, but is instead a product of a consensus vote 
which it is hoped will provide a more justified course of action for mismanagement.
In the traditional system the PDG still maintains his power in many areas of the corporation. In 
particular, his relationship with the worker's representatives who are in the 'Comite d'Enterprise.' 
Here, the PDG is ostensibly committed to disclosing company policy to the Comite at board 
meetings as the Comite has a right to sit on the board, but not to vote. The PDG will, however, 
circumvent many of the board meetings to ensure that the Comite is not privy to certain aspects of 
company policy.
It is this predilection for centralised power which has made banks reticent to interfere with the 
traditional system of corporate power. Despite the fact that the German system with its close 
relationship between banks and companies is viewed with respect, the banks have no wish to 
undermine the position of the PDG by making him subject to bank scrutiny.
The caution employed by French corporations to implementing the German system is indicative of 
the same desire for cultural independence which lies at the heart of the inability of the European 
Community to actually harmonise the corporate structure.
48 Current Ststus of Council Directives concerning Corporations in France and Analysis of 
Proposals for a Fifth and Thirteenth Directive (1993), Stephane J Cournot, International
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INSOLVENCY AND THE LIABILITY OF THE FRENCH DIRECTOR
Like its British counter part, the French director is made liable for debts of the corporation which 
result from the corporation becoming insolvent (or bankrupt as the French position states). The 
initiating act which rendered the director personally liable was the Bankruptcy Act of 1985.
First, the provisions of the act apply to both dejure and de facto directors, which is equivalent to 
the broad provisions laid down in the Insolvency Act relating to civil wrongs being practised by 
directors.49
Under the French system, a director will be made personally liable for the debts of the corporation 
if there has been a transaction prior to the bankruptcy which has involved mismanagement, and 
which as a result has diminished the assets available for distribution to the creditors. The 
directors' only defence is that they acted properly and with due diligence and took all necessary 
measures in the circumstances.
In Article 180 of the Act, where there is evidence that any negligent mismanagement (faute de 
gestion) that contributed to the state of insolvency, the court may order all or part of the 
corporation's debt to be paid by those acting as directors (directeurs de fait). Liability is joint and 
severable. The exposure to liability for the director is therefore considerable.
The provision emulates to some extent the "wrongful trading" provision outlined in section 214 
Insolvency Act 1986 in that it attempts to establish an objective standard for directors' care and 
skill. For British directors, however, one of the problems with that section is that there need be no 
mismanagement for the section to be used, and the factual events which will render a director 
liable are not exhaustive. 50
Business Lawyer, pi95 
49 See in particular sections 212-218 of the Insolvency Act, discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
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Here is where the French legislation is more informative. Under Article 182 of the Bankruptcy 
Act 1985, a list of events is given in which a court may render bankruptcy proceedings against a 
director. These include:
i) Alienating corporate assets as if they were the director's personal property;
ii) Using the corporate veil to dissemble actions intended for the director's personal 
benefit;
iii) Using the company's assets or credit in a manner inconsistent with the company's 
interest or for the personal benefit of the director or any other person or company in 
whom the director has a direct or indirect interest;
iv) Abusively maintaining for personal benefit a policy that could only lead the company 
to insolvency;
v) Keeping false accounting records destroying accounting records or failing to maintain 
proper accounting records in accordance with accepted accounting practices, and
vi) Misappropriating all or part of the company assets or fraudulently increasing the 
company's liabilities.51
Clearly, these provisions contain some degree of misappropriation of the corporate assets by the 
director and arguably are more restrictive than the open ended provision of wrongful trading with 
its albeit criticised agenda of acting as a deterrent to corporate mismanagement. The French 
provisions on management liability for insolvent corporations are more in keeping with the
50 See above at Chapters 3 and 4.
51 See "International Liability of Corporate Directors" edited by Dennis Campbell and Christian 
Campbell. Lloyds of London Press. 1993.
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general rules in European countries which concentrate on negligence and wilful appropriation of 
assets or the manipulation of the insolvency process.
THE PROPOSED EEC FIFTH DIRECTIVE ON COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE: THE 
VREDELING DIRECTIVE AND THE PROPOSAL FOR A SINGLE EUROPEAN 
CORPORATE FORM
The influence of European Community law over the Companies Acts of 1985 and 1989 indicate 
the indomitable position of the European Community in the development of corporate law in the 
UK. All legislation on company law which ranges from changes to the ultra vires doctrine to the 
composition of group accounts for group enterprises have a basis in European Community 
directives and the influence of the Community carries with it an agenda based on a number of 
different principles reflecting the Community's own policy on company law.
One of those principles is the growth in the corporate group in the European Community. The 
effect of the growth of the post war international based corporations is that the laws of the 
different countries which are home to the one institution fail to provide a coherent system of 
policing those directors whose influence will stretch beyond the host nation. This is a product of a 
socio-economic shift in the last twenty years which has seen a dramatic rise in the concept of the 
group enterprise. 52
The net result of this shift has been a decentralising of share ownership in the corporation as the 
share base has diversified to take into account the large number of smaller share owners in the 
market as well as the major institutional share owners. The power vacuum that results is filled 
with an increasingly autonomous directorial system of management which itself has dramatic 
implications for the questions of governance.
; 'Corporate Groups In Europe: Governance, Industrial Organization, and Efficiency in a Post- 
Modern World." David Sugarman, Lancaster. From "Regulating Corporate Groups In 
Europe" Editors Sugarman and Teuber. Baden-Baden 1990.
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The emphasis of the corporation in the European Community reflects the growing socio-economic 
trends which are a product of western social development in the past thirty years. The period is 
known as "post Fordism" or "neo-corporatism". The major characteristics of this scenario, is the 
breakdown of the classical industrial social structure based on class polarity, mass production and 
homogenous labour markets which represented the major call struggles of the particular society. 
The result is a more decentralised and specialised labour force which demands a more pluralist 
approach to management and especially to the control of directors. 53
The momentum for change in the legal structures which formulate the modern corporation have 
been enhanced by the changes in the social and political structures in the wider context. In 
particular, the decline in the polarity in the relationship between management and the labour force 
has initiated an atmosphere in which a more circumspect and consensual approach can be adapted 
on the issues surrounding corporate control and governance.54
Thus there are two major branches from which the corporate structure will continue to grow. This 
represents the changes and aspirations of the different groups in the modern corporate nexus. First, 
there is the change to the traditional concept of the corporation. 55 This reflects the changing nature 
of the corporate form as being representative of the equilibrium which is to be struck if the 
corporation is to remain in touch with those natural persons who make up its component parts. In 
this respect, any development in the infrastructure of corporations would illustrate those 
contemporary principles in society towards profit, labour, creditors and the concept of ownership.
As Gordon states:
'[In] practice it is just about impossible to describe any set of basic practices 
without describing the legal relations among the people involved- legal relations 
that don't simply condition how people relate to each other but to an important 
extent define the constitutive terms of the relationship, relations such as lord and 
peasant, master and slave, employer and employee, rate payer and utility and tax 
payer and municipality...The law governing social relations - even when never
53 See inter alia, Herman (1982), Sabel (1982), Jameson (1982) and Hyman and Streeck (1984).
54 Ante at 26
55 See ante, inter alia Berle and Means.
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invoked, alluded to, or even consciously much thought about... has been such a key 
element in the constitution of productive relations that it is difficult to see the value 
... of trying to describe those relations apart from law. "*"
Second, appreciating that as the corporation begins to cross more and more national boundaries, 
those changing concepts of the corporation cannot be evolved on a piecemeal basis, isolated in 
national laws, but for commercial consistency and efficiency, requires an international 
harmonisation process.
The emphasis for change carries with it therefore, the phenomena of group enterprises and inter 
corporate relations. In this respect, British law has been partially adaptive in modern day legal 
reasoning. The concept of corporate groups has had recognition as an exception to the rule of 
separate legal entity where the holding corporation is claiming damages for compulsory purchase 
from local government. 57 This rale is now established as an important part of corporate life.
However, the polarity in the relationship between those in the corporate nexus is reflected in the 
way that laws governing the corporation fit awkwardly into the needs of the other groups. Thus 
company lawyers will concentrate on the position of the shareholder and management, while 
labour lawyers will look at the position of the employee and competition lawyers at restrictive 
practices. It is in challenging this citadel that the objective of the harmonisation process in the 
European Community has been concerned.58
In achieving this objective, European Community law has to break with those traditions which 
have stood as a vanguard hallmark of modern corporate law, the most central of which is the 
concept of limited liability. There is a need to waive this concept to allow parent companies to be 
liable for their subsidiaries; the proposed Ninth Directive echoes this concept albeit in certain 
circumstances.
56 Robert Gordon (1984) "Critical Legal Histories". 36 Stamford Law Review 57
57 DHN Food Distributors v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976]! WLR 852, [1976] 
3 ALL ER 462 ( Court of Appeal)
58 Supra 31
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The issue of shareholder responsibility is also thematic in the creation of a new European 
corporation as the subject of their duties arises. This is particularly true in the areas of dominant 
shareholders, as their position has already been curtailed in English law by the doctrine that they 
must act in the best interests of the company, and that they do not have an unfettered discretion to 
act simply by virtue of their majority holding. 59
In the USA, the fact that the dominant shareholder owes a higher duty than the ordinary 
shareholder has been codified in the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate 
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations. The duty is more akin to the duties held by the 
directors and reflect the idea that the shareholders cannot waste corporate assets in order to fulfil a 
particular objective of their own (Part V Chapter 3 s 5.10).
The expansion of those groups which have a legal right to a duty stemming from the corporation 
and those that manage it is part of the revolution in corporate law, since the early 1920's. 
European Community law has already illustrated that it will be prepared to recognise the position 
of the creditor as being owed a duty by the company even before the company becomes 
insolvent.60 The position of the creditor has been given greater significance in English law with 
the passing of the Insolvency Act 1986 and related legislation concerning the area of wrongful 
trading.61
However, the proposal to elevate the position of the employee in the corporate structure has been 
met with both adversity and inconsistency in the European Union.62 This aspect of future 
corporate structuring is highlighted in several proposals from the Community. The use of 
Directives can be seen as only one of a number of ways in which the diverse needs of the 
corporate form in Europe can best be served.
59 See inter alia Clemens v Clemens Ltd [1976]2 All ER 268
60 See inter alia Brady v Brady (1987) 3 BCC 535.
61 See ante Chapters 1-3
62 See Post
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In this respect, any attempt to establish a common corporate structure which incorporates many of 
the duties which have been bestowed upon different groups in the company will have to 
compromise the freedoms and flexibility which have been afforded to corporations, post World 
War II, to define their own internal structure. It is not impossible for one such structure to be 
prescribed,63 The European dilemma is one which highlights the political and economic problems 
faced in creating a common corporate structure.
The position of the European Community is illustrated in three directives relating to the subject of 
corporate structuring, and displays some of the problems with defining the concept of harmonising 
in European Community law.
Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of Rome lays down the duty of the Council and Commission of the 
European Community in harmonising the law relating to companies within the community. It 
states that this will be done:
"...by co-ordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection 
of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies 
or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 with a view to 
making such safeguards equivalent throughout the community."
The objective of the different directives which have been issued on company law have attempted 
inter alia to make uniform the structure of the company model throughout the Community. One 
of these is the proposed Fifth Directive on company law.
The draft Fifth Directive64 proposal by the Commission to the Council, is based on Article 57 of 
the Treaty of Rome which requires the Council consults with the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Assembly prior to passing judgement on it. The draft Directive was issued on September 
27th 1972, and an opinion was first rendered by the Economic and Social Committee on April 22 
1974, with a probability that the European Parliament (legal committee) would review the 
proposed Directive.
63 Haaden. "Inside Corporate Groups " 12 International Journal of the Sociology of Law" 271.
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Twenty five years later, this proposed Directive has still not been agreed by the different Member 
States of the community. The circumstances which have led to this paralysis in the evolutionary 
process of harmonising company law in The European Community will now be analysed. The 
problems of implementing a paradigm hypothesis and its effects on corporate structure in the UK 
will also be evaluated.
The proposals advocated by the Commission contain two important elements based on the German 
model of corporate governance; the two-tier board structure and the policy of allowing workers 
participation on company boards over a certain size.65
Under Chapter II of the initial draft, the management board is to be appointed by the supervisory 
board66 which in turn is to be appointed by the general meeting. No less than one third of the 
members of the supervisory board shall be appointed by the workers as their representatives.
The initial reaction of the Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services of the Economic 
and Social Committee of the European Community (the "Section") was delivered on the fifth draft 
on April 22nd 1974. It supported the idea that there was a need for company law to be 
harmonised within the Community and, in particular, harmony in the corporate structure. This it 
was hoped would provide for transitional co-operation and easier attainment of the industrial 
policy objectives of the Community.
However, the "Section" also went on to argue that the imposition of a full or partial two tier board 
structure analogous to the German model on all the Member States was 'premature'. The section 
recommended that a choice be given to Member States. They should be able to choose between
64 COM (72) 887 Final, Brussels, September 27, 1972.
65 See ante on the German system of corporate governance.
66 Article 3 of the original draft
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the traditional system of corporate structuring, illustrated in the British unitary board system, and 
the dual board system. This has been the position in France since 1966."
The commentary of the "Section" seems to illustrate a move from the objective of the Commission 
which seems to have been to legislate towards a more integral interpretation of Article 54(3)(g), 
which is to make the "safe-guards equivalent throughout the Community".68 Here, those 
safeguards would be conferred upon the shareholder and creditor against the growing power of the 
board of directors. This would necessitate certain changes within national legislation, but it has 
been advocated by, inter alia , M Chaban-Delmas, who was Prime Minister of France at the time 
of the initiation of the draft Directive, that the concept of workers participation could be included 
on a board of directors where the company had no such supervisory board, thus undermining the 
need for a dual board system.69
The first version of the draft Directive offered only two options for corporate re-structuring based 
on the German system or the Dutch model. The difference with this second model is that the 
supervisory board itself, and not the workers, choose the membership of the supervisory board. 
The workers are given the option of vetoing the decision of the board, but there is no direct 
election between the workers and the board.
The arguments for maintaining the status quo in the Netherlands underlines the presumptive fears 
of, amongst others, managers and the business community in general. It is felt that to allow the 
workers, or for that matter the shareholder, to determine the constitution of the board would be to 
reduce the arguments of the boardroom discussion into a narrow based dialogue representing the 
interests of the two groups. The Dutch system advocated that issues concerning the worker should 
best be dealt with in the forum of the Workers Councils.
67 See ante for the effects of this choice on the French system.
68 "Industrial Democracy and EEC Company Law." Thomas Conlon."International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly" 1975 Vol 24.
69 "Le Monde", May 25th, 1972 (Paris).
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The Dutch, model in fulfilling the criteria of the draft Directive arguably represents a broadening 
of the provisions which came within the scope of the draft Directive by May 1982. 70 It was clear 
by 1975 that some concessions had to be made in relation to the original draft and a Commission's 
Green Paper on participation and board structure was issued.71 This was further discussed in 
another document from the Commission in 1978.72 It was the appointment of the Dutch MEP, 
Aart Geurtsen, to the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, which eventually led 
to the adoption of the amendments to the original draft by 1982. The amended draft allowed five 
different systems of corporate re-structuring to come within the objective of Article 54(3)(g):
i) a two-tier structure of management and supervisory boards with employees electing 
between one third and one-half of the supervisory board: the German system,
ii) a two-tier structure of management and supervisory boards, with employee 
representatives having the right to veto nominations for the supervisory board where 
the board co-opts its own members: the Dutch system,
iii) a unitary board of directors with employees electing between one-third and one-half of 
the non-executive directors; a proposal which could easily be incorporated into the 
present British system, but which would prompt managerial reaction,
iv) a consultative council combined with either a two-tier board or unitary board, and
v) collective agreements guaranteeing a measure of employee participation, with either a 
two-tier board or a unitary board.
These options are perhaps an indication of the mammoth gulf which exists between the attitude of 
the different Member States within the European Community to the question of company
70 O.J 1982 C149/17. This was amended by OJ No. C of 9.9.1983, p.2 - 380. See Appendix 4.
71 Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8/75.
72 DOC. mm/is
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harmonisation. The nature of the separation between the management and the supervisory boards 
is an example of one such division.
The revision was also a product of the adverse reaction free traders felt towards the idea that the 
shareholders would have their right to choose their corporate structure taken away from them. 
This presumes of course that the role of the shareholder is to police the company and act as a final 
sanctioning measure if the management do not comply with their statutory duties. With such a 
wide diversification of share ownership in certain public companies, this of course is practically 
no longer the case.73
However, Dine74 comments that the harmonisation of the law in the United Kingdom with other 
European countries would merely amount to brinning the law in line with company practice. This 
presumes that the relationship between the executive and non-executive directors is similar to that 
of the members of the management and supervisory boards in Germany and Holland.
In Germany, there is a complete distinction between the two boards as no one on the supervisory 
board is able to sit on the management board. This has been the source of much criticism from 
those who see such a distinction as undermining the valuable communication which can flourish 
easily amongst the two integrated groups in the unitary system, the executive and the non- 
executive director. However, practice within the German and the Dutch systems provides for the 
management to be invited to sit in on the supervisory boards and the relationship between the two 
boards can be as close as they choose.75
Article 12 of the draft directive lists a number of activities which will necessitate the approval of 
the supervisory organ before they can be valid as company policy:
73 "Implications for the United Kingdom of the EEC Fifth Directive" Janet Dine. International and 
comparative Law Quarterly Vol.38 p547
74 Ibid
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i) the closure or transfer of the undertaking or of substantial parts thereof; 
ii) substantial curtailment or extension of the activities of the undertaking; 
iii) substantial organisational changes within the undertaking;
iv) establishment of long term co-operation with other undertakings or the termination 
thereof.
These provisions have survived the most recent revision of the proposed draft76 and contain a 
further provision permitting the company to extend these provisions to other aspects of the 
management. There is also a provision which protects the third party who deals with the 
management when they have acted ultra vires, in not obtaining the approval of the supervisory 
board. The protection is qualified by the third party knowing that the supervisory board's 
approval ought to have been sought.77
The Directive remained silent on the question of establishing a common standard of care and skill 
for all European Community, thus further illustrating the difficulty of defining an appropriate level 
of competence for directors.
The Directive states that national legislation will determine the extent of liability of the directors 
and the directive's proposal that directors should be liable for 'wrongful acts' has not been 
detailed.78
75 One of the results of the Codetermination Act in Germany has been the marked reduction in the 
items subjected to the supervisory board's veto: see Hadden: "Employee participation-What 
Future for the German Model?"(1982) Company Lawyer 254.
76 COM(90) 629 final-SYN 3 (OJ C7 11.1.91 p4) Proposal amended by OJ NO. C 321 
12.12.1991. See Appendix 4.
77 Article 10(4) of the proposed draft.
78 Article 14(1) of the proposed draft.
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WORKER'S PARTICIPATION: THE BRITISH PROBLEM
Inspite of the cultural gulf that exists between the British and other countries in the European 
Community to worker's participation, the concept of introducing greater worker participation into 
corporate management maintained its momentum, throughout the debate over harmonisation. The 
themes of consultation (Article 12) as well as information (Article 11) have led to the concept 
being modified rather than compromised altogether. 79
One of the options proposed to the UK as an alternative to the two tier system was the concept of 
the "Consultative Council" which derives from the workers councils. These bodies, directly 
elected by the employees would be entitled to certain information which would be made accessible 
to the employees, and would allow a basis for consultation between the management and the 
workers for any policy proposals furnished by the company management.
One of the reasons why this method would find a cultural attraction in the UK is that the country 
has a history of collective bargaining with employee representatives and the proposal of the 
consultative council would merely re-define those bargaining rights and furnish them with more 
detailed information about the company.80
Negative reaction to this was firstly due to the fact that consultation with the council may be 
subject to the discretion of the management. If consultation on the proposals initiated by the 
management came at a late stage, then management would be less willing to change any decision 
it had intended to form part of the company's policy.
79 Supra 71.
80 Studies on the participation of workers in the European community can be found, inter alia in " 
Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining in Europe (1974): produced by C.I.R para 
475 This suggests that the UK is more suitable for the introduction of such a council in the 
management structure because it has a history of collective bargaining in the form of trades 
union representation.
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With the idea of broadening barriers for worker participation in the form of representation, 
management will react to the proposals in a way which suggests that they see the new powers 
merely as an extension of trades unionism. Trades unionists ironically see such proposals as 
cutting across their power, and undermining their already compromised position within the 
corporate structure. 81
The initiation of the proposed Directive has been seen by commentators as a skeleton which 
provides for the different Member States to extend and develop the provisions through the Articles 
of Association within each individual company. The German and Dutch systems clearly provide 
an ideal to which each Member State ought to strive, but the evolution of corporate structure and 
the economic effects of their implementation in the differing Member States means that such 
ideals have had to be, at least, postponed, if not compromised . 82
The Report of Lord Watkinson, initiated on behalf of the CBI in 1973, saw the establishment of 
the supervisory board as having "effective joint control (sic) over certain matters of long-term 
policy." These included the outline of recommendations made under Article 12 of the proposed 
Directive.83 The report outlined several factors which it believed would only serve to undermine 
the benefits of the present unitary system.84
Firstly, it proposed that the introduction of a supervisory board would merely supplant the role of 
the General Meetings. This was felt to restrict rather than enhance the profile of the shareholder in 
any management role within the company, as the imposition of the supervisory board would 
impair the links which existed between the shareholders and the management board. The new 
division was perceived as being too structured a framework for co-operation between management 
and owners.
81 For a more detailed examination of this problem, see post.
82 Jane Welch-The Fifth Draft Directive- A False Dawn?. (1983) 2 European Law Review 83.
83 See ante
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Secondly, the report felt that the relationship between the supervisory board and the management 
board would be intimidated by the imbalance afforded to the management board in terms of actual 
management power. While the supervisory board had the grave responsibility of choosing the 
management board, the management board would be responsible for the day to day running of the 
company. The supervisory board was felt to have too much responsibility and too little power. 
The conclusion of the Watkinson Report was that it should be optional for companies to choose 
whether or not to implement the supervisory board.85
Instead, the report advocated the introduction of imposing certain supervisory duties on individual 
non-executive directors or shareholder committees. This would necessitate a clarification of 
duties which was not forthcoming from British law. Ironically, once again, the shareholder could 
lose out by having his position as the ultimate back-stop to management performance 
compromised by the non-executive director.86
In the second part of his analysis of the harmonisation process, Temple Lang deals with the issue 
of distinguishing the role of the Supervisory Board in its capacity as representing the interests of 
those who do not require daily representation with the role of other representative bodies such as 
works councils and the trades unions. His suggestion was a division along the lines of the 
traditional expectations of the differing boards.87 In this vein, employment issues would be dealt 
with by the trades unions and the workers councils while those aspects of monetary and company 
policy which affect the employees would be dealt with by the supervisory board.
The presumption made by the Watkinson Committee is the ability of the shareholder to act as an 
effective policing measure. The position of the shareholder in the public company for instance is 
somewhat compromised by his inability to actually exert any influence when his holding in the
84 "The Responsibility of the British Public Company, Final Report of the Company Affairs 
Committee, Confederation of British Industry (1973) para.59 ("The Lord Watkinson
Committee").
85 For a more detailed discussion of the report see Temple-Lang J " The Fifth EEC Directive on 
the Harmonization of Company Law" Part 1. (1975)Common Market Law Review 155
86 ibid
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company is so small. Also, the ability to actually hold a general meeting will prove difficult 
where the numbers of shareholders involved runs into millions.88
There are also other cultural reasons why shareholders will defer to the directors reflecting the 
traditional expectation of the two groups, particularly in larger public companies.89 Central to this 
theme is the fact that many shareholders do submit their capital to those members of the company 
who they perceive as being better placed to actually deal with company policy; the directors.
A further dimension to the problem of harmonising European Community company law is found 
in the election procedure to the supervisory board which is beset with the same problems of an 
identity crisis and underlies the differing objectives of the corporation within the European 
Community.
The German model promotes the idea of direct election by the employees, while the Dutch model 
prefers members of the supervisory board to be nominated by members of the trades union. The 
result of both methods may be a fusion of the two groups. Even a mixture of both processes will 
result in the fusion being perceived by the differing groups in the company as a compromise on 
their traditional relationship with eachother. Superimposing this fact onto the British system, 
which akeady has an entrenched scepticism for the trades union, would make the supervisory 
board even less attractive as a means of corporate policing.
It is submitted that one way around the problem of the identity crisis, would be to enrol the trades 
union into the system which directly elects the members of the supervisory board. This would 
then give former union representatives the same voting position as the other employees and break
87 in"The Fifth EEC Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law" J Temple-Lang, Part 2. 
1975 Common Market Law Review 345
88 See Chapter 5
89 For further reading see Fischel "The Corporate Governance Movement : Vanderbilt Law
Review 1982."
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away from the structural tradition that workers representation within the company is always 
through the auspices of the trades union.90
A further move to detach the supervisory board from the clutches of the trades union is to make 
the elected members delegates as opposed to representatives. This would put less pressure on 
those who have been elected to the board to extol the rights of the workers. This would be more 
acceptable to the managers since trades union would not be seen as thrusting the candidate onto 
the board.91
Thus, Article 11(4) of the proposed Fifth Directive states:
"The supervisory organ or one-third of the members thereof, shall be entitled to 
obtain from the management organ all information and relevant documents and to 
undertake all such investigations as may be necessary. The supervisory organ may 
authorise one or more of its members or one or more experts to exercise these 
powers. >ai
This means that any information which the supervisory board member obtained would be 
information for the benefit of the employees and not the trades union of which he is 
representative.
Finally, the calibre of the candidate would be an all important ingredient to the success of the 
policing capabilities of the board. The candidate would be presumed to have a basic knowledge of 
company law and an understanding of the financial regulations relating to the company.93
90 It could be argued that even without the formal use of the TUs, the employees would be 
influenced by those who have traditionally taken a more pro-active role in 
employee/management relations; the TUs.
91 supra 65.
92 The article has been amended by section 7 of the amended draft of the fifth directive, 1991 
(COM(90) 629 final-SYN 3(OJ C7 11.1.91). The revised article makes it clear that the 
information which can be obtained by the supervisory organ, is "necessary to the exercise of 
its supervision" making it clear that the ambit of the boards power to demand information is
limited.
93 For further evidence of the need for training within the corporation, and the wishes of the 
directors to comply with on-going training, see ante Chapter 6.
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The proposed Fifth Directive introduces personal liability for the management of the company as 
part of its plan to exact a higher standard of duty from the director. This liability will come from 
breaches of:
i) the law;
ii) the memorandum or articles of association;
iii) duties which render their acts wrongful.
The provisions will not apply if the director can show that he was not at fault. However liability is 
both joint and severable and thus the ambit of the liability is as broad as the provision in the 
Insolvency Act relating to wrongful trading.94
Like the wrongful trading provision, there seems to be some ambiguity over the actual definition 
of 'wrongful acts.' Submissions for a definition include 'acts contrary to the principle of equality 
between shareholders' and 'misuse of discretionary power', as well 'as breach of duty.95
These submissions suggest that a director will be liable for negligent acts which are the result of a 
failure to comply with his fiduciary duties to the shareholder.
THE PROPOSED VREDLING DIRECTIVE
Like the proposed Fifth Directive, the proposed Vredling Directive also envisaged a degree of 
participation by employees in the management of the corporation, and was the second submission
94 See ante Chapters 2 & 3
95 Supra 63.
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from the Commission to the Council in 1983 for such employee inclusion. 96 The initial second 
proposal was produced in 1980, but subsequently amended in 1983.97
The proposal was controversial as it established the requirement for workers participation in the 
management structure of the corporation. Unlike the proposed Fifth Directive, however, this 
proposal envisaged only an indirect input from employees. This is far less radical than the direct 
involvement in the Supervisory Board advocated by the Proposed Directive.98
Although less radical than the proposed Fifth Directive, this proposal has engendered much 
controversy in the European Community.99 On the one hand, the European Industry Organisation, 
UNICE, as well as business organisations from outside the Community, in particular the USA, 
insist that the draft "Vredling" Directive, even as amended in accordance with the views of the 
European Parliament in 1983, is "neither necessary nor useful". They argue that the proposals are 
covered by the International Labour Organisation guidelines. In contrast the European Trade 
Union Confederation emphasises its merits as safeguarding the employees interests. 100
The Proposed Directive was amended in 1983 and raised the controversial topic of group relations 
and employee participation. Under the amended proposal of 1983, the Directive was to apply to 
groups of undertakings (parent undertaking amid subsidiaries) which employ in total at least 1,000 
workers within the Community as a whole. It also applies to single undertakings operating 
through geographically distinct branches and employing in total 1,000 workers in the Community 
(Article 2). Clearly, this qualification seeks to ensure that the larger corporations fall within the 
scope of the directive.
96 The first submission was in 1970, OJCE 1970 C 129 as amended. The directive was named 
after the Dutch member for the Commission who was responsible for social affairs during 
1980
97 The initial proposal OJCE 1980 C 297. Amended Proposal OJ 1983 C 217. See Appendix 4.
98 See ante. The proposal was named after the Dutch member for the Commission who was 
responsible for social affairs in 1980.
99 See inter alia, Peter Lawrence -ed.; "Vredling: No, No, No!" CBI News; 9th March 1984 at 
page 1.
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The main objective of the proposed Directive is to ensure that employees are "informed and 
consulted" by the corporation's management in any policy decisions taken on behalf of the 
company. The procedures enacted in 1983 to facilitate this objective have proved complicated. 
Under the Irish Presidency of the Council in 1984, a "new approach" was proposed to solve some 
of the administrative complexities of the Directive. 101
Another problem addressed by the Council discussion paper was the definition of the term 'group 
undertaking' to which the provisions of the Directive apply. In determining this definition, the 
legal exercise of control is the traditional approach, but a de facto control may also be adopted. 
There was a presumption that the two are interchangeable, 102 but this raises further problems when 
the question of weighted voting rights are used by a corporation in some, but not all areas of the 
corporation.
The amended proposal of 1983 requires the management of a parent undertaking to forward 
general information, giving a clear picture of the activities of the parent undertaking and its 
subsidiaries, to the management of the subsidiaries in the Community. The Directive specifies 
both type of general and specific information to be supplied; this includes details of the economic 
and financial situation, the employment situation and probable trends, and investment prospects.
Clearly, parallels can be found between this directive and the Draft European Company Statute of 
1975, the OECD Guidelines and both German and Dutch law. 103 For example, where any failure 
to disclose occurs, employee representatives could petition the management for the information 
"without delay". The revised text did respect the authority of the local management by taking out 
the provision which allowed parent management to supply directly to employees of the 
subsidiaries any information which they requested.
Jorn Pipkorn "Employee Participation and Public Regulation in Corporate Groups in the EC.
1992.
A discussion paper is published in European Industrial Relations Review 133, February 1985, 
plO et seq. The Presidency of the European Union rotates every six months . This is detailed
101
in Article 146 EC.
102 See Article Three of the proposed Directive - Appendix
103 See ante.
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The consultation requirements laid down in the proposed Directive include any decision which 
"concerned the whole or a major part of the parent undertaking or of a subsidiary in the 
Community, which is liable to have serious consequences for the interests of the employees of its 
subsidiaries in the Community." Also, "precise information" must be forwarded "in good time" 
before the final decision is taken with a view to being passed onto employee representatives.
The term "serious consequences" may include those situations which will radically alter the 
position of the employee, such as the closure of establishments, substantial modifications of the 
undertaking's activities or major modifications affecting the undertaking's internal organisation, 
working practices and production methods. Specifically, reference is made to the introduction of 
new working technologies.
The employees representatives must be allowed 30 days to consult on the proposal before it is 
implemented. The opinion must be received before the proposal is implemented. This opinion 
however, is free to be disregarded by the management.
The draft falls short of giving the employees those co-determination rights which are a 
conspicuous part of German governance. Furthermore the proposed Directive gives no 
jurisdiction for discussing the social consequences of the management policy, thus falling short of 
the proposed Directive for a European Company Statute. 104 This restraint is characteristic of 
modern labour law and is illustrated in the Collective Redundencies Directive and the Acquired 
Rights Directive, 105 to which the proposed Directive was to form a complimentary role.
104 See Post.
105 Council Directive 17th February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the member states 
relating to the Safeguarding of Employees Rights in the event of Transfers of Undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses (77/187/EEC) OJ 1977, No. L 61/27. Also Council Directive 
of 14th February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States Relating to 
Collective Redundencies (75/129/EEC) OJ 1975, No. L48/29. This Directive was amended by 
Council Directive of 24th June 1992 (92/56/EEC) OJ 1992, No. L245/3.
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One further controversial aspect of the proposed Directive was the issue of confidential 
information which may prove harmful to the corporation if it were to be made public to anyone 
outside the immediate management. The balancing act which has to be struck between the 
interests of the employees and the interests of the company were achieved by the company being 
allowed to keep secret those policy decisions which were important to the development of the 
company and which needed to be kept a secret. Nevertheless, the abuse of this process by 
management may render the proposals ineffective As a result the Commission proposed that the 
employee representatives have a right to appeal to an independent tribunal in an administrative 
authority in order to determine whether or not the information should be kept secret.
The final controversial aspect of the proposed Directive was the procedure laid down for the 
election of the employee representatives. The Commission did not follow the opinion of the 
European Parliament and adopt direct elections as laid down in the proposed Fifth Directive. It 
opted for the more flexible approach leaving the election procedure to be decided by the 
individual Member State. In particular, Article 5 of the proposed Directive states that where a 
Works Council already exists, then this body shall receive that information outlined in Article 3 
instead of the employee representatives. Moreover, a single works council may be established 
from an agreement between the management and the employees to represent all of the employees 
in the parent/subsidiary group.
The importance of this aspect of the proposed Vredeling Directive is that it acts as a formative 
base for the subsequent Directive on the Establishment of European Works Councils for those 
companies based in Europe, but not based in the UK. 106
106 See inter alia Directive on the Establishment of European Works Councils: Effect on UK and 
Non EU Companies. Frank Woodbridge and Rose D'Sa. Business Law Review Vol 5 No.l 1 
November 1994 p295.
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THE AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE 1975
In keeping with the underlying commitment to the harmonisation of corporate law and governance 
within the European Community. The first proposal for a single European company law statute 
was initiated in 1970. It went further than the usual principles of private international law by 
proposing that the company becomes subject to the Statute as soon as it is controlled by a 
European company. This derogates from the usual position of the dependent companies' host 
nation from formulating the legal rules on which the company is based. Article 224 of the draft 
statute provides that any company conforming with the requirement of the proposed statute will be 
subject to a centralised management.
The draft statute included the three most controversial elements of the European debate 
concerning corporate restructuring and governance including :
1) 'The formation of a European works council representing all the employees of a 
European company with establishments in different Member States.'
2) The capacity given to a European company to conclude with the trade unions 
represented in its plants, uniform collective agreements throughout the EC, and
3) The representation of employees on the supervisory board which appoints, supervises 
and may dismiss the management board and which agrees on strategic business 
decisions. The Commission proposed that the supervisory board consist of 2/3 
shareholder representatives and 1/3 employer representatives.
It was this composition which The European Parliament proposed should be radically altered four 
years later when a tripartite composition of the supervisory board was initiated, containing:
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i) one-third representatives of shareholders; 
ii) one-third representatives of employees;
iii) one-third members co-opted by these two groups who are to be independent of both 
shareholders and employees and who represent "general interests".
The establishment of a group works council was laid down in Article 130 and employees of all 
enterprises in the group were to be represented (Article 131). These groups were to be given 
similar powers to those of the European Works Councils in matters affecting the group, (articles 
134-136).
The importance of the establishment of a European Works' Council was illustrated in the 
amendment which extended the rights of the councils. There were two modifications in the 
amendments of 1975. First, the works' councils are not just confined to a consultative role on all 
issues relating to basic entrepreneurial decisions such as the closure of a plant, as was the case in 
1970. The proposal of 1975 included consultation as to the decision itself (Article 125) and that 
the social consequences be subject to a social plan (Article 126 a) on which the European Works' 
Council has to agree.
Second, the Works Councils may ask the court to decide what information has to be kept secret by 
the members of the Works Council and thus the Group Works Council. Thus, it is not left to the 
management to decide unilaterally what information may be passed onto their workforce.
The proposals have been met with fierce debate in the Member States, particularly from those 
states that see the introduction of the employee council as a way of undermining the balance 
struck in national law regarding existing industrial relations. However, in its White Paper on the 
Completion of the Internal Market the Commission declared that a Statute for European 
Companies is required for the internal market of 1992. 107
107 Doc. COM (85) 310 FIN. NO. 137
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DIRECTIVE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCILS
In line with the philosophical objectives of Vredeling and the structural formats for corporate 
internal management outlined in the proposals for a single corporate form, the Council of 
European Union passed a directive on the implementation of European Works Councils on 22nd 
September 1994. 108
The Directive is part of the Agreement on Social Policy, the so-called "Social Chapter", which is 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union, and to which the UK did not give its signature at that 
time. 109The UK has now signed the Maastricht Treaty Social Protocol and as a result the European 
Works Council Directive has to be implemented within two years. 110
The preamble to the Directive displays a deference to the increasing international perspective in 
the corporate arena. Clearly, the employees in one Member State were being guided by policies 
undertaken in another country where the corporation had its head office. In many cases, the 
relevant management decision may be outside the scope of the national legislation governing 
rights for the employee to receive such consultation, and thus employees were treated unequally in 
the Community. 111 With an end to the cross frontier boundaries on trade, in theory, in 1992, the 
position relating to this inequality has accelerated.
108 Council Directive (94/95/EC, OJ 1994 L 254/64). The initial proposal for such a directive was 
initiated by Proposal 91/C 39/11. See Appendix 4.
109 The Agreement is annexed to Protocol 14 on social policy which is annexed in particular to 
Article 2(2) of the treaty establishing the European Community. Social Agreement is now 
incorporated into the main treaty.
There has been much debate over whether the British opt out was in fact legal as a Directive has 
direct effect under Article 2 EC which states that the Community will have as its task the job 
of 'implementing the common policies or activities referred to in Article 3, which ensures that 
competition is not distorted in the Community. Debate has further suggested that without the 
UK's signature i.e all members signature, an agreement would not be a Directive but an inter- 
governmental agreement. For further reading see R.Owen Glamorgan Law School 1998.
110 Brussels Agenda. March 1998.
111 Supra 105
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Inspite of the urgency to create a structure which is common to all signatories of the Protocol, the 
Directive does take sufficient notice of the different practices of the Member States in their 
corporate traditions and management structures." 2 This factor alone evidences the problems of 
imposing one particular, prescriptive structure. The Community has already encountered such 
difficulties in the corporate field, in particular, the failing of the initial (and subsequent) proposed 
Fifth Directive and the Vredling Directive. 113
The Directive thus aims to provide for the establishment either of a European Works Council or an 
alternative procedure for informing and consulting with employees in every "Community scale 
undertaking" and every "Community scale group of undertakings".
The Directive is aimed at the large sized corporation and does not wish to burden the small and 
medium sized corporations with legal, financial and administrative procedures which might hold 
the company back in its development. " 4As a result, the Directive will apply only to those 
corporations with an undertaking of 1000 employees in the Community as a whole with at least 
150 employees in each of two Member States.
The Directive may be avoided by those corporations which, at the time the Directive was 
implemented, already had an agreement for the transitional information and consultation of 
employees. 115 It is only when this agreement comes to an end and is not renewed that a 
corporation will become subject to the provisions of the Directive." 6
The definitions of the phrases "Community scale undertaking" and "Community scale group of 
undertakings" are defined in Article 2(1) of the Directive as an undertaking with at least 1,000 
employees in the Community as a whole, and at least 150 employees in at least two Member
112 Supra 107 preamble.
113 Seeante.
114 Article 2 (2) of the Agreement on Social Policy.
115 Article 13(1). For this purpose, consultation is defined in Article 2(1) (f) of the Directive as "... 
exchanging of views and establishment of dialogue between employees' representatives and 
central management or any more appropriate level of management.
116 Article 13(2).
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States. This proviso is very similar to the qualification for co-determination structures found in 
Germany."7
The definition of a 'group of undertakings' for the purpose of the Directive is based on that 
contained in Council Directive 89/440/EEC of July 18th 1989 (OJ 1989 L21O). A group of 
undertakings is defined in Article 2(1 )(b) as a controlling undertaking and its controlled 
undertakings. Article 3(1) defines this as an undertaking which can exercise a dominant influence 
over another undertaking by virtue, for example, of ownership, financial participation or the 
internal rules which govern it.
The Works Council could be initiated either by the central management or at least 100 employees 
or their representatives in at least two undertakings or establishments in at least two different 
Member States (initially excluding the UK, which has now joined). 118 This means that the 
requirement for the commencement of the EWC can come from either management or a sufficient 
number of employees. Central management is also required to designate a "representative agent" 
to establish an EWC where the central management is not based in one country." 9
Provision is also made for a special negotiating body to govern the structure and ambit of the 
initial EWC. 120 The Member State will be able to choose the election of this body, but it will be 
subject to the principle that each Member State which has an undertaking or has one of the 
qualifying group undertakings is represented. 121 The bodies' wide ranging powers which it 
exercises in conjunction with the central management, can decide if the corporation's undertaking 
in the UK will be subject to the establishment of an EWC. The central management's negotiation 
must lead to an agreement, the contents of which are defined in Article 6(2). However, the
117 See ante.
118 Article 5 of the Directive.
119 Artcle 4 (2) of the Directive
120 Article 5 (2) of the Directive.
121 Article 5 (2) (C) of the Directive.
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corporation may decide to follow its own alternative structure and ambit which does not follow the 
recommendations of the Article. 122
The result of this flexibility is further illustrated in Article 13 of the Directive which allows valid 
alternatives to the EWC Directive to be implemented by the corporation where there is an 
agreement already hi place. It may form the whole or just part of the alternative structure or may 
act as a base to which other companies amongst the different undertakings in one group of 
undertakings can have their particular alternative tailor made. 123
The Works Council Directive also gives a list of subsidiary requirements which will come into 
force should the Directive not be adopted, or an alternative not be adopted within six months from 
the date of the request outlined above or where after three years from the start of negotiations 
between the central management and the special negotiating body no agreement has been reached. 
This seemingly lengthy time to reach an agreement has not proven popular with Trades Unions in 
Europe and the establishment of an EWC could take as long as five years from the date of the 
Directive's initiation. 12'1
The structure of the subsidiary requirements regarding employee participation, include having a 
minimum of three and a maximum of thirty six members. The flexible and broad scope of the 
council's powers, illustrated in Annex Article l(c), are akin to the powers given to the employees 
in the German works councils. 125
122 Article 6 (3) of the Directive.
123 For further discussion on this point see "Like It Or Lump It - Your European Works Council, 
No.2" Learmond-Criqui, Houben, Stoel and Smith Vidal, Business Law Review March 1996.
124 This is as a result of the two year period given to comply with the initial negotiations leading 
to a EWC under Article 7 of the Directive, then a three year period for the negotiations to be 
concluded, under Article 14.
125 For further reference to the background and scope of these Councils, see above. In particular, 
Nat West has voluntarily taken on board a Staff council. It has 54 representatives for a 
workforce of 85 000 world wide. The document indicates that the council will deal with cross 
-border issues and goes on to point out that it will not deal with local issues, clearly defining 
the scope of the EWC. See post
214
Europe: Worker Participation in Management and the Governanace Debate 
A list of reasons for consultation between the central board and the employees is given in Annex 
Article 2 and Annex Article 3. They include : the introduction of new working practices; the 
employment situation and the trend; mergers; cutbacks and collective redundancies, as well as 
relocation; the closure of establishments and collective redundancies.
Issues that do not have to be discussed however, are found in Article 8(1) of the Directive and 
include information which the management deems to be confidential. This includes information 
which the management expressly deemed to be confidential but does not cover anything which 
may be impliedly confidential. The law relating to inter alia insider dealing would tend to show 
that in certain circumstances, information must be treated as confidential. 126 The presumption 
therefore that can be made about the ambit of confidential information is that it will not include 
anything which is price sensitive to the share value of the corporation.
Here of course we see a potential conflict as the onset of mergers or take-overs is one of the most 
pertinent ways in which share values can be affected albeit on a short term basis. 127
Finally, the expenses for the meetings of the Work Councils will be borne by the Central 
Management, unless otherwise agreed. 128 Undoubtedly, this expense is one of the major 
drawbacks in convincing the Confederation of British Industry of the merits of implementing a 
Works Council. 129 Meeting must take place at least once a year between the Central Management 
and the representatives of the Works Council. 130 The meetings themselves may not involve a great 
deal of people, but the expenses are broad in their ambit, and will include travelling costs, 
interpreters, and accommodation. 131
126 Supra 83.
127 The provision is similar to that in the Directive on Insider Dealing (89/592 EC, see OJ L 
334/30 18.11.89. ) and displays a legitimacy in allowing directors to refuse shareholders and 
employees information when exercising their duties to the corporation.
128 Annex Article 7
129 CBI Response to the European Commission Communication on Worker Information and
Consultation, 1996
130 Annex Article 2 of the Directive.
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The Directive did not affect British corporations directly, but the British corporation may find 
itself subject to the provisions of the Directive where it has an undertaking on the Continent which 
complies with the definition of a qualifying undertaking as laid down in the Directive. For the 
British corporation in that circumstance, there is a degree of flexibility. The corporation could 
implement a tailor made version of the Directive's compulsory Works Council, but this will only 
provide the corporation with some time to debate the inevitable outcome of having to implement 
some form of European Works Council. As the Social Chapter is now to be signed by the British 
Government, the position in the UK will reflect that already in process on the Continent.
The nature of those corporations which come within the definition of a qualifying corporation 
restricts the number of British corporations which will be caught by the provisions of the 
Directive. Nevertheless, the Directive will apply to many major multinationals. The presumption 
however, is that a multinational will deal in the same business in the different countries throughout 
The Community and does not take into account the fact that central management and employees in 
one undertaking will have an agenda for working practices and corporate policy which bears little 
or indeed no relevance on the practices in another Mmember State. In this circumstance, the 
relevance of the Works Council becomes marginalised. 132
VOLUNTARY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCIL 
DIRECTIVE
The Directive gives provision for a more flexible approach to be taken by the corporation in 
implementing it. Under Article 13, a corporation may already have an agreement which fulfils the
131 In 1996 United Buscuits held a two day council meeting involving 44 workers representitives 
at a cost of $40,000.
132 See ante at 85.
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requirements of the Directive. For some British corporations, this simply represents a policy 
toward greater employee consultation which has been enacted in such a voluntary scheme. 133
The NatWest Group Staff Council was formed as a recognition of the value of staff input and 
feedback and to ensure those particular needs of a group corporation were fulfilled. The emphasis 
in the Council is on the transitional issues which affect the corporation. Thus it is emphasised in 
the document, that the ambit of the Council is to cover only those areas of policy which affect the 
corporation as a transitional entity and will not cover:
"issues that relate to a single country or which are handled at a local level, like pay 
and reward, or terms and conditions of employment. "
The normal term of office for the Council representatives is three years It meets once a year. 
Provision is made for the translation of the proceedings at the meeting and the format of the 
Council conforms largely with that laid down in the Directive.
The Council document also attaches a questions and answers section that acts as an integral 
briefing document which will aid the employees' understanding of the NatWest Group Staff 
Council. One of the questions asks :
"Isn 't this (the Council) just a way for the Group to satisfy the requirements of the 
European Works Councils Directive? "
The question itself suggests that something further than assimilating with the European 
Community over the provision of a Works Council has to be achieved before implementation of a 
Council is made. The response of NatWest is to emphasise the benefits to business efficacy which 
is an integral part of the overall communication strategy of the company. It also contends rather 
than waiting for the more prescriptive elements of the Directive to be implemented, the 
corporation has instead designed a Council structure that is tailor made to meet the particular 
needs of the NatWest Group.
133 See inter alia, the provisions of the Natwest Group Staff Council, which was published in
217
Europe: Worker Participation in Management and the Governanace Debate
The implementation of the Works Council by NatWest is a clear indication that the corporation 
sees benefits, both politically and commercially, in establishing a forum in which the different 
constituent parts of the corporate nexus can indulge in dialogue about the global issues effecting 
the corporation. This is an embarrassing contrast to the steadfast view of the Government that the 
Directive is a negative, and costly way of achieving greater assimilation throughout the European 
Union.
The reservations concerning the prescriptive structures for employee information and participation 
have also been raised by the CBI 134 . It expresses the contradiction of many commentators on the 
establishment of a uniform European Company structure which would assimilate the corporation 
within the Community. While accepting that the blocked legislation for such a company should 
be removed, it states clearly that British business "does not accept that there is any basis for 
making this conditional upon the adoption of a global approach to information and consultation 
arrangements or indeed upon existing rights in this area." 135
THE COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON WORKERS' INFORMATION 
AND CONSULTATION
A response from the Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe, UNICE, was 
delivered on 17th November 1995 136 to the CBI and concerned the overall perspective of 
employee participation in the management structure of the corporation.
Firstly, it was concluded that the proposed Fifth Directive has little prospective impact on the 
debate concerning the participation of employees in the structure of corporate management. It was 
felt that any proposed Directive on the involvement of employees in the corporation would be on a
October 1995.
134 See ante at 99
135 ibid
136 Ref: EN/ 05/67860 1 OO.POO (FR)
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consultation basis rather than as a formal inclusion in the management structure of the 
corporation. 137 Indeed, the contrast between the debate which led to the Directive on European 
Works Councils and the debates on the proposed Fifth Directive were starkly contrasted on the 
point of general support within the Community. 138
UN1CE sees the dissent as an illustration of the general political evolution of the Community and 
the Members thereafter. The fact that Britain has opted out of the "Social Chapter" of the 
Maastricht Treaty indicating a distancing from the other Member States, is 139 perhaps a reflection 
on the polarity between the different members and the controversial area of employee welfare and 
corporate freedom.
The next step for the European Community is to decide how to harmonise the general legal 
standards relating to the structure of management and the objectives of corporate law generally. 
Until now, both have been often piecemeal in their evolution.
UNICE's suggestion is for the establishment of a European company without delay. If the 
European company is not initiated, UNICE believes that it will be detrimental to the image of 
Union and to the commercial community within the Union. 140
The issue of a European company statute, has been placed back on the agenda by the inception of 
the European Works Councils which has been adopted in the UK now the Social Chapter has been 
signed. The Davignon Group, in making its final report, highlighted the differences that exist 
between the different Member States to the question of worker inclusion in management 
structures, and to this end, recommended that negotiations for worker involvement is best left to 
the individual nation on an ad hoc basis. 141
137 See inter alia para 4.2.4 Communication on Workers Information and Consultation
138 IbidatptIIpt4.
139 This reported to the Commission on 14th May 1997, and to the Social Affairs Commission on 
12th June 1997. Its main authors are Padraig Flynn (Industrial Relations , Employment and 
Social Affairs) and Mario Monti (Internal Market).
140 supra 122 at para 7.
141 supra 123 at para 3 (Annex).
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As a result of this flexibility, the proposals have been met with a degree of criticism from 
Germany who see the lack of compulsion as not going far enough to assimilate corporate systems 
that are cross border within the Community. Within countries which do not have the German co- 
determination tradition, the proposals have been criticised on the familiar basis that it would create 
further costs for the corporation. 142
142 "UK holds out against model for Euro-firm" Simon Coss. European Voice. 29th May- 6th June 
1997. Vol3.No. 21. p4.
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CHAPTER 9
THE AMERICAN AND CANADIAN 
PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The importance of comparing the American and Canadian systems of corporate governance 
with that of the British system rests in reviewing the differences in the US and Canadian 
corporate infrastructures, as well as the jurisdictional problems of incorporation. These 
problems raise many issues comparable to those in the United Kingdom and Europe. 1 The 
national responses to these issues however, display a diversity in the underlying attitude to 
corporate risk as well as shareholder expectations of the corporate managers. The result of this 
comparison will serve to illustrate further the capabilities and limited remit of corporate 
governance from an international perspective while also providing hypothesis for corporate 
and in particular, insolvency reform within the United Kingdom in relation to the 
responsibilities of corporate managers.
The underlying philosophy which relates to insolvency legislation indicates one of many 
differences between the legal responses to corporate law and the aspirations of the corporation 
and society . Since the 1986 Insolvency Act and The Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986, British insolvency law has been regarded as creditor orientated in its application and 
development.2 The effects of the fraudulent and more importantly, wrongful trading 
provisions3 , have led to a vigilance in the thinking of corporate managers in their relations with 
the creditor's own security. The emphasis of these provisions is to embrace caution in times of 
financial difficulty, rather than keeping the company going in the hope of being able to trade
1 "Comparisons in UK and USA Insolvency Law." Frank and Tirous. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy. Vol. 8 No.3, Autumn 1992.
2 See ante Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
3 ibid.
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out of the present financial problems. Caution is a consequence of the threat of personal 
liability which the directors would face as a result of a successful claim under SS.212, 213 and 
214 Insolvency Act 1986.4
In the US a greater emphasis is placed on aiding the debtor as much as possible to ensure the 
continued existence of the corporation. The insolvency procedure is dealt with by Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code 1978, which replaced the Chandler Act 1938. 5 Under these 
provisions, the objective of keeping the company as a going concern is paramount. First the 
provisions allow the debtor 120 days to propose a plan to get the company out of its present 
difficulties and then a further 60 days to obtain creditor approval. These dates are from the 
date of filing for bankruptcy. They act like the moratorium found in British insolvency law, 
which is designed to give the managers of the company an opportunity of making a final 
attempt to 'turn things around' for the company and thus its creditors.6
This 'Cram Down' is often used to force non-assenting creditors to accept a plan by managers, 
who threaten the implications of the liquidator rules of complete priority which may serve to 
worsen the position of the creditors in the order to receive payment Creditors can however 
apply for immediate liquidation, but the costs of the petition in the US, guided by the 
underlying objective of corporate rescue, are high, prompting the creditor to prefer the use of 
the voluntary arrangement or 'workouts'.7
These 'workouts' allow for the input of fresh capital from new sources of credit and then to 
give that new capital priority over the former creditors. This is very different from the British 
voluntary arrangement, which concerns itself with the attitude of the current position of the
4 See ante Chapter 3.
5 Supra 1. The objective of the Code is to increase the chances of the corporation continuing 
as a going concern. This is achieved in part by relieving the company of interest on non- 
secured debts and acts as a moratorium.
6 See S.10 Insolvency Act 1986, relating to Administration Orders. The philosophical 
difference between the use of such pro debtor provisions in the States and UK, is illustrated 
by the paucity of Aos during the 1980s and early 1990s. Figures taken from the annual 
report of the Insolvency Service (1986-1996) indicate that from 1993, there has been a 
marked increase in the use of both Administration Orders and Voluntary Arrangements.
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creditors, and which will not bind existing secured debts, which will take assets by virtue of 
their fixed or floating charge. 8
The choice in the US is Chapter 11 or a 'workout'. There are advantages to using the formal 
procedures attached to Chapter 11. First any voluntary arrangement in the form of the workout 
requires 100% of the creditor's vote before such an arrangement can be changed, whereas the 
formal procedure under Chapter 11 requires only a majority of the creditor's vote. The 
Chapter 11 moratorium also provides the company with a breathing space which protects the 
corporation from facing a 'run on assets' as creditors, secured or otherwise try to claw back 
their money. This does not exist in the 'workout'.
The basic presumption behind the options in US insolvency law is that it is to provide the 
creditor with the maximisation of company assets, but this means that the directors of the 
company are allowed to make every effort to keep the company afloat before it becomes 
expedient to wind-up the company9 . The legislation does not contain an agenda of managerial 
discipline, should the company trade while technically insolvent. Within this context, the 
ability of the court to afford protection to the creditor's capital relies on its ability to allow 
priority to new capital that has been injected at the start of the 'work-out', in order to make it 
easier for the corporation to continue trading. This is supported by a preventative system of 
corporate accountability which is the major characteristic of US corporate governance. 10 An 
essential part of this is the structure of the US corporation.
7 Supra 1.
8 Supra 1
9 Supra 1
10 See post
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THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES
It is an underlying principle in the US, that the corporation is managed by its board of 
directors. As the Supreme Court has indicated:
"corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to 
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law 
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to 
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the 
corporation. "^
As a result of this relatively liberal attitude to the structure of the corporation, minimum 
standards for directors are determined on a state by state basis and are thus subject to 
inconsistent criteria and are in fact only discussed in terms of absolute minimums, rather than 
creating reasonable degrees of standards for directors. 12
Like corporations in the UK, US directors will choose an executive committee which will have 
ultimate decision making power, and will be constituted of a number of directors and 
independent or 'outside' directors. 13
As a fiduciary, the director will have certain duties which for a long time in the US have been 
to the company and the shareholder. 14 In carrying out his responsibilities, the director must 
act with a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. The director must ensure that the corporation and 
his interests do not conflict, and that his activities are exercised in good faith. 15
11 CortvAsh(USSupCt.l975),422U.S.66
12 "Responsibilities of Corporate Officers and Directors Under Federal Securities Laws.Sth 
Edition", CCH Editions Ltd. 1993
13 These are similar to NED's in the UK in that they provide they provide the board with an 
objective and independent view of policy and procedure. For analysis of their effectiveness 
in the UK see ant Chapter 7.
14 This compares with the British position where until recently, in the case of Re Chez Nico 
1991 ChD,[1992] BCLC 192, the duty of the directors was owed to the corporation and not 
to the individual shareholder (see Percival v Wright [1902] 2Ch 421).
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THE USE OF THE SHAREHOLDER IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The position of large company ownership in the USA, shares certain similarities with that of its 
British counter-part. The percentage of smaller contributory whose shares are held by 
institutional investors has risen during the 1980's to between 50% and 60% of the total value 
of companies listed on the stock exchange. This figure increases with larger companies. 16
For any changes to be embraced however, the shareholders must fight against a cultural 
disposition which sees their place in the company as deferential to that of the managers. 
Richard Breedon, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), underlined 
this philosophy, commenting:
"By every measure the board of directors is the linchpin of our system of 
corporate governance, and the foundation for the legitimacy of actions taken 
by management in the name of the shareholders. The board has the access to 
the information and the power to provide meaningful oversight of 
management performance in running the business, and it needs to use them 
cooperatively and firmly. This is particularly vital -when a company is in a 
downward spiral, since the cost of waiting for a takeover or bankruptcy to 
make management changes will be far higher than through board 
action."''
The perception of the board as the ultimate controlling body in the company, has been 
challenged by shareholders seeking to communicate with each other over, inter alia, the 
election and dismissal of directors. To be successful in any meaningful way however, the SEC 
must modify its regulations which are set in a philosophy of managerial supremacy. 18 This
15 For an overview of the British position see Chapter 5.
16 See Carolyn Brancato, Columbia University Center for Law and Economic Studies, 
Institutional Investors and Capital Markets: 1991, Update 8 (1991) (institutional ownership 
of the total US equity market increased from 33.1 percent in 1980 to 53.3 percent in 1990).
17 Richard C Breeden, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Corporate Governance 
and Compensation, presented at Town Hall, Los Angeles, California (June 1992).
18 The relation of communication between shareholders is currently dealt with in : Regulations 
of Communications Amongst Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31, 326 1992 SEC 
LEXIS 2470 (Oct. 16, 1992).
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philosophy is supported by a corporate structure which consolidates that supremacy by making 
the practical application of what is a broad based share ownership difficult to implement. 19
The second problem for the shareholders is that of allowing the shareholder information 
which is price sensitive raising the problem of insider dealing.20 There are the practical 
problems of communication between the board and shareholders and amongst the shareholders 
themselves. The eclectic nature of the shareholders makes it impossible to distill all the 
different policies into one policy representative of the shareholders as a whole.
Perhaps these factors are only the manifestations of a broader underlying attitude towards the 
initiation of greater shareholder intervention in corporate governance. Commenting on the 
passivity of the shareholder, Fischel points to the divergence in interest groups and the general 
attitude of deference towards the management as reasons why the shareholder would have a 
minimal effect on the governance of the board.21
Fischel then goes on to look at the types of misfeasances which the shareholder would be 
asked to prevent through governance. He further states that the obvious wrongs such as theft 
of company assets would prompt the shareholder towards some type of action against the 
board, but the more questionable deals of making foreign payments for contracts and not 
complying with the environmental laws would be done in order to advance the profits of the 
company. This would not necessarily prompt the shareholders to act. At the other end of the 
company's policy procedure, Fischel also argues that to allow the admission of shareholder 
ideas would always be unfair as at any one time only a small minority would be represented by 
the proposals.
The shareholder's ability to 'exit' the company is also seen as a further destabilising device in 
the objective of controlling management. The shareholder, faced with the possibility of an
19 See post.
20 This is currently dealt with under the Securities Exchange Act 1934, 15 U.S.C
224
The American and Canadian Perspective on Corporate Governance
uphill task in re-organising corporate boards and developing new policies, may wish to change 
theur affiliation, where the company does something of which the shareholder does not 
approve. The lack of commitment undermines the security of the shareholder's capacity to act 
as a control with a long-term perspective.22
The position of the institutional shareholder at first sight looks more promising as a source of 
corporate control. In 1991, 13 of the of the largest institutional investors held 27% of the 
United States stock market.23 Many of these institutions own between 2-3% of company 
shares, while some of the institutions own over 5% of company holdings. On this basis it is 
possible for 20 financial institutions to have control over a company. However despite this 
potential to control and openly oppose management, the institutional shareholders are reluctant 
to oppose director activity, and have supported management between 59% and 74% of the
The only break from this comparatively universal deference is the position of the institutional 
shareholder upon a takeover of the company. Here, the institutional shareholder has shown 
some assertion in the role of management but this has not extended to other areas of corporate 
activity.25
The net result of this passivity is for the shareholder to utilise his power of exit at the expense 
of raising his voice in the corporate debate. This engenders an atmosphere of apathy amongst 
the shareholders further strengthening the position of the management. There have been
21 Daniel R. Fischel "The Corporate Governance Movement" 1982 Vanderbilt Law Review. 
Vol. 35 No.6.
22 See John C. Coffee : Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, Columbia Law Review, October 1991.
23 Figures are reproduced by Professor Bernard Black, and matches institutional ownership 
with the Wilshire 500 Index, for the years 1990-1991.
24 For a discussion on the reasons for this asymmetrical relationship, see ante Chapters 5 & 7, 
on the concept of "soft information".
25 For instance, it is very rare for institutional investors to be involved in the re-election of 
directors, because the information they receive is often just a synopsis of the candidate with 
no real issues concerning his suitability given which may lead to the Board's 
recommendation from being challenged..
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suggestions to combat this problem.26 These have included reducing the capability of exit to 
raise the enthusiasm of the institutional shareholder to act. Also, delegating shareholder 
control to a professional group of directors who would be truly independent and be able to act 
as a cohesive governance model. Thirdly, to ensure that the shareholder gets the long term 
view of the company's position which would encourage the shareholder to stay with an 
unpopular company with the view of making a long term gain.27
THE USE OF THE BOARD To ADVANCE CORPORATE CONTROL
With the deficiencies in the use of shareholders as a means of controlling the managers in the 
company, emphasis is placed on the effectiveness of the board. This does not promote the idea 
that the Board will be the moral persuader of its managers, rather that the Board will act as a 
safety valve where the company is under-performing. In order to achieve this objective 
however, the Board must first comply with a criteria for structural efficiency which will 
remedy some of the current failings in the Board.
First, the pressure and size of most Boards means that there is little time for views to be 
expressed on those issues which directly and indirectly effect the company. 28 Where 
information is available for the company to furnish those views with facts, the complexity of 
information means a lack of cohesion in the company serving to intimidate it in speaking out 
for fear of publicly contradicting an existing finding in the company.
The position of the Chairman or Chief Executive Officer (CEO) inhibits the directors on the 
Board from speaking out against a particular company policy.29 The amalgamation of these 
two positions means that one person determines the company's agenda and formulates policy.
26 Supra 11.
27 Supra 22.
28 The typical board meets eight times annually. Korn/Ferry 1992, supra note 13, at 12.
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As this person is the most experienced member of the Board and the most powerful, 
independent directors find it difficult to carry out their monitoring function efficiently and 
independently.30
Finally the problem of the scope of director accountability is itself a cause of confusion for the 
company director. Traditionally, the director was concerned only to 'enhance shareholder 
value' but this is now viewed as too narrow31 and the range of people who have an expectation 
to receive a duty form the directors has increased, incorporating employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors and the general community. These groups provide the director with the 
problem of balancing the interests of each nexus group, while complying with the standard of 
behaviour expected from each group. This can often lead to an expectation gap. In this 
respect, independent directors must have a clear criteria for judging director performances.32
The objective of board control over corporate governance is perceived as forming the central 
nexus for good corporate management. This is in response to the improvements felt to have 
been achieved by the board since the sixties. 33 However, in order to make the board even more 
efficient, several changes were advocated to encourage openness and balance within the 
boardroom.
The changes advocated centered around the separation of the CEO and the chairman which 
would like Cadbury discourage an autocracy at the centre of the company, which could 
singularly influence the board. Other changes to be advocated are longer board meetings to
29 In 80% of the companies in the US during 1992, the position of Chairman and the Chief 
Executive Officer, was held by the same person. Korn/Ferry 1992.
30 "Corporate Governance: Reflections on the American Law Institute Report" Saleem Sheikh. 
(1995) International Company and Commercial Law Review. p254.
31 See inter alia, Ireland "Corporate Governance, Stakeholding, and the Company : Towards a 
Less Degenerate Capitalism ?", September 1996, NLJ, and Parkinson "Corporate Law and 
Responsibility", Oxford Clarendon Press, 1993.
32 For the UK's response to this see ante Chapter 7, particularly the recommendations of PRO
NED.
33 Comment from "Crisis Prevention: How To Gear Up Your Board", Walter J. Salmon,
Harvard Business Review, 1993.
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fully discuss corporate policy, and improving the data made available to the management and 
giving access to the corporate shareholder.34
The response to the problems endured in achieving these objectives was illustrated by The 
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, (PCG), which is the result of 
three decades of research in this area. 'The Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations"35 in its present form is the product of a right-wing swing in the eighties, 
which engendered a more liberal attitude to the regulation of corporate institutions as well as a 
narrower perspective of the corporation's objectives and responsibilities. It focused on 
shareholder's advancement in terms of profit and gain as central to the position of corporate 
policy. As a result, the code proffers recommendations as to good management practice and 
does not make its content mandatory in the form of statutory guidelines.36
Inspite of these initial conservative responses to the issue of corporate governance, the code 
contains certain sections which prompt a broader perspective from directors in exercising their 
duties. For instance, in the area of blocking actions for, inter alia, unsolicited tenders of the 
company, the board 'may have regard for the interests of groups (other than shareholders) with 
respect to which the corporation has legitimate concern if to do so would not significantly 
disfavor the long term interests of shareholders.'37
Parts III and ID A, deal with the corporate structure and advocates a board monitoring scheme 
for public companies. The central construction to this structure is a division between the day- 
to-day management of the company, and the company's board whose job it is to monitor and 
control the executives. This division is to be found in S 3.01 and S 3.02 of the code. The 
former provides for the management of the business to be 'conducted by or under the
34 ibid
35 Published in St. Paul, Minnesota, 1994.
36 Provisions governing the composition of the board of directors, the functions and powers of 
audit committees and of nomination committees all began as mandatory rules in Part III, but 
were subsequently changed to mere recommendations. A comparison can be made with the 
UK's political position during the 1980s which has resulted in similar self regulatory 
recommendations. See ante Chapter 7.
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supervision of such senior executives as are designated by the board of directors. Section 3.02 
then lists the 'Functions and Powers of the Board of Directors', providing for a comprehensive 
checklist of 'monitoring tasks' giving the board a positive agenda to pursue.38
The checklist requires the backing of a strongly independent board if it is to be effective. 
Section 1.34 of the Code ensures this independence by requiring public companies (PHCs) to 
have a majority of independent directors, when there is no overall control in the company, and 
three in all other PHCs. The relationship which can constitute non independence is broadly 
defined so that the concept of independence itself is rightly construed.
With a clearly defined and tightly structured board comes the advent of Nomination 
Committees, the initiation of which is found in S 3A.04 of the code. Here, a majority of 
independent directors will, in public companies which have no overall shareholder control, 
become responsible for recommending candidates for directorships and for other board 
committees.
These provisions are of course ostensibly similar to those found in the report of the Cadbury 
Committee.39 However, the Cadbury Committee, while advocating the monitoring role of the 
board, strongly rejected the idea of a two tier monitoring system akin to the German model 
and which is a reasonable consequence of the provisions advocated in the code.40
The code also advocated the use of audit committees to enhance the monitoring power of the 
board41 , while promoting the idea of compensation committees, to monitor the remuneration of
37 Section 6.02.
38 CA Reily United States: The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance. 
The Company Lawyer, Vol. 16, No.4, April 1994.
39 See ante Chapters 5 & 7.
40 See paras 1.8 and 4.1 of the report by Cadbury. See also ante Chapter 8, reflecting on the 
powers and responsibilities of the respective Management and Supervisory Boards in the 
German system. The US proposals do not envisage a broad input from different groups in 
the corporate nexus, and instead emphasises the positions of the management hierarchy, by 
defining within a two tier structure their respective roles.
41 Section 3.05 for large PHCs and S 3A.02 for other PHCs.
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directors and senior executives.42 Again the Cadbury Committee dealt with these committees 
as forming a part of its recommendations on improved corporate structure.43 However, the 
major difference between the two codes is the make-up of the committees; the American code 
uses the independent director to act as the monitor for the company while the Cadbury 
Committee uses the Non-Executive Director or NED to fulfill these purposes. The 
independence of those NEDs can not always be assured. Thus the independence of the 
monitor is less guaranteed in the British system than in the American code.44 The US code 
provides for greater clarity on the definition of independence and dictates the actual number of 
independent directors required to fulfill the objectives of the code.
The American code is not without its restrictions. The definition of independent director 
includes senior directors from other competing companies who might take a restrictive view of 
directorial activity45 . Nevertheless, the attempt to withdraw from the 'in-house' atmosphere 
which the NEDs produce a better prospect for the monitoring of the US companies to be truly 
independent.46
The code's application goes beyond that of recommending a model corporate form, but also 
goes on to outline the expected duty of care for the individual director. In English law, this 
duty has been illustrated in principles relating to acting in good faith and acting in the best 
interests of the company as a whole.47 These duties relating to the skill and care of the director
42 Section 3A.05.
43 See ante Chapter 7.
44 The vulnerability of non-executives was outlines by PRO NED who commenting in their 
report 1993, stated that 67% of NED's were chosen because of then- connections with 
management rather than their ability to act as an independent monitor. Their independence 
is further undermined by the fact that their remuneration will also be determined by those 
on the Board who are being monitored.
45 Section 1.34.
46 The establishment of a "Nominating Committee" (Section 3A.04) was recommended by the 
code but is not enforceable. The provision recognises the benefits of the German two tier 
system (see Chapter 8) and is a clear indication of flexibility in the US, towards different 
governance structures being implemented. This contrasts vividly with the Cadbury 
recommendations (See Chapters 5), and the UK's ambivalence to the implementation of the 
two-tier system.
47 See Chapters 2, 3, 5 & 7.
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are subjective and are set at a low level and objectivity has come only sporadically through 
insolvency and to a much lesser extent, employment legislation.48
The position in the US outlined in the code, reflects a more sophisticated approach to the 
responsibilities of the director for while the overall standard of the performance is intended to 
be more objective than the British counter-part, the relaxation of the standard is considerable 
and illustrated in the business judgment rule.49
S 4.01 (a) requires directors and officers to act "in good faith in a manner which he or she 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and with the care that an 
ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise under similar 
circumstances." Sections 4.02 and 4.02(a) also permits the director to make reasonable inquiry 
and to rely on others but only where the director reasonably believes that such is warranted.
From this strict starting point, the business judgment rule [BJR] described in S 4.01(c) 
introduces what commentators have described as "a judicial gloss on duty of care standards 
that sharply reduces exposure to liability" and offers "a safe harbor for directors and officers 
who make honest, informed business decisions that they rationally believe are in the best 
interests of their corporation". 50
The net effect of this rule is to allow the director the freedom to make difficult commercial 
decisions in a time of crisis without engaging any personal liability. This justifies the active 
but unfortunate director whose actions were independent and well intentioned but whose 
policies in the commercial field end hi a loss for the company. The business judgment rule in 
this respect helps the unfortunate Stakanovite director but will give no shelter to the passive 
director who does not engage at all in policies which will attempt to create a profit for the 
company.
48 ibid.
49 See ante Chapters 5 & 7.
50 For further discussion on the business judgment rule see ibid.
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One final compensatory point in the code, is found in S 7.19. Here, companies can limit the 
amount for damages for innocent breaches of care. The limit may not be less than the annual 
compensation for the director or senior executive and at first light seems to further undermine 
the position of the duty of care. However, ironically, the provision has encouraged a more 
vigilant approach by the courts to smaller claims against the company. Previously, the courts 
felt that the risk of allowing a floodgate of claims against directors for the smallest of breaches 
would impose horrendous damages for one mistake. By capping the claim from the beginning, 
the courts are more confident that such a scenario will no longer arise.
A further duty affirmed by the code is that of fair dealing which means that any transaction 
which is later ratified by the shareholder must be done so only where the shareholder, director 
or senior executive is disinterested (S 5.02). This precludes the shareholder from ratifying an 
action where the shareholder has an interest in the contract. The position in Britain focuses on 
article 85 of Table A which states that 'a director may vote on an issue in which he has an 
interest so long as he discloses that interest to the board first of all so that it may determine the 
wisdom of allowing him to vote.' 51
The position in the UK, displays a more generous disposition to the director and shareholder 
who have the power to control and ratify transactions in the company.52 The Companies Act in 
focusing on shareholder approval for, inter alia, substantial property transactions (S 320) does 
not require that the shareholder be disinterested."
51 Directors are statutorily bound to disclose their interest anyway under S 317 Companies 
Act. The section and Article 85 illustrate a change in UK company to the idea that to have 
an interest in a contract automatically presumed a conflict of interest (See Aberdeen Rail-way 
Company v Blakie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461). The corporation can still give the director the 
right to vote on such a contract (Art 94, Table A).
52 See Northern Counties Securities Ltd. V Jackson & Steeple Ltd. [1974] I WLR 1133, [1974] 
2 All ER 625 (Chancery Division).
53 However, the provision still applies where the director sits alone as the sole 
director/shareholder, and has to approve a transaction by himself (Duckwari v Offerventure. 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 7 July 1994). Failure to comply with this provision will
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Nevertheless, common law dictates that the shareholder can not always choose the motivation 
behind why he votes in a particular way. In legislation giving the shareholder the capacity to 
alter the articles it is imperative that the shareholder acts in the best interests of the company, 
and that equity is employed to define the ambit of this principle.54 The jurisprudence which 
has evolved in the area of altering the articles, displays that the judiciary are prepared to 
intervene in the management of the company. However, the difference between the American 
judiciary and the British judiciary is simply one of defining the extent of the intervention. The 
American judiciary is positive about its capacity to intervene in the running of the company, 
but traditionally the intervention of British judges has been by stealth and the idea of 
determining whether a transaction was fair, has been viewed by many although not all as being 
beyond its forensic capabilities. 55
Similarly, the code's contribution to the principles surrounding the director's ability to make a 
profit also displays an element of certainty which is not found in the British system. Section 
5.04 declares that:
".  [a] director or senior executive may not use corporate property, material non- 
public information, or corporate position to secure a pecuniary benefit." However under 
S5.04(a)(4) such a benefit can be obtained if it is ratified by disinterested shareholders in 
advance .5"
result in damages being paid only if the shareholder suffers damage at the time the SPT was 
made.
54 This is illustrated in the cases of Brown v British Abrasive [1919] 1 Ch 290, in which the 
buy out of recalcitrant shareholders was held not to be in the best interests of the company. 
The buy out was attempted through the alteration of the articles. In the case of Shuttleworth 
v Cox however, the buy out of a director there was held to be in the best interests of the 
company, because he was competing with the present company. Other cases such as 
Clemens v Clemens [1976] 2 All E.R, 268, and Estamanco (Kilner House) Ltd v G.L.C 
[1982] 1 All E.R. 437, display the use of equitable considerations being placed upon the 
ratifying powers of the majority shareholders.
55 Supra 27.
56 This is not the only situation where the director can benefit. For example, the director may 
benefit where value is given to the corporation, where the benefit amounts to compensation, 
where the use is of information, does not harm the corporation and does not amount to
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The British approach to the situation is to be found in the 'no profit rule' which has a stringent 
yet inconsistent case history. The harsh decision of Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver 51 displays a 
judiciary which puts the rule relating to non-profit before any equitable considerations 
surrounding whether the directors were acting to the detriment of the company. Subsequent 
decisions such as Island Export Finance v Umunna 58 shows that the courts will allow 
directors to benefit from their past connection with a company so long as the benefit had did 
not result in any direct detriment to the company. The case suggests that the director can make 
a gain from his connection with a company but is less clear than the American code about 
criteria which has to be adhered to before such a gain can be taken.
The court's intervention in the British system suggests a lack of confidence displayed in the 
internal corporate structure; the lack of board independence to act as an effective monitoring 
system in particular. The effectiveness of the American code is to elevate such concerns and 
allow the internal structures of the corporation to take care of itself.
The role of the shareholder as a monitoring device in the company, is most frequently 
manifested in the use of the derivative action (DA) which is more common in the US than in 
the UK. The threat of the DA for the company is less in the actual resulting litigation and 
more in the time consuming process which follows the initiation of such an action.
In the US, the starting point for bringing such an action is generous to the shareholder as no 
fraud or wrongdoing is required. 59 This liberal stance has the potential for abuse had there not 
been stringent safeguards against the use of the process. This is put into process by the 
corporation through an application to the court, requesting it to dismiss the application. The 
court will apply a two part criteria.
insider dealing, and where the benefit is made proportionately available to all other 
similarly situated shareholders.
57 [1967]2A.C.136.
58 [1986JBCLC460.
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Firstly, it will look at the procedure followed by the company, to request the dismissal. This 
will usually have been taken by a Special Litigation Committee and will be made up of 
shareholders and the board. The point for the court here is to ensure that the decision was 
taken independently.
Secondly, the court will look at the substantive merits of the case. The test is subjective and 
will depend on the seriousness of the wrongdoing and the seriousness of the harm which has 
been caused to that part of the company seeking a dismissal. Cases which are simple to 
undertake are those concerning the dismissal of directors. In order to dismiss a DA by 
claiming this, the director simply has to show that the business judgment rule (BJR) applies.
In order to ensure that the board is objective in its decision to request a dismissal of DA, the 
code states that the board should be composed of 'two or more persons, no participating 
member of which was interested in the action and should be capable of objective judgment in 
the circumstances' (S 7.09(1)). Further, the board or committee 'should be assisted by counsel 
of its choice and such other agents as it reasonably considers necessary' (S 7.09(2)).
In looking at the requisite standards for dismissing an action, three categories become clear. 
First, where the underlying transaction amounted to a breach of duty. The application of the 
BJR here is used for both bringing an action and measuring whether it should be dismissed. 60 
Second, the category involving more serious misconduct, where the underlying transaction 
could not itself be reviewed by the BJR. This would occur where there had been a knowing 
violation of the law in the execution of duty. Here the board must show that it was 'adequately 
informed under the circumstances' and has;
"reasonably determined that dismissal was in the best interests of the 
corporation.'
59 Section 7.02(c) also permits a director to bring a derivative action (provided that he is able 
to represent fairly and adequately, the interests of the shareholders).
60 Importantly, this category includes compensation transactions which under S 5.03 have 
been authorised by the directors. The decision to authorise also has to meet the BJR.
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(S 7.10(a)(2)). The third and final category of misconduct resembles something much closer 
to the concept of fraud in the UK. Here, the board's power to dismiss a DA are limited. If the 
dismissal of the DA would permit the retention of a significant, improper benefit : (i) by a 
defendant who is in control of the company or (ii) where such benefit was obtained, in essence, 
fraudulently or by self-dealing, the court shall not dismiss unless " the likely injury to the 
corporation from continuation of the action convincingly outweighs any adverse impact on the 
public interest from dismissal of the action".61
The position of the board is central to this process, and thus its independence is vital to 
ensuring that the decision to request a dismissal of a DA is in the best interests of the 
corporation. The process is also important for establishing a measured rapport between the 
board and the shareholder, as the former will have to justify its actions to the latter if they are 
to remain valid. In comparison, derivative actions in the UK, such as fraud on the minority, 
illustrate that a rigorous regime is in place, but do not have the safeguards found in the US 
code.62
The important structural point to be made about the implication of the code is in its definition 
of the differing degrees of directorial culpability. This contrasts with the evolutionary and 
undisciplined doctrine of fiduciary duties in English law.63 The consequences of such clear 
definition, are that the courts are able with greater ease to judge the merits of a case and 
whether they permit a particular result to follow.
For the differing contractual bodies in the company, the code gives a more integral and modem 
perspective on the role of the director both as corporate activist but more importantly as 
corporate monitor. This has been helped by having a code with a clear understanding as to its 
objectives. In contrast, the UK's use of insolvency law to stretch the responsibilities of the
61 Section 7.10(b).
62 In the case of Smith v Croft (No2)[1988]Ch 114, the procedure for the DA in the UK is 
outlined. The need for reform for the derivative action in the UK is illustrated in The Law 
Commission Report on Shareholder Remedies. Report No. 162, July 1996.
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director, have been so torn in deciding the main thrust of its objective as to render itself 
emasculated in comparison.64
HARMONISATION OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
The code clearly expresses the model for the transformation of many of the US medium and 
larger companies, but that form is subject to the fact that firstly it is not law, and secondly, it 
belongs to a country which has a legal infrastructure which translates across many 
jurisdictions. For the US, this has meant a tradition of inconsistent approaches to differing 
themes within the law. The role of the federal law was not to bring into its ambit, the 
controversies of bad management and shareholder grievances.65 Rather it provided the 
imposition of duties which helped facilitate the duties of the director like the duty to disclose 
and inform investors. It is only hi this limited context that liability for corporate directors is 
focused upon in the federal law.
In order to transform the code into a coherent and consistent form of corporate governance the 
issue of harmonising the law in the different states has to be discussed. In this respect we shall 
see that similar problems in the European Community system will be found here.
Perhaps the greatest argument for advocating harmonisation in the field of corporate 
governance, is the creation of a consistent chain of objectives which will promote a standard 
form of management. To detract from this objective, is to create an area which will produce a 
'race to the bottom' that is, a race, the objective of which is to find a jurisdiction with the 
minimum of regulation and the maximum hi 'opt out' clauses relating to liability for the 
director.
63 See ante Chapter 5.
54 See ante Chapter 3 and 4.
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As Clive Schmitthoff wrote back in 1973:
"Unless the national company laws in the community are identical in all 
essential aspects, a movement of companies to the state with the laxest company 
law will take place in the community. If it may be said without giving offense to 
our friends in the USA, the community cannot tolerate a Delaware in its 
territory."""
The reference to Delaware, displays an understanding from the US, of the problems faced by 
having a weak state link in the federal chain. Professor Walter Kolvenbach, former President 
of the European Company Lawyers Association has observed:
The goal of harmonisation of company laws of the Member States...presents 
continuing difficulties. Citizens of a Member" State (including business 
associations formed under its laws) are generally able to extend their business 
into the territory of any other Member States. A "market" thereby arises for 
company laws, which offers the business the greatest degree of latitude. On the 
other hand, "Company Law Delawares " were to be avoided.^
Such reference perceives the political sensitivities raised in achieving this harmonisation from 
a federal state, which has to try and transcend the evolution and the differing backgrounds of 
the states involved in a particular union.68
Nevertheless, the incentive to create harmonisation shows a need to combat the 'shopping' for 
the most liberal jurisdiction undertaken by corporate managers, as well as the need to create 
harmony in the growing internationalisation of corporate personality and in particular 
corporate finance.
The position of Delaware reflects a similar story of evolution which formed the present day 
underlying philosophies of Western corporate structures. The choice of Delaware as the major 
centre for incorporation took place during the second and third decades of this century. This 
was after New Jersey, through progressives like Woodrow Wilson had tightened their 
corporate laws. Delaware offered a pro-managerial option to those families who like the
65 Golub v PPD Corp. (CA-8 1978), 1978 CCH, Dec. 96,450.
66 Clive M. Schmittoff, "The Future of European Company Law", in The Harmonisation of 
European Company Law 3, 9 (Schmittoff 2nd ed., 1973).
67 ibid.
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DuPont who drafted the code, wanted to protect their shareholdings. This has resulted today 
with over 40% of New York stock exchange listed companies, and over 50% of the Fortune 
500 companies being incorporated in Delaware. 82% of the firms that reincorporate do so in 
Delaware.69
Thus in creating a pro-managerial jurisdiction, for corporate activity, Delaware has set a 
starring point for jurisdictional competition in incorporation and corporate affairs. A 
comparison is made with the Netherlands in Europe, which has a history of liberal regulation. 
70 However, like the States, Europe has its problems of regulatory harmonisation which result 
in countries 'racing to the bottom' for self-motivated corporate governance.
The problem for the European community is not just one of harmonisation however, but also 
of doctrinal influence within inter state commercial activity. The Treaty of Rome intended to 
promote businesses to operate freely within the community, in a manner which was non- 
discriminatory. This however would be in contrast to any doctrine advocating that a company 
would have to adhere to the rules of the host country in which it did most of its business, 
regardless to the country of incorporation; the 'siege reel' doctrine.
This factor has been more recently illustrated in a number of cases which have advocated that 
the laws of the state of incorporation be employed to govern the affairs of the company even 
when the company is run through an agency in a jurisdiction outside that of the country of 
incorporation.71
68 See Chapter 7 ante.
69 Data provided by Joseph Grundfest, SEC Commissioner, to the Council of the Corporate 
Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association and reprinted in Craig B Smith and 
Clark w Furlow, Corporate Practice Series : Guide to the Takeover Law of Delaware app.E 
at 162(1988). Data on reincorporation from Roberta Romano, "Law as a Product; Some 
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle", 1 JL Econ & Org. 255,244(1985).
70 See ante Chapter 8.
71 Segers v K. Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank en Verzekeringwezen, Groothandel en Frije 
Beropen, Case 79/85, [1986] ECR 2375
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So what has the American tradition got to offer the European dilemma? Advocates of a 
decentralised regulatory system argue that a manager or director will have the freedom to 
choose a jurisdiction to incorporate which will offer the best return for his shareholder. This 
limited perspective of the role of the company, was illustrated in the case of Amanda 
Acquisition Corp, v Universal Foods Corp. n Here, Judge Easterbrook explained:
"When entrepreneurs want to raise capital for a corporate venture, they must 
decide where to incorporate. The choice of where to incorporate in turn affects 
the price investors are willing to pay for shares...State that enact laws that are 
harmful to investors will cause entrepreneurs to invest elsewhere. "
Competition, thrives in a situation where the investor is poorly informed, as then, he will be in 
no position to challenge the authoritative choice of the director. For instance, it would be 
possible for managers to incorporate in a jurisdiction which permitted thievery, if ostensibly, 
the company also made an annual return on investment. Shareholder apathy makes a 
substantial contribution to this scenario, and engenders a feeling of autonomy amongst the 
directors permitting them to take a "free hand" with investor's money. 73
The centralisation of regulation would therefore take away this 'race to the bottom' by 
providing uniformity for all transactions regardless of the jurisdiction of the incorporated firm. 
Decision makers within the company, will not have to learn a multiplicity of rules which 
themselves create further transaction costs either directly, through complying with any 
additional regulation a particular state has, or indirectly through further in-house training.
In this respect, centralisation would take away 'rule shopping'. This phenomena is driven 
ostensibly by the objective of providing the shareholder with the best possible conditions for 
incorporation. However, the short term advantages of a high dividend may be at the long term 
expense of obtaining a good standard of reinvestment and development. Allowing this to 
happen is again a product of poor shareholder information and managerial self-interest.
72 877 F 2nd 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
73 See Tim Pryce-Brown: Shareholder Protection; A Cultural Quagmire. The Company 
Lawyer, Vol. 16,No.4,1995.
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If the US finds that these problems are in essence the norm for most of the corporate decision 
makers, then the European perspective complicates matters further with the addition of other 
social and market pressures which influence corporate managerial decision making. 
Particularly, in the German corporate environment, corporate employees, through the forum of 
the Supervisory Board74, and banks, through their direct investment in the company, exert 
more powerful influences on managerial decision-making, than their British and American 
counter-parts.75 This often provides the shareholder with sufficient incentive to be more 
proactive in the company's affairs, and thus the problems surrounding shareholder passivity do 
not arise. The directors are more closely monitored and the possibility of suboptimal 
reincorporation by the management less of a real threat.
Yet maintaining a decentralised set of rules for the governance of companies is well supported 
throughout the US. most notably from those who see the forum of a diverse set of rules as 
providing a consistent forum for the evolution and development of corporate rules in a 
particular context. This would be a product of the fact that both the US and Europe have 
diverse political and social evolution and that the individual countries or states take on board 
that particular evolution when formulating current legal rules; the so-called 'path dependency' 
syndrome.76
The position of casting off this past to centralise regulation is also beset with the transitional 
cost afforded to those states which have to modify their regulation more acutely. This would 
put particular states at a disadvantage in the short term of having greater management costs 
than their rivals in another jurisdiction which had already in place those aspects of the model 
chosen for centralisation.77 This is not only a cost for the industries involved in the transition,
74 See Chapter 6 ante.
75 For a history of the evolution of the German system and other corporate systems, see Alfred 
D. Chandler "Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism" 506-13, 587-92, 
1990.
76 See Jon Estler, "Sour Grapes", Accountancy, 1983. P 93.
77 See, inter alia, the debate surrounding the implementation of the German model in the EC 
Proposed Fifth Directive. Chapter 8 ante.
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but is also a cost for those practitioners who have to leam and implement the new regulations 
as well as of course the courts.
There appears to be an intrinsic xenophobia to the idea of adopting a particular model if it is 
already the product of one of the group states, 78but the problems beset by the different states 
are real. Local jurisdictions fear too strong a centralised regulation will take away the 
substantial advantages of maintaining the authority of creating its own legal rules.
There are though other advantages in maintaining a decentralised system of regulation. Firstly, 
while jurisdictional competition creates a forum for the unscrupulous director to take 
advantage of the most lax rules concerning corporate regulation, it also provides a forum for 
competition for the best rules which can then on a piecemeal basis translate the legal adoption 
as rules for other jurisdictions. In this vein, the locality in which the status quo is maintained 
may feel that it and not a centralised federation will be best placed to formulate the rules as it 
best placed to be aware of the idiosyncrasies of that particular locality or indeed industry79 .
Secondly, decentralisation permits changes and experiments to the corporate regulation which 
if it contains mistakes will have the effects limited to that particular jurisdiction. From this the 
errors made can be observed by other jurisdictions and the mistakes will not be repeated.
The arguments on both sides have their credibility, but the underlying remit of the 
centralisation theory, is based on an understanding that managers will undertake activities 
inside the company, for the public good, even if that is at the expense of the shareholder. For 
instance, laws may prohibit the use of auctions to sell shares, even though this may maximize 
the amount of money which the company can get for its shares.
78 See ante Chapter 8
79 Craypo "The Impact of Changing Corporate Strategies on Communities, Unions, and 
Workers in the United States of America." Journal of Law and Society. Volume 24, No.l 
March 1997.
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This presumes a broadening in the responsibilities of the traditional director. A particular 
example is found in the United States take-over regulation. Here, the diversity in the 
entrenchment tactics afforded to existing management, means that should one state be too 
stringent for managers resisting takeovers that are hostile, those managers will simply 
reincorporate in a jurisdiction which does permit the resistance tactics, even when those tactics 
harm shareholders as a group.80
The use of the diversity of the take-over regulations is important as the take-over affords a 
pertinent motivation for the monitoring of management who wish to keep their positions safe 
by strengthening the company. Applying liberal rules which prevent the use of takeover, 
hostile or otherwise would mitigate this motivating factor and leave management lax.81
For Europe the position is even more striking as the political and cultural diversities in the 
system are more acute than in the American states. Thus the adoption of a centralised model 
for take-over regulations or controlling management will find stiff opposition from countries 
which have a different cosmetic make-up of corporate ownership and corporate inter 
relations.82
The American perspective on the attempts that Europe has proposed for the effective 
governance of the corporation, shows both the advantages and the disadvantages of 
centralisation. The advantages are threefold.
First, it can co-ordinate agreement for a set of rules where uniformity facilitates transactions. 
This should be viewed in the context that there is a distinction between harmonisation and 
assimilation, but nevertheless this is a real consequence.
80 This presumes that shareholders are of a certain ignorance, but more importantly, in the 
British context, that they are unable to form a strong policing element to the company, 
because of apathy or simply a problem in obtaining a suitable forum.
81 CF Alan Schwartz, "Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction", 2JL Econ. & Org., 229, 
(1986) - (describing the impact of auctions on incentive to search).
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Second, it can set minimal standards for jurisdictions, to ensure that managers do not 
opportunistically 'opt out' of the optimal standard by reincorporating in a jurisdiction with 
laxer, pro-managerial rules.
Third, it can impose rules that maximize shareholder wealth, in circumstances where these 
rules may be "opt out" through reincorporation. This factor is of course subject to the 
broadening of corporate responsibilities to beyond that of shareholder wealth creation. 83
For the US, the structure of corporate ownership and management power is universal. If 
therefore, a vested interest is viewed by keeping the status quo of decentralising corporate 
rules then Europe, containing a vastly diverse set of corporate structures and backgrounds will 
find the task almost impossible.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The similarities in the structures of the British and American corporate systems and cultures, 
have prompted reform measures with similar objectives.84 The first of these objectives is to 
create a relationship between the major fund holders and the management of the large 
corporations to encourage a greater interest in the holding companies from those who actually 
own the stock. This will erode the present phlegmatic approach taken by the holders of the 
major pension funds.85
This proposal, known as the relationship investor, would involve the top one hundred 
corporations in the US, and the top sixty investment houses. Each corporation would have 
approximately eight to ten relationship investors, holding 15-20% of the companies stock
82 See the position of Germany and the proposed EC Fifth Directive in Chapter 8 ante.
83 See ante Chapter 2.
84 Proposals for Internationally Competitive Corporate Governance in Britain and America, 
Alien Sykes Professional Practice Papers, Vol. 2, No. 4, October 1994.
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(slightly less for the larger corporations). Each institution would have a 'shareholder director' 
who because of his holding would be influential without being domineering. His role would 
be to monitor the senior management of the company and to ensure that it is fully accountable 
to the shareholders.
In order to ensure that the role of this 'shareholder manager' was exercised with a long term 
perspective, he would establish negotiations with the senior management for targets with a five 
to seven year perspective. The problem would be in finding individuals of sufficient calibre 
and experience to act in this role. Suggestions have included a retiring businessman with a 
proven track record.
The incentive for the senior managers who could work within the five to seven year program, 
would be to reward them handsomely, if the projected targets were exceeded. Thus the senior 
manager would sacrifice the short term profit regime engendered by the broad based share 
ownership of corporations, for a greater gain in the future.
The 'shareholder director' would be supported by a secretariat, paid for by the companies 
involved, which would provide the 'shareholder director' with a wide information base about 
the company.
The net effect of the deployment of a 'shareholder director', would be to ensure a high 
standard of senior staff. The experienced individual would not be prepared to have his own 
position in the company compromised by association with directors who were of a poor or 
inadequate calibre.
Connected with this would be the objective of creating a long-term perspective in the 
company, which would require self-discipline and greater egality in the boardroom, changing 
the current dominant position of the CEO/Chairman.
85 Ante Chapter 7.
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The major criticism perceived by the introduction of this system is the expectation of harmony 
between the 'shareholder director' and the directors. There is often conflict between the two 
groups. For example, the directors may want an increase in salary at the expense of an 
increase in shareholder dividend. So one of the objectives of the 'shareholder director', must 
be to balance both interests with a long-term perspective.
For the United States a slightly different approach will be undertaken. This is because unlike 
the British position, the US lacks the concentration of institutional investment in the major 
companies. (The top 30 pension funds own only 15% in aggregate of the 10 largest 
corporations.) As a result of such low investment percentages, the investment institutions in 
the US are not culturally disposed to act as corporate monitors with the responsibility of 
overseeing the actions of senior management.86
Here different suggestions have been made for intervention from outside the company.87 The 
institutions could operate to:
i) Appoint independent directors to all companies 
ii) To put extra pressure on under performing companies
The problem with this proposal is that there is still the gap between ownership and control. 
Perhaps a better structure for the investor to adopt is the idea of an intermediary who would act 
similarly to the 'shareholder director' in the proposal for Great Britain.88 Such intermediaries 
would look after the interests in approximately fifteen different stocks taking an active interest 
in corporate governance. This number would allow him the opportunity to be thorough in his
86 Drucker P.F., "Reckoning with the Pension Fund Revolution", Harvard Business Review, 
March-April, 1991.
87 Gilson, R.J. and Kraakman R, "Re: Inventing the Outside Director: An Agenda For 
Institutional Investors", Working Paper No. 66, August 1990, J. M. Olin Program in Law 
and Economics, Stanford Law School.
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regulatory role while affording him the opportunity of having a broad perspective of corporate 
responses to governance. This structural approach was adopted in the Berkshire Hathaway 
company, with great success, and an unusually long-term perspective for an American 
company.
In order to ensure that a long-term perspective was envisaged by the intermediaries, five to 
seven year incentive performances would be given to the managers. The intermediaries would 
in practice act as a voice for the big investment institutions, although they would not belong to 
them. Nevertheless, they would provide a structure which would involve less passivity on 
behalf of the institutional shareholder.
Finally, in order to enshrine the longer term perspective of 'shareholder directors' or 
intermediaries it is important that their service contracts are also of a four to five year duration, 
subject to the usual safeguards against incompetence.
The objective of these proposals is to fulfill that power vacuum which is the product of the 
growing separation of ownership and control. As Barry Riley states:
"...a power vacuum is developing that will be filled by some other economic or 
political interest group if the institutional investors fail to wake-up... fThere is] 
the need to broaden the input into company boardrooms and to get the 
institutions off the hook of voting obligations which they can not live up to but 
which they are terrified of loosing to other interests. "^
In order to take away the reliance on the inconsistent effects takeovers have on the issue of 
corporate governance and to restore competitiveness in the British corporation, these proposals 
will add a structure ready to cope with the dynamics of the modem enterprise.
THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
88 Jacobs. Michael T., "Short Term America", Harvard Business School Press, 1991.
89 "Financial Times", February 1992.
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The importance of Canada in the debate concerning effective corporate governance lies in the 
contrasting corporate structures which are indicative of the manager/owner relationship in 
Canadian companies. This contrast affords the more developing corporate markets in Eastern 
Europe an opportunity to look at national responses to corporate management, where the 
capacity and perspective of a corporation is increasingly internationalised. In doing this, a 
broader perspective of corporate responses to the question of governance can be assessed and 
the appropriate characteristics used in creating new hybrid corporate structures in those 
countries with little company law.
The debate on corporate governance while having endemic objectives within the international 
community, is subject to differing internal structures of both the corporation and the legal 
system in which that corporation is found.90 Thus while Canada and the USA have similar 
legal and cultural origins, the response to the policing of corporate managers has been 
influenced by their national differences.91
So what are those underlying differences in the Canadian system which promotes such a 
contrasting response to the issue of corporate governance? Perhaps the most significant 
difference in the structure of Canadian and American corporations is the much higher 
concentration of share ownership found in the Canadian companies. In the 1990's, the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) can be broken down in the following way:
i) Widely held corporations, that is corporations held by many, often small 
shareholders accounts for 15%,
ii) Corporations held by a single or a small group of shareholders, with legal control, 
that is control of 50%, is 63%
90 See ante Berle and Means, inter alia. Chapters 5 and 7.
91 See Ronald Daniels and Jeffrey Macintosh, "Towards A Distinctive Canadian Corporate 
Law Regime.", (1991), 29 Osgoode Hall L.J.863.
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iii) Corporations held by a single or group of shareholders with effective control, that is 
between 20% and 49.9% accounts for the remainder 25.4%92
This contrasts greatly with the position of the Fortune 500 on the American Stock Exchange, 
where the following figures are found :
i) Widely held shareholder corporations - 63%
ii) Corporations with small shareholder numbers which have legal control - 12%
iii) Corporations with small shareholder numbers which have effective control - 18%
The most significant consequence of this structure is that Canadian corporations do not have 
the problem of monitoring management which is such a significant idiosyncrasy of the 
American and the British systems. When a particularly stubborn board decides to undermine 
the position of the shareholder in Canada, that board can be firmly removed at the next General 
Meeting. Thus there is far less need to resort to hostile takeover bids to effect management 
change.93
The structure of corporate governance comes instead with its own idiosyncratic problems. 
Instead of emphasising the chasm which produces friction emanating from the relationship 
between the management and the shareholder, the emphasis is changed to the relationship 
between the shareholders and other interested groups such as creditors and employees. 
Notably, inflated compensation payments for shareholders, unfair self-dealing transactions, or 
unanticipated changes in shareholder risk taking, combine to stigmatize the tight control of the 
all empowered shareholder. The focus on the relationship between majority and minority
92 ibid.
93 This is borne out empirically. Of 1,148 Canadian mergers in 1989, only 7 resulted in 
management resistance see ibid.
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shareholder, has, as a result, prompted the advocacy of external constraints on the corporate 
market.94
Exacerbating the problems connected with tight shareholder ownership, is the interconnected 
pattern of ownership, which has become an integral part of the Canadian corporate structure. 
In 1987, of the top 100 most profitable companies in Canada, 45 held 10% or more of the 
voting shares of another company, although few held 100% of another company.95 This is 
consolidated by an extensive pattern of inter-linked directorships. In percentage terms, 71.1% 
of Canadian board appointments were made to directors with only one board appointment, 
17.5% to directors with two appointments, and 11.4% to directors with three or more 
directorships. Correspondingly, the figure for the US is 81.1%, 11.1% and 7.1% respectively.
The impetus of the banks during the eighties has allowed for the conglomeration of the 
corporate field in Canada. An example of this is the Hees/Edper empire; during 1989 the 
group controlled 350 operating companies (although few had 100% control), and controlled 
8.3% of companies listed on the TSE 300.96 Further, one of the principals of the Hees/Edper 
group holds more (9) directorship than any other on the TSE 300.97
The final, most significant difference on the Canadian stock exchange is the amount of stock 
which is thinly traded on the stock market. Only 5.35% of stock is frequently or deeply traded 
on the stock exchange. This indicates the infrequency, with which shares are often traded. For 
the governance of the company, this provides a consistent monitoring by shareholders and 
contrasts with the 'exit' of shareholders in American corporations, leaving because of the 
frustration of having no 'voice' in the company.
94 It is notable that the preoccupation of the Canadian regulatory framework has distracted 
owners and policy-makers from performance orientated concerns.
95 ante 63.
96 See James Gillies Boardroom Renaissance (Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. 1992).
97 ibid.
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These structural differences in the Canadian corporation are only part of the broader socio- 
legal differences, which have contributed to the governance debate. Canada ostensibly shares 
similarities to the USA, in its approach to the establishment of the corporation. Both have a 
separate legal entity, with standards of fiduciary duties imposed upon its management. These 
factors are illustrated in Canadian statutes which are in fact based on American precedent.98
Nevertheless, the differences in the Canadian legal structure have contributed to a watershed in 
the comparative studies of governance in the two countries. The first and perhaps the most 
important distinction between the two countries is the American competitive element that 
exists inter-state. The fact that states are responsible for the administration of corporate law 
prompts a vigorous joust for the market share of incorporations. In the US, this competition is 
led by Delaware, and has provided a controversial input into the state of American corporate 
freedom."
In sharp contrast, Canada has no such Delaware inspite of its federal legal structure. 100 This 
deprives Canada of a specialisation court, which, in Delaware has established a wealth of legal 
responses to evolutionary questions surrounding the role of the corporation and the 
responsibilities of its directors. 101 This in turn has led to a lack of specialised 
commercial/corporate courts, scant judicial precedent and sluggish rates of legislative
innovation. 102
98 The similarity in the content of corporate statutes is not at all surprising given the reliance of 
the framers of the pre-eminent model of corporate law in Canada, The Canada Corporation 
Act, on American Precedents. See acknowledgment, Robert Dickinson et al., "Proposals for 
a New Business Corporation Law for Canada", (Ottowa Information Canada, 1971), page 
iv.
99 For the impact of competition on the corporate market, see William Gary, "Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware" 1974, 83 Yale Law Journal 663 and Roberta 
Romano, "Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle", 1985, J.L., Econ 
and Organ.225.
100 See Ronald Daniels, "Should Province Compete? The Case for a Comparative Corporate 
Law Market", 1991,36 McGill L.J.
101 See Roberta Romana, "The Genius of American Corporate Law", (12th August 1992, draft 
version monograph to be published by American Enterprise Institute).
102 Ontario has gone some way to providing judges with the option of becoming specialists in 
the corporate/ commercial field, but this option has proven to have a minimal effect on the 
effectiveness of legal improvement. The decision of the trial judges who are offered this
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The result has been a reliance on provincial regulators, of which the most important is the 
Ontario Securities Commission to stand at the epicentre of corporate law matters. For instance, 
the effect on the minority shareholder of any corporate activity which would have a 
detrimental effect on their rights, has been guarded de facto by the Canadian securities 
regulators. This has kept intervention by the courts at a low level. 103
Another important consequence of the high intervention of the local securities commission, is 
to prevent the management and the shareholders from asserting private dispute resolutions in 
the face of using an expensive and protracted court system. This can and has had a debilitating 
effect on the abilities of the shareholders and management to act in a way which is beneficial 
to the corporation. This compares to the States where such private solutions are common- 
place. 104 The result is to foster a dependency attitude amongst shareholders and management 
upon a well intentioned but often undisciplined benefactor.' 05
Regulation may have been dealt a severe blow by the decision of Pezin v British Columbia 
(Securities Commission) ^6 Here, the court overturned a finding of the B.C. Securities 
Commission into allegations of insider dealing. The court in its summing up, commented on 
the legislative responsibilities surrounding insider dealing and also on the more expansive 
obligations found in the Canadian Securities Administrators and the Vancouver Stock 
Exchange. It stated:
option can be overturned anyway by the Ontario Court of Appeal or the Canadian 
Supreme Court, and by generalist judges.
103 On these points see respectively, Philip Anisman, "The Commission as Protector of 
Minority Shareholders", Securities Law: Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 
(Toronto, Richard De Boo, 1989), and Edward Morgan, "Extraterritoriality and Insider 
Trading", paper delivered at 1992 International Bar Association Conference.
104 See Roberta Romano," The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?" (1991), 7 
J.L Econ and Organ.
105 For example, the first oppression action brought under the Ontario Business Corporations 
Act has languished in pre-trial proceedings for almost a decade. The Ontario Securities 
Commission took a lead role in the litigation; delays, in, part, are attributable to competing 
claims on the Commissions resources.
106 (1992), 96 D.L.R(4TH) 137, 66 B.C.L.R (2nd) 257 (C.A), leave to appeal to S.C.C granted 
(1993), 98D.L.R. (4th) vii
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"Since the legislature has dealt with the disclosure issue so carefully, 
specifically and comprehensively, there is no room for a more exacting 
disclosure requirement than the legislature has imposed. To do so would be an 
error in law. "107
This statement, contrasts with the legislative recalcitrance, which prompts the securities into 
acute intervention in the role of corporate governance. This produces at best an oversight of 
the issue, which has been described as sporadic and unpredictable. 108
The strength of the securities regulators within the corporate framework has also produced a 
passivity amongst shareholders resulting in a small number of derivative claims. This has 
proven to be so notwithstanding Canada's oppression remedy which was designed to prompt 
the Canadian courts to move away from their traditional reluctant stance to intervene in 
defining the fiduciary duties of majority shareholders. The scope of the remedy has been 
widely interpreted and is included in cases relating to public companies. 109 Nevertheless, the 
remedy is used infrequently, reflecting the continuing traditional stance of the judiciary.
THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER
Like the USA and the UK, Canada has seen a stark rise in the level of institutional shareholders 
in its widely held corporations, during the eighties; at present an estimated 50-60% of shares 
are held in this way, ""although the overall number of institutional investors is much lower. 
The role of the institutional shareholder has been given considerable authority from the US, 
where their position in augmented by the sheer size of their investment capacity and the depth
107 ibidatp!59D.L.R.
108 Nigel Wright, "Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Culture: A Comparative Study of 
Securities Regulation in Ontario and the United States", LL M thesis for Harvard
University.
109 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. (1991) 49 C.P.C. (2nd) 239, 50 O.A.C. 254
(Div Ct).
110 "Institutions Flex Market Muscle", The Globe and Mail, November 11th 1988, pB18
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of their expertise. The institutional investor has been perceived as the harmonising element in 
the corporate gap between ownership and control. 1 "
However, this perception is mitigated in the British experience, as institutional shareholders are 
reluctant to criticise those managers from whom they receive 'soft' information on prospective 
investment worth of their companies." 2
The position of the institutional shareholder in Canada is still in a nascent stage, but an 
indication of their perceived value to the governance debate is illustrated in the strategies 
companies undertake to make themselves susceptible to takeover; the 'poison pill' scenario." 3 
The provincial securities administrators have reacted to the problem by insisting that 
management obtain the approval of the majority of shareholders before the 'poison pill' policy 
is employed.
For some companies however, this has proven difficult as some companies have diverse 
ownership and are unable to obtain the necessary majority. In those circumstances, companies 
went ahead with the policy and the attempt to prevent adoption was thwarted." 4
The role of the institutional shareholder in the formula for corporate governance, has been 
described as lackluster" 5 and this can inter alia be blamed on the lack of confidential voting 
and the widespread vote-bundling by companies." 6 However, the persistence of the
111 Jayne Barnard, "Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance", 1991, 69 
N.C.L. Rev 435
112 See ante Chapter 5 & 7.
113 See Jeffrey Macintosh, "The Poison Pill: A Noxious Nostrum for Canadian Shareholders", 
1989, 15C.B.L.J276.
114 For example, see Allenvest, where the policy was undertaken as less than 50% of 
shareholders voted against it.
115 "Recent Trends in Canadian Corporate Governance." Ronald J Daniels and Edward J 
Waitzer [1994], Canadian Business Law Journal, [Vol. 23], page 23.
116 For example, the vote on the company Inco's poison pill was tied to a receipt of a one time 
generous dividend payment.
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institutions has meant that in some cases it has become routine for shareholder approval to be 
sort before a poison pill policy to be undertaken. 117
The intervention of the institutional shareholders, is still closely attached to the issue in which 
the company is involved. For instance, the 'voice' of the shareholders is more prominent in 
areas where there is a conflict of interest matter between the company and any controlling 
company. These issues are often undertaken through the 'low key' forum of, inter alia , the 
securities commissions and require little more than approval or dissent by the shareholders. In 
contrast, mismanagement problems, the core of shareholder activism in the United States, do 
not prompt a large response from the institutional shareholders. 118
The concern for the institutional shareholder's 'voice', is that it is without co-ordination. In 
this respect it reacts often without an underlying policy towards the problems in front of it. 
The lack of co-ordination produces a lack of depth and quality which, if improved, would 
effect a more respected response from management and shareholders. 119
The antipathy exhibited towards co-ordination is the product of a range of factors. 
Organisational constraints derive from the concentration of share ownership. The traditional, 
low yield safer investment is an anathema for corporate governance. There is also the political 
constraint. Any attack by public pension funds will be viewed as a veiled attack by the 
Government on Corporate Canada.
117 See Catherine McCall, "An Acceptable Poison Pill? TransAlta's New Shareholder 
Approval Plan", [November 1992], Corporate Governance, Revision 6.
118 In the States however, the position is still considered to be costly and complex. 
Nevertheless, recently, the American Council of Institutions declared that the focus of their 
1993 campaign of inspecting the corporations would be to look for "Performance, 
performance, performance." See IRRC Corporate Governance Newsletter, September,
1992.
"' Edward J Waitzer, Are Institutional Shareholders Really Impacting Corporate 
Governance?", [1991], Cdn. Inv Revision 9.
255
The American and Canadian Perspective on Corporate Governance
The use of the public pension fund holders to act as corporate governance monitors is 
illustrated in the USA, where political self-interest becomes apparent. 120 Here, the monitors, 
while not being the poodles of those that they govern, do not aspire to align themselves with 
the interests of the beneficial shareholders either, keeping their own independent agenda. The 
result is a new set of agency problems. 121 The political objectives to the governance debate, 
was illustrated in Canada more recently when the state of Ontario strongly rejected the idea of 
intrusive scrutiny in public pension funds. 122
The inclusion of the institutional investor in the role of corporate governance, is indicative of 
the benefits which the institutional investor can offer the management team. 123 The experience 
in the US suggests that this relationship will evolve without the need for regulatory 
intervention124 .
The second method characteristic of Canada's attempt to improve the performance of the 
management is to increase the level of personal liability for the board, initiated both by statute 
and by the judiciary. There are at present over 100 statutes in Canada, which result in personal 
liability for the director125 .
The proliferation of legislation is indicative of the broadening of the expectation of the 
directors' duties from the stakeholder. However, legislative attempts are beset with difficulties 
related to the challenge to the traditional expectation of the shareholder which is, that he is the
120 See Roberta Romano in "The Future of Hostile Takeovers; Legislation and Public Opinion", 
1988, U.Cin.L., Revision 457 at 469, note 32.
121 See Robert Clark "Four Stages of Capitalism; Reflection on Investment Management 
Treaties", 1981, 94 Harvard Law Review, 561.
122 See the 'Caisse de depot et de placement du Quebec'. (December 5th 1988) No. 500-05- 
013354-889.
123 See ante Chapter 7.
124 John Pound, "Westinghouse Lights Boardroom Path", The Wall Street Journal, December 
llth, 1992.
125 D. Palmateer (with the assistance of Grace Kimucho and Anna Torma), "Statutory 
Liabilities and Offenses of Directors and Officers in Ontario", draft dated October 9th, 
1990.
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sole benefactor of the management's efforts in the corporation. This is now being challenged 
by other stakeholders who see the traditional view as too narrow 126 .
The problem of broadening the ambit of the director's responsibility, is in creating a vague 
concept of stakeholder which detracts from the director's own perspective of his duties, and 
thus serving to undermine them. Perhaps the best way forward is to establish the shareholder 
as the management's major concern but to make this subject to other stakeholder interests in 
the process.
A problem connected to this is the fact that too draconian a scheme of liability for the director 
will indirectly affect the shareholder by reducing the value of his shares and the profit margin 
of his corporation. '"Implicit in this is the idea that risk involving a technical breach of duty 
will be tolerated hi the name of expedient business practice.
Like the USA and the UK, Canada's response to the issue of corporate governance is moulded 
by both an increase in the level of institutional shareholders and the broadening sensitivity of 
the public to the evolving expectations demanded from the Board. The problem for 
management is that within the nexus groupings of the company, these two factors can result in 
conflict. The institutional shareholder, has initiated a greater demand for the management to 
channel their duties into the shareholder, while the other corporate stakeholders take a 
disadvantaged perspective from any strategic policies designed to advocate shareholder 
prosperity. 128
128
126 See ante, Chapter 5 and Ronald Daniels, "Takeovers and Stakeholders: Contractarianism 
and Compassion" (1993), 43 U.T.LJ.
127 See, inter alia, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, "Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts", 1991,100 Yale L.J. 1879.
See Ronald Daniels and Edward Morgan in "Independent Directors Should Stay 
Gatekeepers", The Financial Post, July 1 1992, page 10; and "Directors Face Grab Bag of 
Liabilities", The Financial Post, August 12 1992, page 10.
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The result of this conflict may provoke a destablising effect on corporate management who see 
an early retreat from the corporation a more attractive proposition than a mounting bill for 
personal liability. 129
This illustrates a general problem for any governmental attempt to try and bridge the gap 
which persists between shareholders and other corporate stakeholders. The public wants 
perhaps too much from its directors: an impeccable level of behaviour but also the best profit 
margin. If the balance between these two objectives is moved in favour of one or the other, 
then Canada, through those responding to the Cadbury Report in the UK, will be faced with a 
charge of strangling commerce for the sake of the ill-informed. 130
For Canada, the response to the issue of corporate governance is best contextualised 
internationally. Canada can be best described as an intermediate country in the spectra of 
commercial and financial markets. 131 In this respect, Canada has an active stock exchange but 
the structural ownership of corporations is tight and thus not so susceptible to the arguments 
advocated which led to the Cadbury Report. 132 Nevertheless, in advocating the need for a 
better system of governance which balances the objectives of both the shareholders and the 
other stakeholders, Canada offers a blended approach towards corporate governance 
deferential to the needs of the investor both per se and as a focus for broadening managerial 
responsibility to the corporation as a whole.
THE ETHICAL QUESTION OF THE POISON PILL
129 In Canada during the latter part of the eighties, directors from troubled corporations such as 
Westar Mining Ltd. and Canadian Airlines International Ltd. resigned rather than face 
personal liability. 
130 See ante Chapter 7.
131 See Coffee: "Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor.", 
October 1991, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 6.
132 «<><> smtp fTianter S.132 See ante Ch pt r 5
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The question of poison pills in both the US and Canadian jurisdictions, illustrates some of the 
most fundamental problems in balancing the different responsibilities involved in the running 
of corporations and the role of management in particular.
The pill was initiated as a defence tactic in the United States in December 1982, by Martin 
Lipton133 . In the following six years, over 800 pill plans were adopted in the US in various 
forms and without the approval of shareholders. 134 They were subsequently introduced into the 
Canadian financial markets in 1988 in the Inco Case. 135
The pill works by attaching certain rights to acquire shares to a sale of existing shares. These 
rights are traded with ordinary shares but the strike price is so high that they become 
unmarketable. However a certain event which attaches to the right will trigger its activation 
forcing the acquirer to purchase more shares in the corporation with a view to, inter alia , 
block a takeover of the corporation. In Moran v Household International Inc.^^, a pill was 
triggered upon the acquisition or 20% or more of the corporation's common shares or upon a 
take-over of 30% of the corporations common shares.
The pill activates by separating the right to purchase new shares from the existing shares, and 
thus flood the corporation with shares. This devise can then be used either to block the 
takeover, or at least to force the person taking over the corporation to negotiate a higher price 
for the existing shares by threatening the flood of new shares.
The use of the pill has been attractive to those boards of directors who wish to defend the 
corporation from a hostile takeover. The coercive tactic of raising the bidding price for the 
target corporation was illustrated in the case of Federated Department Stores whose pill forced 
Campeau to pay US C$73.50 per share up from the original offer of C$47.00.
133 The pill was apparently conceived in connection with El Paso's defence against a hostile 
bid from Burlington and Northern Railway.
134 See "The Poison Pill; A Noxious Nostrum For Canadian Shareholders.", 1989, Canadian 
Business Law Journal, Jeffrey G. Macintosh.
135 See post.
259
The American and Canadian Perspective on Corporate Governance
There are several criticisms to be made of allowing the tactic of the poison pill. First, by 
preventing the threat of takeover it is argued that the share value of the corporation will 
suffer. 137 This is based on the presumption that with the threat of the management being 
overturned taken away, the management of the corporation will have no incentive to achieve 
the optimum goals of the corporation. In a study undertaken at the end of their eighties 
however, corporations with pills out performed those without by 9.6%. 138
Moreover, research undertaken to illustrate the price change in shares which were brought 
about by the initiation of a pill produced a fall of 1% in share prices when it was announced 
that the pill was being adopted. 139 Studies undertaken by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission also show a drop in the price of shares, but less significantly at 0.5%. I4°
Second, and perhaps more cogently, is the principle of issuing shares for a proper purpose. 
The principle, central to the issuing of new shares in the UK141 , finds its Commonwealth 
starting point in the case of Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd. l42 Here directors who 
favoured a takeover offer from Smith issued shares to block a takeover from Ampol and 
associates. The court in ruling that this share issue not to be within the definition of proper 
purpose, confirmed the existing rule that even though the directors had not acted selfishly, the 
sole purpose of the issue was to dilute the majority share holding to allow the other 
shareholders the opportunity of selling their shares more advantageously.
136 500 A.2d 1346 (Del Sup Ct., 1985).
137 See ante at 106.
138 Study undertaken by Gergeson & Co.Inc., October 31,1988.
139 The study was carried out over a two day period in order to eliminate other price varying 
factors. Seventy three companies without other factors were observed.
140 Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the Chief Economist, "The Effect of 
Poison Pills on the Wealth of Target Shareholders, October 23, 1986, SEC Study.
141 See inter alia Hogg v Cramphorn [1967], Ch 254.
142 Following the above decision in [1974], All ER 1126 (P.C.)
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However, in the case of Teck Corporation v Millar l43 the more liberal court in Delaware ruled 
that directors were not in breach of their fiduciary duty to the corporation if they acted in good 
faith in what they believed, on reasonable grounds, to be in the best interests of the 
corporation. In the context of the pill the courts will have to grapple with following 
observations of the judges in the Howard Smith and Teck case.
In Howard Smith, Lord Wilberforce observed the following in relation to directors powers to 
issue shares:
"... to use their fiduciary power solely for the purpose of shifting the power to 
decide to whom and at what price shares are to be sold cannot be related to any 
purpose for which the power over the share capital was conferred on them. " l44
However, Mr. Justice Berger in Teck sums up the directors' duties in a specific takeover 
contest as follows:
"... directors are entitled to consider the reputation, experience and policies of 
anyone seeking to take over the company. If they decide, on reasonable grounds, 
a take over will cause substantial damage to the company's interests, they are 
entitled to use their powers to protect the company. " 145
A further case which offers a test for establishing the validity of inter alia a pill, is Re Olympia 
& York Enterprises Ltd. and Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. (Canada), 146 where the actions of 
the corporation defending the takeover were supported by the court, who stated that such a 
defence strategy could be implemented where it was:
i) in good faith that they perceived a threat to the corporation 
ii) they acted after proper investigation, and
143 (1972), 33 D.L.R. (3rd) 288, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 385 (B.C.S.C.).
144 Supra 141 at 1136.
145 Supra 143 at 317 and 415-416 respectively.
146 (1986), 37 D.L.R. (4th) at p.194, 59 O.R. (2d) at p.225 (H.C.J.), affid 37 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 
59 O.R. (2d) 254 ( Div. Ct)
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iii) the means adopted to oppose the take-over were reasonable to the threat posed.
Clearly, these cases reflect the taxing task of the court's wish to provide the management of the 
corporation with the means of exercising its job with as much efficiency as possible but also to 
ensure that the power it exercises does not obtain an autonomy which is unhealthy for the 
corporation and which provides for a phlegmatic approach to the question of management 
motivation.
Apart from these common law arguments over the validity of the pill, Canadian law also offers 
statutory laws which may be activated in the context of an executed pill. In an action brought 
by Caisse de Depot Attack on the Inco Rights Plan, the following statutory violations were 
contended against the application of the Pill:
i) the plan constituted a restriction on the ownership and issue of common shares in 
violation of subsection 49(9) of the Canada Business Corporation Act [CBCA];
ii) the plan constitutes an undue restriction on the absolute right of a shareholder to 
transfer his shares by delegating to the directors the mandate to negotiate their 
sales price, in violation of subsection 49 (9) and S 102 CBCA;
iii) the object and effect of the plan are to create a disparity of rights between holders 
of shares of the same class in that a shareholder holding 20% or more of voting 
shares of Inco is the only one prevented from exercising his rights contrary to the 
terms and spirit of S 24 CBCA;
v) the plan also gives directors to decide the price at which shares would be conferred 
on members who held 20% of the votes; a power not conferred by S 102 CBCA, 
without the shareholders approval, and;
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vi) the plan contravenes the principle that securities of a corporation are negotiable 
instruments as provided for in subsection 48 (3) of the CBCA.
Finally and perhaps most importantly is the oppression remedy under S 241 of the CBCA, 
which provides for a 'complainant' which includes a director to apply for relief against the 
corporation where the corporation's affairs have been conducted in a manner which is 
'oppressive or unfairly prejudicial'.
This section provides the court with wide discretion to grant relief which may include setting 
aside or varying a transaction or contract to which the corporation is a party. (Section 247 of 
the Ontario Business Corporation Act (OBCA)). This type of remedy is not available in the 
US which has no corresponding oppression remedy but for Canada, the remedy is available in 
two areas where the pill is in place:
i) That the pill discourages bidders, and is thus oppressive for that reason. The issuer may 
argue that if properly used a pill can infact benefit shareholders by raising the price of the 
shares and by defending hostile takeovers. It would seem expedient therefore to allow pills that 
had the backing of the shareholder's approval.
ii) that in allowing the purchase of the acquirer's shares at 50% once he had purchased 20% of 
the target company (the "flip in") then the purchaser could initiate the oppression remedy on 
the basis that he had suffered punitive dilution if it proceeds to and beyond the specified 
percentage. In reply, the issuer would point out the salutary effects of the pill and the decisions 
of inter alia, the US & UK courts dealing with its operation. 147
147 In the case of/? V Board of Trade exp St. Martin Preserving Company Ltd.[\964] 2 All ER 
561, Astwood CJ made it clear that a "poison pill" was a legitimate defence mechanism 
which could be used by the directors so long as there was no collateral purpose other than 
to prevent a hostile takeover, or that the issue did not favour one shareholder at the 
expense of another, (p565).
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The discriminatory elements of the pill can be indirectly evaluated by the decision of Bowater 
Canada and R.L. Grain 7/ic. 148Here a "step-down" attempt to alter the voting power of shares if 
they went outside the family unit of a corporation from 10 votes per share to 1 vote per share 
was set aside on the basis that the corporation could not discriminate between different groups 
of shareholders. The trial judge(whose decision was upheld on appeal) stated : 149
"this interpretation is founded on the principle that votes attach to the shares as 
opposed to the shareholder. I agree with Bowater's counsel that present 
corporate law cannot tolerate the result that the rights of a share depend on the 
identity of a shareholder. "
The problem for Canadian corporations is that corporate rights are contractually based and thus 
are capable of being varied by the participating parties to the contract. Corporations as a result 
may do indirectly what they cannot do directly, but employing a device which is 
discriminatory, such as the pill, may lead Canadian courts to strike down certain rights plans. 150
American cases have also engendered a defensive attitude to the rights issues arising from the 
implementation of a pill. In The Bank of New York Co. Inc. v Irving Bank Corp. 151 the 
discriminatory feature of a rights plan, violated a provision of the New York Business 
Corporation Law which provides that subject to permissible variations in the certificate of 
incorporation, "each share shall be equal to every other share in the same class." This decision 
is at variance with the decisions undertaken by the Delaware courts.
The "pill" issue raises questions fundamental to the role of directors and their relationship with 
the corporation and the different contractual groups in the corporate nexus. First, the power of 
the directors to act in the best interests of the corporation can be mooted over whether the use
148 Bowater Canada Ltd. R.L.Crain Inc.(1987), 26 O.A.C.348 (Ont.C.A.), affg McRae J., 
unreported judgment, S.C.O. January 23 1987; and see also Jacobsen v United Canso Oil 
& Gas Ltd.(1980) 113 D.L.R.(3d) 427,[1980] 6 W.W.R. 38 (Alta Q.B.)
149 ibid at p7 of the judgment.
150 In ruling that attaching rights to share, or indeed burdens, based on the identity of the 
shareholder was intolerable. Me Rae J effectively outlawed the use of the pill which 
attached to shares because of the identity of one party owning a particular percentage of 
shares
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of the pill should act as an integral part of the director's weaponry. The proper purpose 
doctrine, central to the themes of capital maintenance and shareholder protection, is put into 
question in the light of the positive consequences of share issue manipulation undertaken by 
the directors.
Observing this issue, the question arises as to whether there is any connection between the 
amount of managerial ownership in the corporation and the use of pills. In a study undertaken 
by Malatesta 152 83.6% of firms announcing poison pills were found to have lower than average 
management ownership. The difference was significant; 9.39% of management ownership with 
pills compared with 23.1% for the average corporation.
The suggestion here is that not only are pills more concerned with the entrenchment of the 
management rather than the benefit of shareholders but also that the entrenchment objective 
directly effects the position of the shareholders, to their detriment. 153
Second, the inconsistency of the courts response to the question of the pill illustrates the 
problem of the corporate personality converting to new jurisdictions in order to obtain the most 
liberal set of laws in its favour; the "race to the bottom" 154 . The pressures of the directors to 
fend off the advances of a hostile takeover may well prompt a justification of the manipulation 
of the federal system to seek out friendlier states with the result that directors will be treated 
more liberally on a whole range of issues unconnected with the rights issue.
Third, the pill raises important questions concerning the expectation of shareholders for the 
directors to act in accordance with their wishes. The deference of shareholders, whilst giving 
the directors a sense of autonomy in the corporate structure mitigates the general legal 
presumption that shareholder approval is important to the decision making process of many of
151 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y.Sup Ct., 1988), affd without opinion, 533 N.Y.S. (2d) 412 
(October 4, 1988)
152 Paul Malatesta and Ralph A. Walking, "Poison Pill Securities; Stockbroker Wealth , 
Profitability and Ownership Structure", 1988, 20 J Fin Econ 347 ("Malatesta Study").
153 See ante at 105.
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the corporation's policies. To make shareholder approval a central part of the validation 
process for pills 155 the question of information to and suitability of the shareholders becomes a 
further moot point.
SHAREHOLDERS IN THE CAPACITY OF PENSION FUND HOLDERS
For Canada as for other advanced commercial nations, the use of the pension fund has 
increased in its input into the financial base of the corporation but unlike shareholders in 
Britain, Canadian shareholders have been more successful in their pursuit of greater activism 
in the corporation's management. This may be attributed to the more closely held share 
ownership in Canadian corporations, which makes a shareholder input more accessible, or it 
could be attributed to a change of attitude from the pension fund holders to the corporation; 
seeking a step away from the "soft information" bias which affects the British pension fund 
holder from acting as an effective police force to the shareholders they represent. 156
In Canada, the Pension Investment Association of Canada, the (PIAC), issued a code of best 
practice similar to that issued by Cadbury. Although the code is voluntary, it is the basis for 
rating corporations in their compliance with the eighteen point code.
The significance of the code is several fold, but importantly, it asserts the asset of having the 
proxy machinery which represents billions of dollars of pension fund monies. Secondly, it 
recognises the importance of not alienating the members of the pension funds, from the 
ultimate management of their money, by requiring their managers to ensure that the 
corporation's management complies with the code. 157
154 See ante.
155 This proposal was made by The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) informally before 
the decision in Inco was made, that a pill would only be accepted with the approval of the 
shareholders.
156 See ante Chapters 5, 7 and Chapter 9.
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The PIAC code recommended inter alia that public companies have a board composed of a 
majority of 15 members, with a majority of members being independent outsiders. Each board 
should also have nominating, audit and compensation committees, controlled and headed by 
outsiders. The role of the Chairman and the Chief Executive should be split, and the code also 
calls for the rejection by shareholders of certain types of stock option plans as forming a part 
of the overall remuneration of directors.
The code goes on to denounce poison pills, unequal voting rights and staggered boards. 
Clearly the code bears some resemblance to the Cadbury Code, but these denunciations go 
further to give some clarity over the perception of the poison pill on the worth of shareholder 
stakes. This represents an expectation gap between the shareholder representatives and the 
courts who still see the poison pill as a moot point of law which can actually work in favour of 
the shareholder even if this is a secondary consideration. 158
The code does not however incorporate some of the recommendations of the Fairvest 
Submissions. 159 These included the board being no more than twelve members and that the 
directors could sit on no more than seven boards and that there should be enhanced executive 
pay disclosure. What it was particularly critical of was the way in which the shareholder was 
only able to submit resolutions every three years to the management and called for an 
enhancement to the shareholder's voice in the corporation.
These discussions illustrate that the problems of governance and the incorporation of the 
different groups in the corporate nexus are shared throughout the Western commercial 
markets, and the role of the shareholder in particular is a cause for concern amongst the 
corporation's management. 160
157 See inter alia, "Measuring up in Canada: Pension Group Creates code for Corporate 
Governance", Marlene Givant Star, Pensions and Investments, April 18, 1994.
158 See ante.
159 Fairvest Securities Corporation is a Toronto stock brokerage firm specializing in corporate 
governance, formerly called Allenvest Group Ltd.
160 gee "Shareholder Communications at the Annual General Meeting": A Consultative 
Document' The Department of Trade and Industry. April 1996.
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For Canada however, the position of the shareholder in the corporation has received further 
enhancement through the Toronto Stock Exchange's announcement that it is adopting 
additional listing requirements. 161 These requirements will necessitate the corporation to give 
an annual disclosure of its approach to corporate governance. Particularly important is the fact 
that corporations are to give explanations for differences between different corporate systems, 
and differences with the guidelines contained in the TSE Committee on Corporate Governance 
in Canada (the Final Report).
The announcement of the guidelines illustrates an increase in awareness in the need for 
improved corporate governance across Canada. The TSE has made recommendations that 
their guidelines be discussed with other stock exchanges in Canada with a view to adopting 
similar guidelines.
The requirement to disclose however, is less onerous than the British requirement illustrated in 
the Cadbury Code, which requires corporations to "give reasons for" any areas of non- 
compliance with the Code of Best Practice. 162 There is as yet however no evidence to compare 
the detail of the corporation's response to the disclosure requirements of compliance with 
those found in the UK. It may be that with a less onerous requirement to disclose the 
corporation may be more willing to furnish more detailed accounts of corporate inconsistency 
and peculiarity in its governance structures than the often perfunctory and brief pro forma type 
of response which has been the focus of much media criticism in the UK. 163
The code recommends fourteen (14) guidelines some of which are similar to those requested 
by the PIAC in 1994. 164 Most importantly is the recommendation that the majority of directors 
on the board be unrelated. 165 The thrust of this measure can be seen to be mitigated when one
161 Announcement made in February 1995.
162 See para 3.07- 3.10 of the Cadbury Code of Practice.
163 See inter alia: John SM Turner and Fasken Martineau, "Canada : Toronto Stock Exchange 
Adopts Corporate Governance Listing Requirement", International Briefing, Butterworths 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, April 1995.
164 See ante.
165 Schedule A2 of the TSE guidelines.
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considers that an unrelated director can in fact be one that receives an income from the 
corporation. This then may not provide a framework for creating truly unrelated directors with 
a detached perspective of the corporation and its board.
The second part of the recommendations, set out in Schedule B of the of the TSE's guidelines 
recommends a change in the corporate law of Canada firstly to eliminate the suggestion that 
directors are responsible for the day to day running of the corporation, secondly that all 
legislation imposing personal liability be reviewed with a view to removing liability which 
does not serve its purpose. Thirdly, to impose civil liabilities upon directors for failing to give 
continuous and timely disclosure of the corporation's activities.
Clearly, a balance is being struck between the acceptance that directors should be protected if 
they act with due diligence which would be a defence to any civil claim, while making sure 
that through the implementation of certain structures in the corporation a constant and 
consistent appraisal of the board's activities can be made.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
The remit of this thesis is to identify the reasons for the particular and idiosyncratic development 
of the creation of legal standards of behaviour for corporate directors, and to assess the 
appropriateness of that standard in relation to the director himself and to those in the corporate 
nexus who are affected by his actions. In assessing the development of directors' duties both 
inside and outside the UK, it was important to furnish recommendations as to the direction in 
which the further development in this area should take. In this vein several observations had to be 
addressed. First, is the current area of insolvency law an appropriate one to use in establishing 
an objective standard of care and skill for directors and is the expectation of it too ambitious? If 
so, what developments can be made for the creation of further directors duties to remedy any 
expectation gap which exists between directors, shareholders and other groups in the corporate 
nexus?
Second, is the question of making objective the standard of directors' duties sufficient to bridge 
that expectation gap or is it necessary to look at other structural devices within the corporate 
framework which will complement any changes in the intrinsic standard for director behaviour.
Finally, is there a need for a radical restructuring of the very concept of 'corporation' and 
'director' ? In assessing this last point we should conclude what principles can be engineered to 
create better corporate governance which express the eclectic qualities of the modern corporation.
Post war development of company law in the UK has emphasised the input of non-statutory 
regulations highlighting two important objectives. First, there is the requirement to limit the
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power of the judiciary to develop detailed criteria for the establishment of standards for directors 
and management in general. The objective is to create greater flexibility in establishing 
principles for governance. Second, the need to establish an alternative system of regulation to 
both statute and common law development which will maintain public confidence while at the 
same time provide a working formula for the complex world of commerce to recognise as good 
practice.
The judiciary has responded to the problem of initiating such non-statutory regulation by 
exercising commercial decisions in areas of company law. 1 This is not surprising as the basis of 
many legal interpretations in companies legislation will reflect some degree of sensitivity to the 
commercial effect of that particular decision. It is with this background that the judiciary's 
interpretation of the Insolvency Act 1986 is considered.
The Insolvency Act itself was initiated not as a proactive panacea to all the consequences flowing 
from a company facing financial difficulty but as a combination of different and often conflicting 
objectives. 2 The need to facilitate a more pro debtor system of legal response to corporate failure, 
is illustrated in the enabling provisions allowing the company to seek more easily a voluntary
In particular the judicial interpretation of exercising good faith in a commercial context, is 
illustrated in the concept of altering the articles "bona fide for the benefit of the company as a 
whole" [Lindley MR in Alien v Gold reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656 at pp 671-2.] 
This requires the judge to look at the commercial well being of the company as well as its 
members and affords the judge with a wide practical stance on the principle. Contrast the 
cases of LJ Banks in Shuttleworth v Cox [1927] 2 KB 9 CA, where the shareholder was 
emphasised as being the person who decided what was in the best interests of the company, 
and Brown v British Abrasive[1919] and more controversially Dafen Tinplate v Llanelli Steel 
Co. (1907) Ltd [1920] 2 Ch 290, where the judge was very pro-active in deciding the remit of 
what was in the company's best interest. This pre war history of judicial discretion was carried 
forward in many post war cases, but the concept of acting in good faith, and the concept of the 
corporation has had varied interpretations, for instance, Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v 
Lloyds Bank Ltd [1970] Ch 62 [1969] 2 All ER 1185 (Chancery Division). Here a breach of 
duty did not compromise the principle of capacity to act in deciding a transaction to be ultra 
vires. In this case the corporation was viewed as a separate legal entity which had a capacity 
divorced from the intention of the directors. In the case of Parke v Daily News[1962] Ch 927 
[1962] 2All ER 929, the corporation was viewed as the interests of the shareholders as a whole, 
thus indicating one particular tangent to the director's duty to act bona fide for the benefit of 
the company.
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arrangement with the purpose of saving the corporation. 3 The use of this device has increased 
nearly tenfold since its inception in 1985.4 The use of the Administration Order5 has similarly 
shown that the corporation as debtor has a significant effect on the underlying approach towards 
insolvent corporations and their officers. Here the importance of the corporation as tax payer and 
employer is clearly emphasised.
The provision of wrongful trading is to be found in the other objective of the eclectic Insolvency 
Act 1986, in attempting to raise the standard of director's performance and thus creating greater 
protection for the creditor. Its initiation was designed to bring within the remit of legal sanction, 
those directors who through negligence and lack of understanding caused loss to the creditor. 
The section was sensitive to the fact that within the relationship of creditor and director there is an 
element of risk which affords certain margins for the director to have discretion over the 
creditor's money but that once that discretion reached a particular point which negated the 
creditor's security, then the director would be responsible for ensuring that the creditor's interest 
was placed first.6
The relevance of subsection (4) of S.214 Insolvency Act 1986, is that in achieving the above 
assurances, an objective criteria for director's behaviour was presumed, and then taken out of its 
original context, to be used as a general standard for director's duty of care and skill.7 There are 
several important observations to make about the use of S.214 in this way.
First, the section is designed to protect the creditor in his relationship with the director. This 
relationship presumes that the creditor will view with caution and even concern, the actions of a
2 See ante at Chapter 2
3 Sections 1-7 Insolvency Act 1986, make the procedure for voluntary arrangements much easier 
than the previous provisions under s245-247 Companies Act 1985.
4 See ante Chapter 4.
5 Sections 8-27 Insolvency Act 1986, which is used in order to facilitate a more secure voluntary 
arrangement. As they effect a moratorium over the corporation's assets.
6 ibid
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director who incurs credit in a situation where the company is insolvent. Yet there are occasions 
when a greater degree of credit will be incurred and with it a subsequent greater risk of failure 
which may be encouraged by the creditor. The concept of risk is a commercial one and the 
commercial spirit of one creditor may be more cavalier than that of another. To assess the 
relationship as always being asymmetrical in terms of encouraging commercial risk and the 
responsibilities for that risk as well as the orchestration of it, is to disregard the economic 
aspirations which encourage both nexus groups (director and creditor) to demand increased risks 
which may involve incurring credit at a time when the company is insolvent and for the creditor 
to agree that risk in the hope of obtaining a better return on his initial investment It is the director 
however who under the provision of S.214 remains liable for any loss.
For the director, this means that he cannot always comply with the expectations of his creditors as 
he will always have an eye on section 214 Insolvency Act. In practice however we have seen that 
this section is not understood by many in the commercial community and thus its preventative 
measures will not be translated into director action. 8The result is that the section loses credibility 
as a standard raising device for those who do not know of its provisions while at the same time 
can act as an intimidating device for those who wish to carry on trading with their creditor's 
consent in order to keep the company afloat. In both scenarios, the section circumvents the idea 
of accountability.
The problems surrounding the implementation of wrongful trading illustrates the difficulties in 
interpreting the legislation and the financial difficulties of bringing the case.9 Section 214 
Insolvency Act engenders an objective perspective of the director's standard of care and skill. 
Nevertheless, it fails to consider the question of whether an objective standard means one 
standard or if it is one standard subject to the resources of the corporation and the calibre of
7 See Re D'Jan of London ante Chapter 3
8 See ante Chapter 3 and the findings of the Insplvency Service's Report 1993
9 ibid.
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people at the disposal of the director. This would mean that several levels of performance and 
due diligence would apply to directors depending on their corporation's size and resources.'° For 
instance a lecturer may set as the required standard for his exam, the level that every student does 
his best (an objective standard). Each student diligently performs to the best of his ability but on 
return of the papers the lecturer has twenty different levels of performance which have been 
fashioned by the students own ability and personal circumstance.
For Knox J. in Re Produce Marketing Consortium, " the corporation's resources were an 
important consideration in determining whether the director had exercised his duties of care and 
skill within the parameter of the new wrongful trading provision, yet no criteria is given as to 
what amount of resources available to a particular corporation will necessitate a particular 
standard of care from any one director. In trying to establish such a criteria the courts would have 
to develop further their ability to make a judgement on a commercial basis which may define 
whether something wrongful has taken place and if so who has been wronged and by whom. The 
momentum of non-statutory regulation and the recognition of the law's minimalist approach to 
the development of inter alia the legal definition of director's duty of care and skill indicates that 
this is an inappropriate and maybe impossible task for the judiciary to perform.
In creating an objective standard for directors s 214 Insolvency Act 1986 suggests that a single set 
of criteria can be used to assess whether a director has fulfilled his legal or even moral obligations 
to the creditor. With the relationship between the two groups depending on the conservative or 
cavalier nature of both directors and creditors in their attitude to corporate policy such an 
aspiration will prove difficult to distil into one legal concept. If this is true for the relationship of 
directors with one group in the corporate nexus then even further difficulties will arise with the 
directors' relationships with the other groups such as shareholders, employees and third parties,
10 See ante Chapter 3 and 4.
11 See ante Chapter 3.
274
Conclusion
who are to benefit from the application of an objective criteria for inter alia directors' care and 
skill. 12
From the evidence of case law, statute and non-statutory regulation, the development of directors' 
duties can be assessed in terms of piecemeal attempts by the judiciary , Parliament and the City 
to react to the changing requirements of trade and industry. In particular the need to address the 
void which exists between shareholder and director - the orthodox but certainly not the universal 
definition of corporate governance."
The nature of wrongful trading, indeed its very title suggests a degree of culpability which will 
warrant the payment of damages to compensate for the wrong done. Yet with the concept being 
used more broadly, and the poor number of cases that followed its inception, the conclusion has 
to be that it has not provided the companies and those within its nexus with a holy grail for good 
standards of director performance. The problem is not just that a wrongful act has occurred but 
that the definition of wrongful carries with it the same subjective factors associated within the 
relationship of the director and the creditor as well as the substance and resources of the particular 
company. 14
It is here that the court's response to the powers of disqualification within the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 may be considered as an indication of the court's ability to respond to 
the varying degrees of culpability which will result in the director being disqualified, exonerated, 
or as a compromise, controlled. The discretion to look at his performance overall in several 
different companies currently afforded by section 6 of the CDDA, could be extended to section 
10 CDDA 15. This discretion, narrowly extended to improve section 10 CDDA may be expediently
12 ibid.
13 See ante Chapter 5.
14 See ante Conclusion.
15 This provision affords a disqualification order to the court to be made against a director who is 
liable for wrongful trading, under section 214 Insolvency Act 1986. See ante Chapter 4.
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extended into other areas of corporate law relating to the monitoring of director's duties in order 
to create a greater circumspection, balancing the development of director's duties with the 
objective of preserving enterprise and recognising the concept of risk taking as a legitimate 
consequence of investment. In failing to employ such discretion, wrongful trading is both 
draconian in its application and produces reservations amongst the judiciary to implement it. 
This has further undermined those objectives of the Cork Report which were an integral 
expectation for commercial morality.
A further major consideration of the Cork Report was to prevent the abuses of the insolvency 
process by those who saw it as a means of taking assets away from the corporation and thus its 
creditors 16. The provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 which illustrated this objective were not as 
far reaching as the Cork Report had requested. 17 Nevertheless, they were a reaction to the 
political damage that the more extreme cases of director mismanagement of funds were causing 
to the ethos of the new entrepreneurial era initiated at the beginning of the 1980's. In this respect 
they were not intended to act as a general strategy for good corporate behaviour, but merely to 
reform those aspects of insolvency which were seen as representing a "jungle" mentality to credit, 
serving to undermine confidence in the growing number of smaller corporations.
The use of S.214 Insolvency Act 1986, is an opportunistic way of developing a statutory standard 
of care and skill for the general duty of directors. No doubt the fact that directors' duties have 
traditionally been politically unimportant has acted as a catalyst for such opportunism as specific 
statutory provisions to enhance directors' duties have been overlooked 18but the consequence of 
that opportunism has been to produce a provision which has produced a dichotomised 
interpretation from judges and academic commentators who have recognised both the civil and
16 See ante Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
17 See ante at Chapters 2 and 3.
18 Section 13 Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 exonerates a director from liability for 
failiure to comply with the concept of reasonableness in the execution of his duty to act with care 
and skill. See ante Chapter 6.
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quasi criminal aspects of the provision ". The further development and refinement of 
corporations and the advent of popular capitalism changed the political atmosphere in this area, 
and perhaps in this context, wrongful trading was in the wrong place but at the wrong time.
The use of wrongful trading can prove more burdensome than helpful in retrieving assets for the 
creditor and it also remains uncircumspect to the fact that a director may come within its technical 
remit but can also remain an integral and prolific director whose position determines the future of 
employees in another corporation of which he is director. Britain today demands that the spirit of 
enterprise be fanned by industry and law. This provision rests too heavily on the objective of 
policing directors activities and in doing so implodes itself to become a legal artefact that is 
neither often employed or respected.
The provision clearly has an identity crisis in terms of its philosophical objectives. The provision 
was clearly intended to be a preventative measure, by which the director of a corporation would 
raise the standard of his skill and care in order to avoid being subject to personal liability for 
company debts20 . However, the Insolvency Service's findings indicated that the provision would 
not create such a climate because it was sporadically understood and similarly respected21 . Such 
figures were confirmed by my own findings even though the general attitude of directors was one 
of a willingness to learn about those legal principles which could raise the corporate veil and 
render them personally liable.22
The result is that wrongful trading becomes less preventative in its input to the general 
governance debate and its ability to act as a policing device undermined by its inability to 
compete with the other preventative measures which have been orchestrated in the name of good
19 See ante Chapter 6
20 See ante Chapters 2 and 3
21 ibid.
22 The concept of continued training is thematic to good governance and was recognised by the 
Cadbury Report and the report of the Hampel Committee.
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corporate governance. As a curative measure it is undermined both by the cost of implementing 
it and the confidence of the Insolvency Service to bring a claim under it.
So where can the commercial community including investors, creditors, employees and the 
beneficiaries of the taxation system look in order to find those preventative measures ? The 
Cadbury Code as the major alternative to legal threats emphasises the need for preventative 
measures within the corporate structure to ensure good board practice, and to prevent adverse 
shareholder reaction when the communication system between the two groups breaks down23 . 
The effects of poor communication between directors and auditors, was displayed in the extreme 
in the Queen Moat House disaster24 . The emphasis here was on the need to ensure that as the 
corporation grew and particularly where that growth was quick, there were appropriate levels of 
restructuring in the corporate body to ensure the integrity of the board and to fulfil the 
expectation of the others within the corporate group.25
The report into the Queen Moat House crash, indicates the need for the corporation to evolve in 
its structure as it grows and becomes both more powerful and socially as well as commercially 
responsible. In this respect it displays similar concerns to those surrounding the wrongful trading 
provision in that it recognises the diversity of the corporate form and the fact that the 
corporation's resources are an important part of establishing the appropriate levels of 
governance. 26
Appropriate levels of governance, which fulfils commercial and social expectations as well as 
initiate an effective and practical legal objective will thus not be completed with reference to one
23 See ante Chapter 7. In particular, the survey undertaken by Manches & Co. Solicitors which 
has been confirmed by Alice Belcher "Regulation by the Market: The Case of the Cadbury 
Code and Compliance Statement." The Company Lawyer 1996. Vol. 17 No.l. Here the 
problem of creative compliance is considered as corporations try to ostensibly comply with the 
provisions of Cadbury, while taking advantage of the fact that it is not mandatory.
24 ibid.
25 ibid.
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legal formula. Principles of governance will provide a bare minimum for behavioural standards, 
and this has to combine the commercial efficiency of the corporation with its respective duties to 
its nexus groups. The small corporation may wish to relax legal requirements on meetings and 
shareholder information,27 whereas larger corporations will have to ensure that these aspects of its 
governance strategy are more strictly adhered to and can respond to the broad based share 
ownership of the corporation. While principles such as independent monitoring and 
communication can be requested by inter alia, Cadbury, the fact remains that the resourcing 
issue for each company will remain subjective dependant on the corporation's own development 
and experience.28
The Queen Moat House scenario indicates only one particular problem in the law's relationship 
with the corporation namely that large public corporation have the difficulty of maintaining a 
strong input from the shareholder in the management structure. The legal powers residual to the 
shareholders are undermined by the fact that the shareholders cannot form one effective voice. 
The questions for governance in such a scenario are far different from those of a smaller 
corporation or even a quasi partnership in which the Board and shareholders are closely related or 
even almost inter-changeable. Yet even here the ability of the shareholder to act as an objective 
and integral monitoring force is undermined by the fact that shareholders will have a profit 
orientated agenda which might applaud certain aspects of bad practice by the Board where bigger 
profits will result.
This raises the question of whether the corporation be perceived as one legal concept fashioned 
in eighteenth century property rights responding to the requirements of particular social groups. 
Rather it would be expedient to redefine the institution of the corporation responding to the 
judiciary's attempt to further develop special provisions for the smaller corporation and the
26 Chapters 6 & 7.
27 See Sealy, "Company Law in a Changing Commercial Climate" The Company Lawyer 
Lectures, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, December, 1996.
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regulators for providing extra control for the large enterprises. This can be achieved through the 
creation of different types of corporations onto which particular legal devices designed to give 
appropriate guide for good governance would be super imposed. The ability to establish some 
objectivity will be increased by reducing the number and types of corporation to which it should 
apply.
In this vein we establish two very important principles of governance. First is the development of 
improved communication between the different groups in the corporate body whose traditional 
role was to act as a check on each other. Second, that the efforts to ensure that these 
communications are effective and are not burdensome to the corporation reflecting the size and 
resources of the corporation. However, where there is a quickly growing corporation the 
paramount principle should be effective communication which reflects the rapid commercial 
growth. The Queen Moat House scenario, albeit acute in its illustration, displays the need for this 
prioritising.
The need to establish some guidelines for directors of different sized corporations is endorsed by 
the response to the provisions of Cadbury and Hampel. The Code/ Recommendations highlight 
two major elements in the attitude of corporations to the concept of governance. First, that the 
financial consequences of implementing the Cadbury provisions mean that corporations will vary 
in their capacity and determination to implement all of the provisions.29 A corporation which has 
alternative structures for governance will be ambivalent to the imposition of a prescriptive code. 
The cost of restructuring will be perceived as a pointless exercise merely affirming the 
corporation's commitment to appropriate governance structures.
28 A view illustrated in the report of the Hampel Committee See ante Chapter 6 and Appendix 3.
29 See ante Chapter 7. In particular the figures by Manches and Co. on the implementation of the 
code's provisions.
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Second, that conceptually the code / recommendations are preventative measures in trying to 
adopt structures which will enable the corporation to develop open and comprehensive strategies 
for corporate management. Important in this objective is the communication with others in 
management, including shareholders and their representatives. Their ability to have independent 
monitoring of management is presumed but cannot always be trusted. 30 This is in contrast to the 
curative effect of using the Insolvency Act provisions as a mechanism for the same objective.31
However, the Code's ability to persuade corporations to adopt such objective monitoring 
measures are severely compromised by the inter-action between executive and non-executive 
directors and the fact that within many of the sub groups proposed by Cadbury there is an overlap 
of personnel. This means that often individuals will wield greater power than Cadbury wished as 
their influence grows in these sub committees.
The code's inability to act as a universal device for good corporate governance as envisaged by 
its authors is due to the fact that the code's objectives while designed for those large broad based 
corporations listed on the stock-exchange' nevertheless expected to influence other corporations 
as well.32 Corporations outside the larger company category were expected to take on board the 
provisions of the code with the hope that they would also implement its recommendations.33 Yet, 
the code required further armoury in its objective of being universally implemented on the Stock 
Exchange. This was achieved in part through validation from the Yellow Book.34 In applying 
such a prescriptive approach the code like the Insolvency Act 1986, has failed to recognise the 
need for greater sensitivity towards the corporation's capacity to implement its provisions. A 
universal set of principles for governance is too optimistic and uncircumspect.
30 See inter alia Fischel Chapter Nine.
31 See ante.
32 See ante Chapter 7.
33 ibid
34 Section 12 "Stock Exchange Listings Rules" made the compliance statement with the code 
compulsory , after the new issue was published in December 1, 1993. This fulfilled
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For corporations not covered by the Yellow Book, guidance for good governance has not been 
dealt with on any quasi statutory level35 but works published by the Institute of Directors which 
are aimed at the medium sized corporation36 show that it is important to further develop criteria 
for the governance of medium and smaller corporations. The already mitigated lustre of the 
Cadbury code is further tarnished as broad principles are not translated into detailed criteria 
which would be the remit of a statutory schedule. This raises the fundamental question of 
whether allowing self regulation to develop standards of good corporate practice is expedient. 
The idea that Cadbury has a soft centre,37 sees the legislative process as important in hardening 
the impact of the code on the corporate community. 38 In order for the Code to bight, statutory 
provisions with effective sanctioning for non compliance is essential but the importance of not 
over regulating or finding inappropriate levels of regulation must be taken on board as well.
The implication of a statutory device to enhance the standards expected from directors would 
benefit from a review of the nature of the corporate form and responsibility. This is a priority for 
all other legislation dealing with director standards and governance. The idea of a stakeholding 
corporation broadens the responsibilities of the company and challenges the traditional focus of 
directors' duties from a profit motivated objective designed to enhance the capital security of the
recommendations from inter alia, the Accounting Standards Board who stated that compliance 
ought only to be compulsory when the code itself was compulsory.
35 See Re Chez Nico (Restaurants). Chapters 6 & 7 ante.
36 See ante Chapter 7, particularly the report published by Henley Management College, on 
guidance for good practice for directors.
37 Amongst those who see the way forward is to implement legislation is the Law Society which 
state "We consider that the law relating to the duties of directors is an area of company law 
which should be reviewed in depth as part of the exercise of raising standards of corporate 
governance. It is only after such a thorough review which can examine all the implications of 
legislative change and their interaction with other areas of company law that legislative reform 
would be appropriate." Memorandum No. 271 July 1992.
38 One of the latest surveys undertaken by the Pension Investment Research Consultant found 
that 47% of corporations had complied with Cadbury fully, but that there were still various 
important outstanding issues which corporations were not addressing and which were central 
to the Cadbury theme. For further reading see The Company Lawyer (1995) Vol. 16 No.3.
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corporation to a performance related objective designed to enhance the profile of the corporation 
in the area of good citizenship which encompasses a broader nexus group.39
This does not mean that the corporation abdicates its responsibilities to its shareholders and 
creditors, as maximising corporate profit will remain at the forefront of the objective for 
corporations.40 Rather it defers to the idea that within the objective of maximising profits there is 
the overall performace of the company to consider. The objective of the law is to define what 
those considerations are and then go on to ask whether they can be universally applied to the 
corporation or need refinement, according to a particular corporation's size and management 
experience. The focus is currently too broad, too universal. Efforts to hone in on the needs of 
particular corporations is essential. Nexus groups may have different legal obligations or 
expectations depending on the original focus and ambit of the corporation. These have to be 
considered in the process of initiating guidelines for management.
In order to achieve such an objective a return should be made to the traditional view that the duty 
of the director is to the corporation. 41 This will presume however, that the corporation itself has 
changed to become inclusive expressing duties to all those within the corporate nexus at least. 
Corporations such as Cadbury Schweppes, Guinness, Thorn EMI and Whitbread have already 
embraced this 'inclusive' conception of the corporation.42 However, to distil these voluntary 
arrangements into a universal demand for the corporation to comply with, is to presume that the 
corporation is one legal form requiring one legal application of governance.
39 For further discussion on the development of directors duties see ante Chapter 4.
40 See ante Chapter 5. The response of corporations to the question of what was the most 
important objective in the corporation signalled a response which indicated that performance 
had been accepted as the most important objective but that profit was an integral part of this.
41 See ante Chapter 4.
42 The Royal Society of Arts organised a survey included in the "Tomorrow's Company" inquiry 
(1995), which illustrated that these firms were more open in their approach to the idea that the 
corporation as changed conceptually within society and that as a result responsibility of 
management should change accordingly.
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This clearly is not the position either in law or even more dramatically in fact.43 The approach of 
the law relating to the corporation in the Anglo-American tradition is to emphasise the contractual 
obligations between the different groups in the corporate nexus and then to extend the legal 
responsibility of that contract when it was expedient . This has led to an ad hoc evolution of 
standards for the director created by statutory and non-statutory regulation.44 For the German and 
Japanese systems however, a more socially rounded view of the corporation as a public 
institution has been fostered which has aspirations of its own set apart from developing the cause 
of one group within the corporate nexus, for example, the shareholder. 4S As a result, the focus of
•
management is broadened to include a more universal benefit for the corporation and others 
within it. Corporations are :
"perfectly naturally perceived as ... social institution fsj, with public responsibilities".^^
The difficulty of changing the standards for good governance within the UK, emphasises the 
difficulty in changing the concept of the corporation itself. The political perspective on the role 
of the corporation as defender of private property and private enterprise, inhibits the growth of 
the idea that this concept is one of only a number of concepts which are an important part of the 
concept of the corporation. The hostility to the proposal of worker's participation in 
management, 47 underlines the political reaction to any degree of change which illustrates a 
broadening in the corporate ideal. The polarity which is an inevitable consequence of such a 
tunnelled view in the UK has developed the direction of management to one which is exclusory 
and ambivalent to the social and economic changes which were the products of the share 
ownership boom of the Thaterite era.
43 See ante Chapters 5 & 7.
44 See ante Chapter 4.
45 Ireland "Corporate Governance, Stakeholding, and the Company: Towards a Less Degenerated 
Capitalism?" Journal of Law and Society, September 1996.
46 ibid.
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This is perhaps because of the nature of the nexus group which is being advocated for inclusion. 
The history of the Thatcherite era saw the proposed inception of the works councils at a time 
when the prosperity of business depended in part on the ability to restrict the power of the unions. 
This created a attitude of at best reluctance and at worst ambivalence to anything which 
compromised the power of management to express the new enterprise culture, particularly by 
implementing a structure perceived as trades unionism through the back door.
It is ironic that some corporations have taken the initiative and included a works council, despite 
the UK's long history of rejection of it in Europe and successive government's continued 
ambivalence to the German model of corporate structure, which gives power to the employees 
through the supervisory board.48
If the German system is to be considered as extreme in its form this does not prevent a more 
moderate use of employees in UK management. The introduction of the works council is an ideal 
opportunity to test whether the inclusion of workers in the management process in some 
contained context would result in a positive blue print for further inclusion, somewhere between 
the all powerful supervisory board and the works council. The most persuasive argument against 
inclusion of a system akin to the supervisory board is that its powers are not reflected in the 
responsibilities which are attached to it.49 To define levels of responsibilities for such a board 
would undoubtedly follow some of the same considerations as those outlined for day to day 
management responsibility. 50 Thus a two tier system could be employed but modified so that the 
powers undertaken by the shareholders will in fact be complimented by a more appropriate level 
of responsibility.
47 See ante Chapter 8.
48 ibid.
49 ibid.
50 Ante Chapters 4,5,6 7&8.
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The effect of establishing such a board would be to create a greater degree of circumspection 
between directors, shareholders and employees who are at the centre of the governance debate. 
Such a restructure would be more inclined to fulfil the performance related criteria which has 
been advocated as the future of the corporation51 and to develop the new concept of the company 
as a public interest. For the larger corporation the pressure of public opinion which is 
undoubtedly increasing can be channelled in such a scheme.
This concept is justified on the basis that whether directly through small investment or through 
the use of the investment institutions, the public's money plays an increased role in the equity of 
listed corporations. 52 This has increased the interest shown by the public to the way in which 
management structures are monitored. Yet there may be a danger in focusing on the expectations 
of the new shareholder in treating the public as a consumer who expects to get a degree of 
certainty in their investment coupled with a management structure with the objective of 
maximising that investment. The shareholders may be ambivalent to that objective being 
compromised by the corporation's new social responsibilities. Like the 1832 Reform Act, the 
shareholder may want a more selective enfranchisement of the corporate system than that 
advocated by Berle53 which may resemble the extension of directors duties along the same line as 
that undertaken in Commonwealth countries, and which has found form in the City Code of 
Takeovers and Mergers.54
Thus in extending the duty for directors a balance has to be struck which appreciate the needs of 
all those within the corporate nexus and not just one particular group which has traditionally both 
in law and in fact been allowed residual powers of management influence.
51 Supra 35. In particular, the comments by H. Collins "Organisational Regulation and the Limits 
to Contract" and McCahery, Picciotto, and Scott "Corporate Control and Accountability" 
(1993).
52 See ante Chapter 7.
53 See ante Chapter 4.
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Australia, through the initiation of The Life Assurance Act 1995, indicated that within certain 
enterprises, the metamorphosis of shareholder as consumer is justified, in preventing fraud, thus 
placing the shareholder's interest in priority to that of any other group in the company.55 The use 
of personal liability to prevent the director from giving misleading information to a client ", is 
mitigated by the defence that due diligence was taken in giving that information.57 Yet with less 
security orientated investment objectives, can this high degree of shareholder orientated duty be 
universally applicable? A shareholder ceases to become a client or a consumer once he has taken 
up position in the company. Rather he is an investor in a social institution which has the ability to 
make great profits but like any other good citizen has responsibilities to his peers.
The shareholder's position does however act as a touchstone to the problem of conceptualising 
the corporation in law. Clearly, the arguments surrounding the concept of the stakeholder 
company reflect the change in corporate involvement in society but that fact is expressed only in 
the larger or listed corporations. The expectations of the directors, shareholders and employees in 
smaller corporations will have less politically charged agendas for change and can gain access 
more easily to the current procedures for shareholder and employee redress, than counterparts in 
the large corporations.58
Gaining access to these remedies will be an important development for shareholders in listed 
corporations. The institutional investors may need to put in place a more effective system of
54 ibid. In particular the case of Re ChezNico Restaurants Pic.
55 See Amanda Morgan "Life Insurance Company Directors: Beyond the Call of Duty?" 
Australian Business Law Review. Vol. 25 . February 1997.
56 Section 32 Life Assurance Act 1995.
57 Section 48 Life Assurance Act 1995.
58 Ibid and Chapter 5. In particular the use of section 303 Companies Act in relation to director 
dismissal and Section 459, relating to unfair prejudice.
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monitoring which reflects the expectations of those investing, as well as their increased 
motivation to secure their voice within the corporation. 59
The emphasis for the law is to clarify the type of corporations which will come within the remit 
of certain governance obligations, for clearly the factual metaphysical nature of the corporation is 
not being responded to by a statutory change in the standard of directors' duties. The need to use 
a provision in the Insolvency Act as an annunciation of the new standard for directors is 
indicative of this.
The impact of history and social structuring has created corporate idiosyncrasies that can be 
identified by national boundaries.60 These have developed into a guarded and often hostile 
attitude to the structures of other corporations within the same economic and socio-political 
groups. The position of the UK in the broader European debate on the participation of workers in 
the management structure of corporations has displayed a political ambivalence which is now 
coming to an end with the advent of the Blair administration and the impending signing of the 
Social Chapter and annexed documents. This political move is following the corporate and 
cultural shift towards a greater acceptance for worker participation, although again the theme of 
being sensitive to the resources of the corporation will be viewed in deciding whether the fact or 
degree of worker participation is appropriate.
To change the nature and concept of the corporation within society therefore is to change the 
attitude of that society itself to the objective of the corporation. In Britain, this has partly been 
achieved by the alteration of share-ownership amongst the small investor, and the growth in 
private pension funds and other savings devices. Yet the passivity of many shareholders in the 
context of their potential management duties reflects the polarised perspective of the ordinary
59 The issue is discussed in "Private Shareholders: Corporate Governance Rights - A Consultative 
Document." Department of Trade and Industry, November 1996.
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investor, to the seemingly autonomous director whose legal restraints have been mitigated by the 
failure of the law to recognise the change in the financial make-up of large corporations in the 
eighties and nineties.61
These failures do not seem to reflect the wishes of management to be perceived as a group 
ignorant of their legal responsibilities.62 Rather, the future of broad based share owned 
corporations depends on the ability of corporate managers to maintain confidence in their 
investors and to recognise the broader remit of corporate responsibility and accountability.63 Most 
importantly this means that the directors steer away from those who are speculating in the short 
term for instant profits and respond more to the objectives of those whose commitment to the 
corporation is long term. This will produce a more circumspect and far sighted director who will 
be in a position to see the corporation as a citizen with a range of responsibilities to its internal 
members as well as the broader society.
In this context, legislation based on a further refinement in the categorising of the corporation de 
jure rather than simply de facto , could superimpose onto that categorisation relevant training 
and qualifying provisions as well as codes of recommended practice that could both fulfil the 
legal obligation of the director to the corporation (with its new conceptual basis) as well as 
provide those affected within and without the corporate nexus with the assurance that as the 
corporation grows there are recognised legal structures and training designed to keep governance 
within the corporation intact but sensitive to the corporation's resources and internal structure.64
60 See ante Chapter 8, particularly, the impact of the evolution of the German and French 
corporate systems.
61 Figures for changes in the corporate structure are found in Chapter 7.
62 See ante Chapter 6. The returns to the questionnaire indicated that directors would see legal 
training as an integral part of their future management role.
63 ibid.
64 DTI Consults on limited liability partnerships, Joanna Gray, (1997), The Company Lawyer, 
Vol. 18. No.4. Here, a new form of corporation is considered for the professional partnership,
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In this respect the statutory provision and the code of recommended practice would harmonise. 
The statute would provide the particular legal standards for a director of a particular corporation 
to attain, based on the corporation's size and resources. Such provisions would include the 
standard of care and skill expected in that corporation as well as the communication 
requirements with shareholders and relevant board structures if necessary. The codes would then 
complement this statutory core of information by providing advice to the corporation as to how 
best it can fulfil those statutory objectives.
Like the present relationship between statutory provisions and regulatory codes of best practice, 
this relationship would leave some discretion to the corporation to fulfil its legal duties but the 
compulsory element of the law would always remain as the ultimate objective and the discretion 
to implement the recommended codes would not create the undermining effect that has 
characterised much of the commentary on the implementation of present non-statutory codes.
The objectives of governance, reflecting the evolution of the corporation, are themselves 
metaphysical. The use of section 214 (4) Insolvency Act, 1986, as a means of common law 
development in the area of directors' duties and the implementation of non-statutory codes, 
culminate to achieve a national response to the particular needs of both the commercial 
community and the broader society. Yet this is only a part of the governance process.
The relationship of the UK and other European countries, as well as the objectives of the 
European Community as a political entity, mirror some of the problems found in balancing the 
requirement of commercial freedom, with the increase in concern with the power of management, 
and its relationship with others in the corporate nexus.65 First, there is the question of 
harmonisation and the extent of its ambit in the context of restructuring the corporation. Here,
and shows how traditional forms of corporate structure can be refined to meet the needs of a 
particular enterprise. 
65 See ante Chapters 8 and 9.
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the proposed implementation of the German two tier system of governance found in its larger 
corporations displays an ideal which presumes a common economic and social background. This 
clearly has been an important factor in the transformation of post war Germany, with the more 
radical evolution of industrial structures, than those conservative attitudes which remained in the 
allied nations. 66
Yet this need not be a fatal blow to the harmonisation of governance throughout Europe, even 
where its economies have become more divergent through the emancipation of the former Eastern 
Block countries. What is important for any success in the harmonisation of governance laws and 
regulation within the European Community is that the ambit of the term harmony is correctly 
interpreted and that political discipline refrains from translating the concept to one of 
assimilation.67
Extolling the German model as a paradigm, even a prerequisite for not only good governance, but 
dynamic governance reflecting the modem responsibilities of the newly conceptualised 
corporation is to undermine the positive aspects of other national governance structures which are 
working, albeit inconsistently in part, and which are carved from a tradition more evolutionary in 
its character than revolutionary. To assess UK ambivalence to the implementation of the 
proposed Fifth Directive and to Works Councils in terms of political anxiety alone is to ignore 
this fundamental problem of the European agenda. Nevertheless lessons can be learned from the 
German model and the use of the EC to cross fertilise ideas for governance places member states 
in a unique position to look at what is best about the different systems and harness ideas, even 
where they are subject to modification. Europe undoubtedly provides a forum for future 
development.
66 See ante Chapter 8.
67 ibid.
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The US and Canadian approach to governance illustrates within their formalised federal 
structures the importance of harmonisation of governance controls in any economic block.68 The 
establishment of one objective standard for directors, as well as recommended structures for 
corporate governance will undermine the "race to the bottom" scenario which creates incentives 
for states to have the most user friendly laws which will attract the patronage of a particular 
corporation.69
Translated into the European context, corporations would feel more secure in the knowledge that 
the objectives which they had legally to obtain, were to be the general consideration of 
corporations throughout the community. This would take away any anxieties over unfair 
competition which results from a lack of monitoring within one particular jurisdiction which is 
prepared to see the inflation of short term corporate gains by allowing incorporation in a liberal 
atmosphere at the expense of creating corporate responsibility and a commitment to long term 
policies.
The Canadian perspective is important in assessing the subjective criteria of different states 
towards the question of management structure and responsibility within the remit of harmonised 
national governance with an objective of seeking objective standard practice. Like Germany, its 
traditions have resulted in its own shareholder structure and management role. Like Germany, it 
is a federal state which has incorporated both state and federal laws into its corporation laws. In 
this respect it shares some of the same distinctions with the USA as the UK does with Germany.70
Yet both Canada and the US illustrate that in order to achieve governance which creates 
confidence as well commercial freedom the emphasis has to be upon establishing objective 
parameters of governance inside which there is a very subjective criteria for fulfilment. This
68 See ante Chapter 9.
69 ibid.
70 See ante Chapters 7,8 &9.
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phenomena is to be a characteristic of both national and international corporate law.71 Law has to 
be viewed as essential to the objective of effective governance but limited in the extent to which it 
can fulfil the expectations of shareholders, creditors, employees and society.
In Britain, the law's manipulation of section 214(4) Insolvency Act 1986, can be seen as unique 
in its involvement with the broader question of directors' duties. The USA has illustrated that 
even within its pro debtor insolvency regime it is necessary to provide for some redress against 
directors who have acted in a manner which results in a further loss to the corporation which was 
already financially vulnerable. 72 Yet the USA have placed the role of liability for directors within 
the broader context of sustaining the corporation for the benefit of others within the corporate 
nexus. This has been a tradition in the USA which has not translated easily in the UK.73
Nevertheless the increase in the UK of corporate saving devices in insolvency law suggests a 
cultural move towards a greater acceptance of risk taking as an integral part of management life 
and an understanding that directors should not necessarily be made liable for losses when things 
go wrong. Saving the corporation and improving its financial structure are illustrations of 
commitment by all in the corporation and not a device to give a director yet another chance.
The "workouts" in the US, which are analogous to the British Voluntary Arrangements, have 
been endorsed by other aspects of corporate law in particular the Business Judgement Rule. 
These devices, while not connected, do illustrate an underlying commercial philosophy which 
adheres to the stricter principles of laissez faire.
71 See Ante Chapter 8. In particular the proposed paper on the future of auditing as part of the 
broader issue of corporate governance within the European Community.
72 See ante Chapter 9.
73 In the annual reports from the Insolvency Service, 1986-1996, the use of pro debtor 
arrangements such as the Voluntary Arrangement and the Administration Order, have been 
used more widely, only in the past three years. From 1986-1993, their small numbers 
indicated the lack of trust in the new philosophy towards insolvent corporations.
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The Business Judgement Rule can be used by directors who reasonably believed that the policy 
decision they were taking was in the best interests of the corporation even when they were 
mistaken and the corporation ends up in further financial difficulty. The principle supports the 
philosophy that within the commercial arena there is legal as well as commercial justification for 
error and that within a culture disposed to the growth of entrepreneurialism this principle is to be 
valued through its broad application.
In the UK, the use of the wrongful trading provision illustrates a more circumspect culture 
towards those who are the contributors to corporate capital. This controlling element of the 
insolvency provisions has been criticised for being difficult to implement and ineffective as a 
policing device.74 Yet perhaps its greatest vulnerability is that its inception came at a time when 
the liberal laissez faire attitude towards commerce was making a resurgence under the Thatcher 
administration. Its subsequent lack of use can be seen as a product of such a change in culture 
and thus a move towards a more understanding approach to risk and management error.
In this respect wrongful trading represented a respect for capital input that was out of pace with 
the newly developed sense of enterprise which could not justify quasi punishment in the cultural 
atmosphere of Anglo-American business. The paucity of cases indicates not only that the 
provision is for its own limited purposes difficult to implement but that broadened to cover the 
general statutory pronouncement on directors' duties, it completely fails to empathise with 
modern commercial needs or attitudes towards commercial failure.
The compelling argument for the provision still remains as a society which allows and even 
encourages free trade will always be punctuated with those rogue directors whose purpose is to 
manipulate the system for their own personal gain, leaving commercial debris behind them. 
These directors indicate that within the commercial community there will remain an indefatigable
74 See ante Chapters 2, 3 & 4.
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urge for self promotion which is prepared to bend any legal standard in the interests of profit. 
This proves that the system is imperfect but does not prove that the system is unable to improve 
or that the law can be a central part of that improvement. No doubt the role of the Serious Fraud 
Office and the Investigations Department of the DTI will remain sensitive to public scrutiny in 
making accountable those directors who have intentionally raided corporations for their own 
benefit casting corporate debris on the society the companies are supporting.
The importance for the law in raising directorial standards is to first recognise its own limitations 
both legal and cultural respecting not only that the provision has to be used but that there is 
consensus amongst those it affects that it is desired or at least respected. This is the philosophy 
underlying the implementation of the non-statutory codes. Yet there is also a requirement for a 
degree of prescription affording guidance as to the director and providing confidence to all those 
within the corporate nexus that their interest may not be first but is at lest equitably dealt with by 
the law.
Wrongful trading is at best a backstop which can be utilised in the face of no other alternative but 
at worst can be viewed as a semantic artefact which filled a legal commitment at a particular time 
in commercial history. Society wanted the freedom to trade but wanted the legal protection to 
ensure that everyone with which they traded not only exercised the same degree of skill and care 
but that they could exercise it and wanted to. This clearly does not reflect the possible reality of 
the commercial world or of those that trade in it.
The future of governance stands at a vulnerable cross roads as the political climate within the UK 
becomes increasingly sensitive to the well being of shareholders who now both directly and 
indirectly form such a substantial part of the electorate. Its future depends on the ability of the 
legislature to provide a pro active basis which will first define both the role and the legal 
responsibility of those within the corporate nexus, even if that entails redefining the status of a
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particular corporation based on its size and share structure. The implementation of commercial 
standards will then be able to recognise more clearly, the objective of creating that standard, 
which in turn reflects the broadening of the corporation's role in society.
In achieving an improved governance structure the metaphysical nature of the concept of 
governance and of the institutions to which it attaches is paramount. The appropriate regulations 
must defer to the reasonable capacity of a particular corporation and less to any one particular 
group in the corporate nexus which it serves. In allowing the corporation to evolve itself in to a 
more socially based institution as well as a profit making machine, this could be met with 
approval from those within the corporate nexus who because of the cultural background in which 
the institution has developed, has regarded internal attrition amongst those in the corporate nexus 
as being the prerequisite to creating a corporation with both determination and gravitas. This 
need not be so.
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